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In this thesis, we study algorithms which can be used to extract, or learn, formal
mathematical models from software systems and then using these models to test
whether the given software systems satisfy certain security properties such as ro-
bustness against code injection attacks. Specifically, we focus in studying learning
algorithms for automata and transducers and the symbolic extensions of these mod-
els, namely symbolic finite automata (SFAs). In a high level, this thesis contributes
the following results:
1. In the first part of the thesis, we present a unified treatment of many common
variations of the seminal L⇤ algorithm for learning deterministic finite automata
(DFAs) as a congruence learning algorithm for the underlying Nerode congru-
ence which forms the basis of automata theory. Under this formulation the
basic data structures used by different variations are unified as different ways
to implement the Nerode congruence using queries.
2. Next, building on the new formulation of L⇤-style algorithms we proceed to
develop new algorithms for learning transducer models. Firstly, we present the
first algorithm for learning deterministic partial transducers. Furthermore, we
extend my algorithm into non-deterministic models by introducing a novel, gen-
eralized congruence relation over string transformations which is able to capture
a subclass of string transformations with regular lookahead. We demonstrate
that this class is able to capture many practical string transformation from the
domain of string sanitizers in Web applications.
3. Classical learning algorithms for automata and transducers operate over finite
alphabets and have a query complexity that scales linearly with the size of the
alphabet. However, in practice, this dependence on the alphabet size hinders
the performance of the algorithms. To address this issue, we develop theMAT ⇤
algorithm for learning symbolic finite state automata (s-FAs) which operate over
infinite alphabets. In practice, the MAT ⇤ learning algorithm allow us to plug
custom transition learning algorithms which will efficiently infer the predicates
in the transitions of the s-FA without querying the whole alphabet set.
4. Finally, we use our learning algorithm toolbox as the basis for the development
of a set of black-box testing algorithms. More specifically, we present Gram-
mar Oriented Filter Auditing (GOFA), a novel technique which allows one to
utilize my learning algorithms to evaluate the robustness of a string sanitizer
or filter against a set of attack strings given as a context free grammar. Fur-
thermore, because such grammars are many times unavailable, we developed
sfadiff a differential testing technique based on symbolic automata learning
which can be used in order to perform differential testing of two different parser
implementations using s-FA learning algorithms and we demonstrate how our
algorithm can be used to develop program fingerprints. We evaluate our al-
gorithms against state-of-the-art Web Application Firewalls and discover over
15 previously unknown vulnerabilities which result in evading the firewalls and
performing code injection attacks in the backend Web application. Finally, we
show how our learning algorithms can uncover vulnerabilities which are missed
by other black-box methods such as fuzzing and grammar-based testing.
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In modern years, the wide adoption of computer systems in every aspect of our lives
have revolutionized modern societies. From the Internet revolution, to self-driving
cars and heart pacemakers which are remotely controlled by software systems, our
lives are becoming more and more dependent on the correct functionality of the
software and hardware systems we develop.
In this computer-dependent world, the development of tools and algorithms which
allow us to analyze properties of software and hardware systems is of paramount
importance. However, due to it’s generality, this problem is very difficult to tackle
effectively. In it’s more general mathematical form the problem is unsolvable in a
formidable manner: the famous Rice’s theorem [74] from the early 1950s, states that
any non-trivial semantic property of a computer program is undecidable. Here, by
non-trivial semantic property we basically mean any program property which cannot
be derived simply by the syntactic structure of the program, i.e. it depends on the
semantics of the program.
In order to cope with undecidability, the research community developed a large
body of approximation techniques such as the seminal abstract interpretation [29]
framework, where the program is analyzed with respect to an abstract domain and
then the program is executed with respect to some abstract semantics which are
easier to analyze. In more general terms, the main avenue of research in order to
prove program properties is the following: Initially, we use a simpler computational
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model which can be analyzed efficiently with respect to the desired property and then,
we construct an approximation of the original program in the selected computational
model and analyze the approximation instead of the original program. Constructing
the approximation is usually performed with specialized algorithms such as static
analysis algorithms.
This thesis will follow the same general avenue of research however, we will study a
different way of constructing the approximations of the system to be analyzed. More
specifically, we develop novel active learning algorithms which can be used to extract
formal models from software systems by actively querying the target system, produc-
ing a model of the system and finally, refining the model using counterexamples, i.e.
inputs where the output of the model is not consistent with the output of the target
system. This learning model, which is called learning with a minimally adequate
teacher (MAT), is a natural learning model where the algorithm is able to ask the
target system queries with arbitrary inputs and obtain the output of the system in
these queries and moreover, to test whether a candidate model is correct or obtain a
counterexample.
In terms of formal models, we will utilize finite automata for modelling programs
with binary output and transducers (automata with output) in order to model gen-
eral programs. Automata and transducers are among the most fundamental com-
putational models since they present nice algebraic properties, efficient computation
of many properties and moreover, they are expressive enough in order to model or
approximate many important real-life functionalities such as parsers and string trans-
formation routines.
The field of active learning algorithms for automata and transducers was moti-
vated by a series of negative results which proved NP-Hardness of Ocam-razor style
learning algorithms for deterministic finite automata [42] . In 1989, Dana Angluin
presented the seminal L⇤ algorithm [14] which was the first algorithm which can learn
deterministic finite automata using membership and equivalence queries in polyno-
mial time and using a polynomial number of queries. Since then, this algorithm has
spawn a large number of variations and optimizations as well as a number of applica-
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tions in various domains. In the first part of this thesis, we will study the L⇤ family
of algorithms under an algebraic automata-theoretic view; the main advantage of this
new formulation of the algorithm is the unification of the main data structures which
by this type of algorithms such as the observation table and the classification tree as
data structures which implement the Nerode congruence relation using queries. Once
these data structures are abstracted away and the algorithm is explained in terms of
extending a congruence relation, we can greatly simplify the analysis and presentation
of the whole family of L⇤ algorithms.
Next, we move to our first novel algorithm. Specifically, we present a novel L⇤-
style algorithm for learning deterministic partial transducers. While learning total
deterministic transducers can be achieved using a simple extension to the original
L⇤ algorithm, once we introduce partiality the learning process becomes much more
challenging. To address this problem, we develop an independent algorithm which
can be used to infer the output of each transition in a single-valued transducer given
the underlying state machine of the transducer. Afterwards, we extend the syntactic
congruence which forms the equivalent of the Nerode congruence for transducers into
a generalized form which can model string transformations functions with regular
lookahead and provide an instantiation of our generalized congruence which gives rise
to a canonical class of non-deterministic transducers. Finally, we provide an extension
of our deterministic learning algorithm for this new class of transducers.
Afterwards, we demonstrate the applicability of our novel learning algorithms in
the domain of string sanitizers for Web applications. We demonstrate that our novel
class of non-deterministic class can capture a large number of string transformations
which are used by popular string sanitization frameworks such as the Internet Explorer
and Edge XSS filters. To the best of our knowledge our learning algorithm is the first
that can efficiently infer models of such string transformations which can then be
used for further analysis of the sanitization routines.
L⇤ and other similar algorithms work primarily over a finite alphabet ⌃ and the
number of queries performed by the algorithm scales linearly with the size of the
alphabet. However, when we want to use this type of algorithms in order to learn
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models of parsers and string transformation routines we need to be able to operate
our learning algorithms using very large alphabet such as UTF-16 which includes
216 symbols. In order to address this significant scalability issue, we extend the L⇤
algorithm into symbolic automata (s-FA). Symbolic automata have transitions which
operate over predicates instead of individual characters and can therefore represent
regular languages over infinite alphabets. In the next chapter of the thesis, we present
the MAT ⇤ algorithm which can learn s-FAs over any boolean algebra which is also
learnable using membership and equivalence query. We demonstrate that MAT ⇤
allows us to scale automata learning algorithms efficiently into alphabets such as
UTF-16. Another important practical implication of this algorithm is the capability
to plug any learning algorithm for inferring the transitions of the s-FA independently
of the learning algorithm which learns the congruence. We demonstrate this point by
presenting and analyzing a statistical learning algorithm which infers the predicates
in each transitions by learning from a data-set of s-FAs. Finally, beyond the practical
implications of our algorithm we demonstrate how our algorithm provides an almost
complete characterization of the set of efficiently learnable s-FAs.
Now that we have developed a comprehensive toolbox of learning algorithms, our
next goal is to develop techniques and algorithms which will allow us to use these
algorithms for the analysis of systems. We focus in the analysis of Web applications
for code injection attacks. Code injection attacks currently present the primary risk
factor for Web application security. In a nutshell, code injection attacks occur when
the application confuses part of the user input which is intended to be data as code,
therefore changing the semantics of the execution of the Web application code. Code
injection attacks can result in the execution of arbitrary code in the Web server or the
user’s browser, leaking of sensitive information and other severe security implications.
In order to defend against code injection attacks, Web applications employ a number
of different lines of defenses. In this thesis we will focus primarily on two popular
defense mechanisms: (1) Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) and string sanitizers.
Web Application Firewalls work as a generic defense mechanism and they are
generally deployed independently of the Web Application. While many different ar-
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chitectures are available, in their most common form, web application firewalls act
as a parser which tries to detect whether an input to the Web application contains a
code injection (or other) attack and in this case the request is dropped from further
processing by the application. On the other hand, string sanitizers work by taking
as input an input to the application which is “unsanitized” and through a series of
string transformations such as removing potentially dangerous part of the input and
encoding certain sensitive characters, transform the input into a “sanitized” input
which is safe for further processing by the Web application.
Our main goal is to use our learning algorithm in order to extract models of
Web Application Firewalls and String sanitizers and analyze their robustness against
code injection attacks. The first setting we consider is the Grammar Oriented Filter
Auditing (GOFA) problem. In the GOFA setting we are given a context free grammar
G which describes the set of attack strings for a particular code injection attack. For
example, consider the class of SQL Injection attacks; then, the context free grammar
G can be the set of valid continuations to SQL statements that start with a particular
prefix. Given such a grammar the GOFA problem asks to find a string s belonging
to G such that s is bypassing the filter or sanitization routine. We will demonstrate
that, by using the context free grammar G in order to simulate an equivalence query
as follows: given a model inferred by our learning algorithms, we use the model to see
if there exists any string s 2 G which bypasses our inferred model. If such an input is
found, then we test the candidate attack against the actual filter or sanitizer. If the
attack succeeds then we have effectively solved the problem. Otherwise, notice that
the string s is a counterexample to our model and therefore can be used to further
refine the model.
While the GOFA algorithm can be used to efficiently test the robustness of filters
and sanitizers in a black-box manner when the grammar G is available, such a detailed
description of the set of attack strings is often not available or not accurate enough
in order to thoroughly test the robustness of firewalls and sanitizers against code
injection attacks. For example, in order to thoroughly evaluate the robustness of Cross
Site Scripting (XSS) filters and sanitizers one would need a grammar describing the
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set of HTML statements which result in Javascript execution. However, the HTML
standard is implemented quite differently by each different browser and these small
variations actually play a significant role in the evaluation of the robustness of string
sanitizers and filters. To address this important issue we develop SFADiff a technique
building on top of our GOFA algorithm. In a nutshell, instead of being given the
grammar G as an input to the GOFA algorithm, we utilize our learning algorithms
in order to infer the set of attack strings. For example instead of using the HTML
standard as the set of attack strings for the GOFA algorithm, we can utilize our
learning algorithms to infer regular approximations of the HTML standard parsed by
different browsers. Finally, we show how these techniques can be also used in order
to generate program fingerprints which can be used to distinguish between different
implementations using only black-box queries.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our GOFA and SFADIff algorithms we
use our algorithms to evaluate the robustness of popular Web Application Firewalls
against common code injection attacks such as SQL Injection (SQLi) and Cross Site
Scripting (XSS). Our GOFA algorithm is able to find more than 10 previously un-
known bypasses against Mod-Security, the most popular open source WAF, while our
SFADiff algorithm found 6 different XSS attacks bypassing PHPIDS and Expose two
popular WAFs. Moreover, we demonstrate how our algorithms can be used to built
a fingerprint tree which can be used in order to distinguish between different WAF
products using only black-box queries. Finally, we demonstrate that, when used in
conjunction with our transducer learning algorithm, the GOFA algorithm can un-
cover sophisticated recursive XSS attacks against sanitizers. We showcase this point
by demonstrating how our system can bypass a sanitization function in a popular
PHP application and construct a valid XSS attack.
1.1 Bibliographical Note
The results presented in this thesis have been also peer reviewed and presented in
the following conferences: The GOFA algorithm along with a preliminary version of
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the MAT* algorithm were presented under the title “Back in Black: Towards Formal
Black-box Analysis of Sanitizers and Filters” in the “2016 IEEE Symposium on Secu-
rity and Privacy”. The SFADiff extension was presented under the title “SFADiff: Au-
tomated Evasion Attacks and Fingerprinting using Black-box Differential Automata
Learning” in the “Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
and Communications Security”. The MAT* algorithm was presented under the title
“The Learnability of Symbolic Automata” in “2018 International Conference on Com-






Hardness of Automata Learning. Active learning algorithms for Deterministic
Finite Automata and other related classes were initated after a series of negative re-
sults on various passive learning models. Gold [42] shows that finding the minimum
DFA consistent with a set of samples is NP-Hard while, a few years later, the problem
was shown to be NP-Hard to approximate within any polynomial [72]. Moreover, a
representation-independant hardness result for learning automata based on crypto-
graphic assumptions was proven by Kearns and Valiant [52]. Even in the case where
access to membership queries is provided, certain models such as non-deterministic
finite automata, context free grammars, unions of DFAs and others remain hard to
learn [16].
The L⇤ Algorithm. In order to cope with hardness results, Angluin [14] intro-
duced the Minimally Adequate Teacher (MAT) learning model and the L⇤ algorithm.
After its introduction, Anlguin’s algorithm was improved and many variations were in-
troduced; Rivest and Schapire [75] showed how to improve the query complexity of the
algorithm and introduced the binary search method for processing counterexamples.
The classification tree data structure was introduced by Kearns and Vazirani [53].
Balcazar et al. [18] describe a general approach to view the different variations of
Angluin’s algorithm. Isberner et al. [51] recently developed the TTT algorithm which
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provide a space optimal variation of the L⇤ algorithm which also contributes practical
improvements in the classification tree data structure by rearranging the nodes of the
tree. Implementations for most variations of the L⇤ algorithm can be found in the
LearnLib library [73].
Extensions to other models. A large number of extensions to classical au-
tomata exist with different properties and applications and extensions of the L⇤ algo-
rithm have been developed for such models as well. Residual Finite State Automata
(RFSA) [35] are canonical non-deterministic automata which can be exponentially
more succint than DFAs. A learning algorithm for RFSAs was developed by Bollig
et al. [22]. Adaptations of the L⇤ were also developed for alternating [15] and nom-
inal [63] which are more expressive than the classical deterministic finite automata.
Finally, another important model is register automata [25] which are canonical au-
tomata models which incorporate restricted use of registers and for which different
learning algorithms were developed [49, 13].
Other learning algorithms. Beyond the setting of active learning, the RPNI
algorithm [67] is usually employed in order to learn deterministic finite automata
from a set of samples. The algorithm will learn a correct DFA when a characteristic
sample of the regular language is provided (identification in the limit). Finally, a
line of work on kernel methods for identifying regular languages was developed more
recently [28, 55].
Learning transducers. Transducers were introduced as a mathematical object
by Marcel-Paul Schutzenberger and were used extensively in the past in natural lan-
guage processing [64]. However, lately transducers (and their extensions) have seen
extensive applications in the field of programming languages as an underlying formal-
ism for many domain specific languages [47, 41, 61]. A minimization algorithm for
deterministic finite state transducers was developed by Mohri [65].
An adaptation of the L⇤ algorithm to transducers [84] and Mealy machines [77]
were introduced after the development of the L⇤ algorithm. A general treatment of
the field of grammatical inference can be found in [33]. An algorithm for learning non-
deterministic Mealy machines was developed in [54], however, the algorithm required
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a stronger type of queries than output queries and has an exponential running time.
The OSTIA algorithm is a popular passive learning algorithm for total transducers
developed by Oncina et al. [68].
2.2 Symbolic Automata and Transducers
Symbolic automata and transducer were initially introduced to cope with large alpha-
bets that were used in regular expressions and as a theoretical tool to reason about
automata with infinite alphabets. This line of work was initiated with the introduc-
tion of symbolic automata [82], although similar constructions were suggested much
earlier [86]. The introduction of symbolic finite state transducers (SFTs) followed
shortly afterwards with the developed of BEK [48], a domain specific language for
string sanitizers while the corresponding theory can be found in a follow up work
by Bjorner et al. [21]. A minimization algorithm for symbolic automata was devel-
oped by D’Antoni and Veanes [31] while a minimization for symbolic transducers was
developed by Saarikivi and Veanes [76]. Extensions to richer symbolic models and
domain specific languages were developed in the following years [37, 83, 81, 32]. A
general survey of the field of symbolic automata and transducers can be found in [39].
Learning Symbolic Automata and Transducers. In the inference of sym-
bolic automata and transducers there are two relevant recent works. Botincan and
Babic [23] used symbolic execution in combination with the Shabaz-Groz algorithm
in order to infer symbolic models of programs as symbolic lookback transducers. Al-
though the authors claim that equivalence of symbolic lookback transducers(SLT) is
decidable a paper published recently by D’Antoni and Veanes [38] shows that equiv-
alence of SLTs is in fact undecidable. The problem of learning regular languages over
large alphabets has attracted attention even before the introduction of symbolic au-
tomata through various techniques such as alphabet refinement [50] and parametric
languages [20]. The first algorithm to address learning of symbolic automata was
developed by Maller and Mens [60], however the algorithm assumed the existence of
an equivalence oracle which provides counterexamples of minimal length.
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2.3 Applications of Automata Learning
In the context of testing, automata learning algorithms were used in order to infer
specifications for model checking, a concept called black-box checking [70, 43]. The
Vasileski-Chow algorithm [27], an algorithm for checking compliance of two automata,
given an upper bound on the size of the black-box automaton. This algorithm how-
ever, has a worst case exponential complexity a fact which makes it impractical for
real applications. Another important area of application for automata learning ap-
plication is learning models of network protocols. Recent examples include learning
and model checking models of the SSH protocol [40], learning TLS/SSL state ma-
chines [34], botnet command and control centers [26] and TLS hostname verification
routines [79]. Finally, we point out that a general review of applications of automata
learning algorithms is presented in a recent review article [80].
2.4 Web Application Analysis
There is a large body of work regarding whitebox program analysis techniques that
aim at validating the security of sanitizer code. The SANER [19] project uses static
and dynamic analysis to create finite state transducers which are overapproximations
of the sanitizer functions of programs. Minamide [62] constructs a string analyzer
for PHP which is used to detect vulnerabilities such as cross site scripting. He also
describes a classification of various PHP functions according to the automaton model
needed to describe them. The Reggae system [58] attempts to generate high coverage
test cases with symbolic execution for systems that use complex regular expressions.
Wasserman and Su [85] utilize Context free grammars to construct overapproxima-
tions of the output of a web application. Their approach could be used in order to
implement a grammar which can then be used as an equivalence oracle when applying





In this section, we will provide a general introduction to the formal models we will
use in this thesis. For a more complete description of basic concepts we recommend
basic theory of computation textbooks [57].
3.1 Strings and Languages
Given a set ⌃, ⌃⇤ denotes the set of all finite sequences of elements over ⌃. We
do not distinguish here between ⌃ and unit-length sequences in ⌃⇤, assuming thus
that ⌃ \ ⌃⇤ = ⌃. The empty sequence is denoted by ✏. We frequently refer to ⌃ as
an alphabet, its elements are called characters and sequences of characters are called
strings. We write s, t, u, v, w for strings and a, b, c,↵,  ,   for characters. We let x, y, z
range over characters as well as strings. For any integers m and n let [m..n] denote
the range {i | m  i  n}. Given a bottom element ? /2 ⌃⇤ we write ⌃⇤? for ⌃⇤[{?}.
We use   similarly to ⌃. We use ⌃ for input alphabets and   for output alphabets
of string functions. We denote the Boolean domain as B = {T,F}.
The length of a string s is denoted by |s|. For s 2 ⌃⇤ and i 2 [1..|s|], let s[i..] be
the suffix of s from position i, let s[..i] be the prefix of s upto position i, and let s[i]
be the character at position i.
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3.1.1 String Operations.
For u, v, w 2 ⌃⇤ and a 2 ⌃ we define the following operations:
– u 2 v: u is a prefix of v; u   v means u 2 v and u 6= v.
– v 3 u: u is a suffix of v; v   u means v 3 u and u 6= v.
– u u v: the maximal common prefix of u and v; u u ? = u and ? u v = v.
– u t v: the maximal common suffix of u and v; u t ? = u and ? t v = v.
– u·v (or uv for short): the product (concatenation) of u with v.
– for k   1, i 2 [1..k], vi 2 ⌃⇤, let
Nk
i=1 vi denote the generalized product
v1·v2 · · · vk.
– if w = u·v then w   v def= u (right division of w by v).
– if w = u·v then u   w def= v (left division of w by u).
– if L ✓ ⌃⇤ then prefixes(L) def= {v | 9u 2 L.v 2 u}; L is prefix closed if
prefixes(L) = L.
Let ? 2 ? but, forall u 2 ⌃⇤, ? 62 u and u 62 ?. For all operations, other than u
and t, the result is ? whenever some argument is ?. Given a function f : ⌃⇤ !  ⇤?,
the domain of f is dom(f) def= {v 2 ⌃⇤ | f(v) 6= ?}, f is monotone when forall
u, v 2 dom(f) if u 2 v then f(u) 2 f(v). The following properties are used.
Proposition 1. Let X be a nonempty subset of strings. There exist fixed witnesses
w1, w2 2 X such that
d
X = w1 u w2 and for all x 2 X either
d
X = x u w1 ord
X = x u w2.
3.1.2 Regular Expressions
Given a fixed finite alphabet ⌃ we make use of standard notation of regular expressions
(over ⌃) and if r is a regular expression then [[r]] is the corresponding language that
r denotes. For example, [[.*]] = ⌃⇤ and [[[^a].*|()]] is the set of all strings that do
not start with character a, provided for example that ⌃ is ASCII.
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3.1.3 Derivatives
Given character a 2 ⌃ and language L ✓ ⌃⇤, the derivative of L with respect to a
is the language a0L def= {v 2 ⌃⇤ | a·v 2 L}. L is nullable if ✏ 2 L. When we work
with regular languages, we make use of the property that any derivative of a regular
language is also regular. For example b0[[[^a].*|()]] = [[.*]] and a0[[[^a].*|()]] = ;.
3.1.4 Automata
We will now proceed to define finite state automata which form the basis of the models
we study in this thesis.
Definition 1. A finite automaton (FA) is a tuple A = (Q, q0, F,  ) where Q is the set
of states, q0 2 Q is the initial state, F ✓ Q is the set of final states and   ⇢ Q⇥⌃⇥Q
is the transition relation.
In this thesis, we will work primarily with deterministic finite automata(DFA),
where determinism is defined as follows:
Definition 2. A finite automaton A = (Q, q0, F,  ) is deterministic if and only if
(q,↵, p) 2   ^ (q,↵, p0) 2  , then we have that p = p0.
In other words, a finite automaton is deterministic if and only if every transition
from a state on a specific input symbol have a unique target state.
An important property of deterministic finite automata (and FA automata in
general) is that they form a Boolean algebra, i.e. they are closed under the boolean
operations of intersection,union and negation. Moreover, equivalence of DFAs can be
efficiently checked in time O(n log n) and emptiness can be also checked efficiently.
These properties make DFAs an attractive model for analyzing programs.
3.1.5 Transducers
A transducer is a tuple A = (⌃, , Q, q0, F, , ) where ⌃ is the input alphabet,   is




















Figure 3-1: Examples of automata and transducers. (left:) A deterministic finite
automaton accepting the language <[>ˆ]*>. (middle:) A partial deterministic trans-
ducer. (right:) A total functional non-deterministic transducer that removes HTML
tags.
of final states,   ✓ Q ⇥ ⌃ ⇥  ⇤ ⇥ Q is the transition relation,   2  ⇤ is the output
prefix. A is finite if all of its components are finite.
We let p a/u  ! q denote (p, a, u, q) 2  . Transducer A is a simple computational
model which consumes input symbols and produces output symbols. Let the transitive
closure of the transition relation of A, denoted  ⇤, be the least subset T of Q⇥⌃⇤⇥
 ⇤ ⇥Q such that
– if q 2 Q then (q, ✏, ✏, q) 2 T ;
– if pi 1




i=1 ui, pk) 2 T .
A state q is reachable if there exist u and v such that (q0, u, v, q) 2  ⇤; we say that u
accesses q. A state q is live if there exist u and v and p 2 F such (q, u, v, p) 2  ⇤; we
say that u is enabled from q. Transducer A is said to be trim if all of its states are
reachable and live. For each state q 2 Q let the transduction of A (from q) denoted
TA (T qA) be the following subset of ⌃⇤ ⇥  ⇤,
T qA def= {(u, v) | 9p 2 F.(q, u, v, p) 2  ⇤}, TA def= {(u, ·v) | (u, v) 2 T q0A }.
The domain of A, dom(A), is the set of all u such that there exists some v
such that (u, v) 2 TA. A is total when dom(A) = ⌃⇤ and partial otherwise. A is
functional if, for all u 2 ⌃⇤ there is at most one v 2  ⇤ such that (u, v) 2 TA. A
is deterministic if, for all q 2 QA and a 2 ⌃ there exist at most one u and p such
that (q, a, u, p) 2  . If A is deterministic then A is also functional. Figure 3-1(right)
shows a trim total nondeterministic functional finite state transducer. Figure 3-
1(left) is deterministic and partial. In this paper, we are going to work exclusively
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with functional transducers. For functional transducers A we adopt the view of the
transduction of A as a partial function over ⌃⇤ or, because it is more convenient to
work with total functions, as a function from ⌃⇤ to  ⇤? such that for all u 2 ⌃⇤, if
u 2 dom(A) and (u, v) 2 TA then TA(u) = v, and if u /2 dom(A) then TA(u) = ?.
Earliest Normal Form
For q 2 Q define bq as the greatest common prefix of all the outputs originating from
q, i.e., bq def= d{v | 9p 2 F : 9u 2 ⌃⇤ : (q, u, v, p) 2  ⇤}. We let d ; def= ?, so thatbq = ? when q is not live. Observe that bq = ✏ for all q 2 F because (q, ✏, ✏, q) 2  ⇤
for all q. The earliest normal form of A or ENF(A) is defined as follows.
ENF(A) def= (⌃, , Q, q0, F, {(p, a, bp   (u·bq), q) | (p, a, u, q) 2  }, ·bq0).
Observe that bp 2 u·bq for all (p, a, u, q) 2   so the output bp   (u·bq) is indeed well-
defined.
3.1.6 Context Free Grammars
A straightforward generatlization to automata and transducers is the addition of a
stack to the corresponding models. The corresponding models are called pushdown
automata and transducers and they are one of the most classic models which combine
rich expressive properties with low complexity. An equivalent definition of pushdown
automata is given through context free grammars which we will extensively in order
to provide formal specifications of attacks.
Definition 3. A Context Free Grammar (CFG) G is a 4-tuple G = (V,⌃, R, S) where
V is the set of non-terminals, ⌃ is the set of terminals, R ✓ V ⇥ (V [ ⌃)⇤ is the set
of productions and S 2 V is the initial symbol.
While certain properties of CFGs are undecidable such as computing whether two
grammars are equivalent, other important properties can be computed in polynomial
time. Important for our applications is the computation of the intersection between a
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Figure 3-2: The Minimally Adequate Teacher (MAT) learning model.
CFG and a DFA which can be performed in polynomial time and moreover, checking
a CFG for emptiness which can also be performed in polynomial time.
3.2 Learning Model
The algorithms described in this paper are active learning algorithms operating in
a learning model called learning with a Minimally Adequate Teacher (MAT) and
also learning from membership and equivalence queries [14, 53]. Under this model, a
learning algorithm which is learning a target function f : ⌃⇤ !  ⇤ [ {?} is given the
ability to perform two types of queries:
• Output queries: Also called membership queries in the case f is a boolean
function. For any input s 2 ⌃⇤, an output query will return the value of the
function f(s).
• Equivalence queries: Once the learning algorithm generates a candidate
model h for the function f , an equivalence query is performed to verify cor-
rectness of the model. If the model is correct, i.e. for all s 2 ⌃⇤ we have that
f(s) = h(s) then, the query will return T. Otherwise, a counterexample c 2 ⌃⇤
is provided such that f(c) 6= h(c).
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Relation to PAC learning. The most traditional learning model used in learning
theory is the Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) model. In this model, a learning
algorithm have no query access to the target function and only receives samples from
the function according to some target distribution. The goal of the learning algorithm
is to output a hypothesis (i.e. model) which, with high probability, has a small error
on future samples from the same distribution. Under this model, even deterministic
finite automata are hard to learn under cryptographic assumptions [52]. However,
with a simple reduction [53] one can show that the existence of a MAT algorithm for
a class of functions implies that the function is PAC-learnable when output queries




Automata and transducers are computational models based on simple state ma-
chine graphs. However, these graphs can be perceived as emerging from algebraic
equivalence properties of the underlying function which is computed by the automa-
ton or the transducer. When we consider the state machines which are emerging from
these underlying equivalence properties we obtain normal forms for the automata and
transducers computing a specific function. More importantly, all the learning algo-
rithms in the L⇤ family of algorithms, can be viewed as algorithms which iteratively
learn the underlying equivalence relation and indeed, under this view, many concepts
and data structures in the learning algorithms arise naturally under this formulation
of the problem.
We will start this chapter by describing the Nerode congruence which forms the
basis for regular languages and then proceed to describe the syntactic congruence
from which canonical forms of transducers arise. Finally, we will discuss how all these
equivalence relations can be defined through their negations, a fact which form the
basis of learning.
4.1 Equivalence Relations
Before describing the equivalence relations which form the basis of automata and
transducers we will first give a refreshment of equivalence relations.
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Definition 4 (Equivalence relation). A binary relation ⇠ over a set X is said to be
an equivalence relation if and only if the following hold for any a, b, c 2 X:
1. Reflexivity: a ⇠ a.
2. Symmetry: a ⇠ b =) b ⇠ a.
3. Transitivity: If a ⇠ b and b ⇠ c, then a ⇠ c.
Despite the fact that the relations we will describe next are dumped congruences,
they are primarily equivalence relations over strings.
4.2 Nerode Congruence
Despite the fact that automata were introduced in 1943, the algebraic underlying
of automata theory came more than one decade later by Myhil and Nerode who,
independently, showed that DFAs, and therefore regular languages, can be viewed as
emerging from an equivalence relation over strings with respect to the target language.
We will now formally define the Nerode Congruence:
Definition 5 (Nerode Congruence). Let f : ⌃⇤ ! B be a boolean function. Given
two strings u, v 2 ⌃⇤ the Nerode congruence is defined as follows:
u ⇠ v def() 8w 2 ⌃⇤ : f(uw) = f(vw) (4.1)
It is easy to verify that the Nerode congruence is an equivalence relation. A ⇠-
equivalence class is denoted by hui/⇠ or hui when ⇠ is clear from the context, and
given S ✓ ⌃⇤, hSi def= {hxi | x 2 S}. Given the congruence, one can construct the
corresponding DFA as follows:
DFA(f) def= (h⌃⇤i, h✏i, h{u | f(u) = T}i, {hui a ! hu·ai | u 2 ⌃⇤, a 2 ⌃})
It follows that DFA(f) is a minimal DFA for f . Notice that the congruence relation
can be defined for any function f regardless of whether the function is regular or not.
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The seminal theorem proved by Myhill and Nerode shows that when the number of
equivalence classes in this congruence relation is finite then the corresponding function
is regular.
Theorem 1 (Myhill-Nerode). Let f : ⌃⇤ ! B be an arbitrary function. Then, f is
regular if and only if the number of equivalence classes in the corresponding Nerode
congruence is finite.
4.3 Syntactic Congruence
Like automata, transducers can emerge from a similar underlying congruence relation
like the Nerode congruence. While the main idea is again to force state equivalence
with respect to the behavior of the target function on the set of different suffixes, here
we have to take into account the fact that an output is produced during each step of
the computation. The syntactic congruence is an equivalence relation which defines
state equivalence with respect to general outputs.
Fix f : ⌃⇤ !  ⇤?. Define bf(u) as the output prefix of f that depends only on
input prefix u and define fu as the continuation function of f after input u that cuts




f(u·w), fu(w) def= bf(u)   f(u·w), u ⇠ v def() fu = fv (4.2)
One can now construct a transducer from f , Tf ,
Tf def= (⌃, , h⌃⇤i, h✏i, hdom(f)i, {hui a/ f (u,a)     ! hu·ai | u 2 ⌃⇤, a 2 ⌃},bf(✏))
where  f (u, a)
def
= bf(u)   bf(u·a) is the output produced from state hui for a, provided
that hu·ai is live, else  f (u, a) def= ✏. One can show that Tf is in ENF and also minimal.
The following basic property holds for the output function.
Proposition 2. For any u 2 ⌃⇤ we have that d↵2⌃  (u,↵) = ✏.
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Intuition. While the Nerode congruence is largely self explained, in the sense
that state equivalence basically imply that two strings have the same behavior with
respect to the function f irrespectively from the suffix. However, in the syntactic
congruence the definition is more convoluted. The main idea behind the syntactic
congruence is to define the concept of “the output produced so far by the function f ”
without invoking the concept of a transducer or states. In a deterministic transducer
it is evident that given a common prefix the output produced up to that point will
be the same irrespective of the suffixes used. This concept is captured formally in the
syntactic congruence using the bf(u) term, which provides the common prefix over an
infinite number of suffixes and this way provides a definition of the “output produced
so far”. Once we have this definition, state equivalence is defined as equality of the
output produced by the different suffixes.
4.4 Distinguishing predicates
Both the Nerode and the Syntactic congruence require the computation of the function
on an infinite number of inputs (suffixes). Therefore, unless an explicit form of the
congruence is given such as a DFA or a transducer, using simply queries to the target
function, as in the case of learning, is impossible to decide whether two strings are
equivalent. For this reason, Instead of reasoning directly about it we reason about its
negation through witnesses of distinguishability. As we will show, both congruences
can be computed efficiently when a set of distinguishing predicates is avaiable. For
the following we will consider a congruence to be either the syntactic or the Nerode
congruence.
A predicate  (x) over strings distinguishes s and t (or distinguishes hsi and hti)
–  (s) 6,  (t)
– for all u, v 2 ⌃⇤ if u ⇠ v then  (u),  (v)
In other words a distinguishing predicate separates at least two congruence classes.
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For every finite equivalence relation there exists a finite set of predicates which dis-
tinguishes between all the different equivalence classes.
We use a set R of strings that represent distinct congruence classes. One can show
that R can be chosen to be prefix closed, intuitively elements of R are access strings
to distinguishable states. A set   of predicates is saturated for R if for all s, t 2 R
there exists   2   such that   distinguishes s and t.
Given a saturated set   for a congruence relation ⇠ we can then compute the
congruence relation between u, v 2 ⌃⇤ as follows:




For the remainder of the paper we will commonly define a congruence relation as
(R, ) with respect to a prefix closed set of representatives R of ⇠ and a saturated
set   of predicates.
4.5 Black-box distinguishability
Now that we defined distinguishing predicates we will describe the type of predi-
cates which can be used in order to distinguish equivalence classes in the case of the
congruences we have defined so far.
4.5.1 Nerode Congruence
In the case of the Nerode congruence distinguishing between equivalence classes is
straightforward. Let Pdomw def= (f(w) = T). Then, it follows from the definition of
equivalence that
u 6⇠ v =) 9w, f(uw) 6= f(vw)
Therefore, it follows that for every two equivalence classes hui, hvi there exists a













Figure 4-1: Partial transducer.
4.5.2 Syntactic Congruence
Black-box distinguishability in transducers has been studied implicitly in the context
of Mealy machine and total transducer learning algorithms [77, 17]. In Mealy ma-
chines, exactly one output symbol is produced for each input symbol and therefore,
checking the suffix of certain length suffices in order to extract the corresponding
output produced. On the other hand, in the case of total transducers we have thatbf(u) = f(u) and therefore, the value fu(w) can be computed as fu(w) = f(u)   f(uw).
It is therefore natural to ask whether similar checks are enough to determine
the output fu(w) for some suffix w in the general setting of partial transducers as
well. However, as the following example demonstrates, such simple suffix checks are
inherently unable to distinguish between different states.
Example 1. Let f be the underlying function of the transducer Tf shown in figure 4-
1. Then bf(a) = f(aa) u f(ab) = d and bf(b) = f(bb) u f(ba) = ✏. Here q0 = h✏i,
q1 = hai, q2 = hbi and q3 = haai. We have that
fa(a) = bf(a)   f(aa) = d   dd = d, fa(b) = c,
fb(a) = bf(b)   f(ba) = ✏   dd = dd, fb(b) = c
States hai and hbi are distinguishable with the input suffix a, but there is no position
conflict which is detectable between them because fb(w) 3 fa(w) for all w. However,
notice that since f(aa) = f(ba) = dd, no simple suffix check is capable of using this
input to distinguish between the states accessed by a and b respectively. ⇥
Example 1 is important because it demonstrates that simple methods of proving
distinguishability in a black-box manner that were used by previous learning algo-
rithms cannot be ported into the setting of partial transducers.
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A class of distinguishing predicates
We now describe a class of predicates which are provably distinguishable for any two
distinct equivalence classes. We start by defining the suffix extraction function J
which can be used to compute fu(w) given only black-box access to the function f .
J (u, w, w1) = (f(u·w) u f(u·w1))   f(u·w) (4.4)
The following lemma establishes the connection between J and fu. It is important also
to note that J (u, w, w1) is effectively computable for any given u, w, w1 because f(x)
is assumed to be effectively computable for any x and the involved string operations
are effectively computable.
Lemma 1. For any u, w 2 ⌃⇤ there exists w1 2 ⌃⇤ such that J (u, w, w1) = fu(w).
Moreover, the following property holds.
Proposition 3. For any u, w, w1, we have that fu(w) 3 J (u, w, w1).
We will now proceed to define two types of distinguishing predicates which can
be used in order to distinguish between different equivalence classes based on either
differences in the domain or in the output.
Domain Distinguishability The first type of distinguishing predicates we will use
are the domain distinguishing predicates Pdomw indexed by a string w 2 ⌃⇤ which were
also used in order to distinguish equivalence classes in the Nerode congruence. In the
context of transducers these predicates are used when we have two equivalence classes
hui, hvi which can be distinguished using a suffix w such that f(uw) 2 dom(f) but
f(vw) 62 dom(f) or vice versa.
Output Distinguishability As we demonstrated in example 1 distiguishing based
on the output after two states is a non-trivial task. In order to complete this task we
utilize the suffix extraction function defined above. In order to distinguish between
two states using the suffix extraction function we choose appropriate w1, w2 such
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that, for two different access strings u, v we have that J (u, w1, w2) 6= J (v, w1, w2).
Since, by lemma 1, we can always find such w1, w2, the suffix extraction function
avoids the problems of simply checking the suffix as in example 1. To convert this
test into a distinguishing predicate, we fix the value that J should have on a fixed
set of strings w1, w2. More specifically, we define the output distinguishing predicate
Poutw1,w2,t(u)
def
= (J (u, w1, w2) = t). It is easy to verify that Poutw1,w2,t for appropriately
chosen w1, w2, t satisfies the definition of a distinguish predicate.
It is important to note that both kind of distinguishing predicates can be effectively
evaluated. The following proposition states that output and domain distinguishing
predicates can be used to distinguish between any s, t 2 R for which there exists w
such that fs(w) 6= ft(w).
Proposition 4. For all s, t 2 R such that s ⌧ t, there exists either a domain dis-
tinguishing predicate or an output distinguishing predicate that distinguishes s from
t.
Proof. In the case that there exist a sequence w such that sw 2 dom(f) but tw 62
dom(f) or vice versa then, it is clear that the domain distinguishing predicate Pdomw
distinguishes s from t. Let us consider the case where s, t have an output conflict,
i.e. there exists w such that fs(w) 6= ft(w). Without loss of generality, we assume
that |fs(w)|   |ft(w)| and choose w1 such that fs(w1) u fs(w) = ✏. We claim that the
output distinguishing predicate Poutw,w1,fs(w) distinguishes s from t. Indeed, consider
the following cases:
• Position conflict. Assume that there exists some position k such that fs(w)[k] 6=
ft(w)[k]. Then, clearly J (s, w, w1) 6= J (t, w, w1).
• Length conflict. Assume that fs(w)   ft(w) or, in other words, that fs(w) =
vft(w) for some v 6= ✏. Then, by proposition 3 we have that |J (t, w, w1)| 
|ft(w)| < |fs(w)| and therefore, it follows that J (t, w, w1) 6= fs(w).
Keep in mind that, since we assumed that |fs(w)|   |ft(w)|, no other case of length
conflict exists.
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Example 2. Let us consider a set of distinguishing predicates which distinguish
between all states in the transducer of figure 4-1. Notice that states q3 and {q0, q1, q2}
are distinguished by the domain predicate Pdom✏ . Moreover, states q0 and {q1, q2} are
distinguished by the domain predicate Pdoma and finally states q1 and q2, which are
indistinguishable using suffix checks, are distinguished by the predicate Pouta,b,d. ⇥
4.6 Building a DFA model
At this point, we have described how we can go from computing the congruence using
an infinite number of suffixes into computing the congruence through distinguishing
predicates which can be done using a bounded number of queries. However, we still
need query access in order to be able to compute the negated representation of the
congruence. We will now describe an algorithm which can be used in order to build
a DFA model of the congruence (either the Nerode or Syntactic) which can be used
withouth querying the target function. While we described such a construction in the
mathematical definition of both congruences, here we will give an explicit algorithmic
form which can be used by the learning algorithms.
Algorithm 1 getDFA Algorithm
Require: (R, ) is a congruence relation, ⌃ is the alphabet
function L⇤(f , (R, ),⌃)
Q  R
q0  ✏
F  {r|r 2 R ^ f(r) = T}
   ;
for r 2 R do
for ↵ 2 ⌃ do
Let r0 be such that r0 ⇠ r↵
     [ (r,↵, r0)
return (Q, q0, F,⌃, )
Given access a congruence (R, ) we can convert the congruence to a DFA repre-
sentation as follows:
• The set of states is the set of equivalence class representatives Q = R.
27
• The initial state is q0 = ✏.
• The set of final states is F = {u|u 2 Q ^ f(u) = T}.
• The transition function   is constructed as follows: For each state u 2 Q and
alphabet symbol ↵ 2 ⌃, we use the congruence relation in order to find v 2 Q
such that u↵ ⇠ v. Then, we add the transition (u,↵, v) in  .
Therefore, we can see that once a finite congruence is obtained for a function f , it is
straightforward to construct a DFA representation of the congruence. This implies
that learning a DFA is reducing to learning the underlying Nerode congruence. We
will use similar ideas in order to learn partial transducers in section 6. Algorithm 1
presents the pseudocode for the algorithm for getting a DFA from the congruence
relation.
From congruence to transducer. In the case that the target function is a
boolean function, once we construct the DFA representation of the congruence we
have effectively recovered the entire function. However, in the case of a general
function the DFA representation will only correspond to the syntactic congruence.
Recovering the entire transducer corresponds to also computing the output function
 . We will discuss how this is achieved for different transducer models in chapter 6.
4.7 Partial Congruence
During the execution of the learning algorithm, various approximations to the con-
gruence will be constructed and utilized by the learning algorithm. In this section we
will formally define the class of intermediate approximations to the target congruence
constructed by our algorithms. Such a definition is important in order to be able to
analyze algorithms which operate given such approximate information.
Definition 6. For a congruence ⇠f def= ( ,R) we define the partial congruence ⇠hdef=
(H,RH) of ⇠f as follows:
• RH ✓ R is a prefix-closed subset of R.
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• H ✓   is a subset of   which is saturated for RH.
In the case of the Nerode congruence, the partial congruence (R, ) gives rise to an
approximation h of f using the same DFA construction we described in the previous
section. In the case of the syntactic congruence, we will also define the partial output
function  h as follows:
Definition 7. Given a partial congruence ⇠h, we define the partial output function
 h as follows, for u 2 ⌃⇤ and a 2 ⌃:
 h(u, a)
def
=  f (r, a) where r is the member of RH such that r ⇠h u (4.5)
Thus, the choice of the output depends on the set RH of representatives which is
also why RH is an integral part of the definition of ⇠h. The effect of removing repre-
sentatives and distinguishing predicates amounts to collapsing of certain equivalence
classes. More formally:
Proposition 5. Let ⇠f= ( ,R) be a congruence and ⇠h= (H,RH) be a partial
congruence of ⇠f . Then the following properties hold:
1. Persistence of congruence: For all u, v 2 ⌃⇤, if u ⇠f v then u ⇠h v.
2. Collapse of equivalence classes: Let s 2 R\RH. Then, there exists r 2 RH
such that for all u 2 ⌃⇤, if u ⇠f s then u ⇠h r.
Moreover, the following useful property follows trivially from the definition:
Proposition 6. For all r 2 RH and a 2 ⌃, we have that  h(r, a) =  f (r, a).
Given a partial congruence, the learning algorithms described in this thesis will
iteratively extend the congruence by adding new equivalence classes until a saturated
set of distinguishing predicates is obtained. We will now formally define an extension
to a partial congruence.
Definition 8. Given a partial congruence ⇠h= (H,RH), an extension to ⇠h is a
tuple (r, ) 2 ⌃⇤ ⇥ P such that:
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1. r 62 RH and RH [ {r} is a prefix-closed set.
2. Let ri 2 RH such that ri ⇠h r. Then,   is a distinguishing predicate for ri, r.
One can easily see that the above definition implies that the partial congruence
defined as (H [  ,RH [ {r}) is also a partial congruence which contains one more
equivalence class than ⇠h. The main invariant we will prove for the learning al-
gorithms is that each counterexample will provide us with a valid extension to the
current partial congruence until all equivalence classes are recovered.
4.8 Implementing a partial congruence
Implementing the congruence relation is usually performed in terms of the corre-
sponding state machine of the automaton or the transducer. If two strings end up in
the state then they are congruent with respect to the underlying congruence relation
(either Nerode or Syntactic). However, when we compute the congruence relations
based on distinguishing predicates and queries we will utilize different data strctures
in order to efficiently compute equivalence between different strings with respect to
a specific congruence. We will now explore two different data structures which are
commonly used in variations of the L⇤ algorithm for this purpose, the observation
table [14] and the classification tree [53] also sometimes referred as discrimination
tree [51]. In order for these data structures to effectively implement a (partial) con-
gruence we would like them to support the following basic functionalities:
1. Equivalence checking: The most basic property of any data structure imple-
menting a congruence is to be able to decide equivalence between two strings. In
other words, given u, v 2 ⌃⇤ the data structure must be able to answer whether
u ⇠h v with respect to the partial congruence (R, ).
2. Extension: Given a partial congruence (R, ) and an extension (r, ) the
data structure must be able to extend the partial congruence with the given
extension.
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Figure 4-2: (Left:) A DFA accepting the language <[ˆ>]*>. (Middle:) The corre-
sponding observation table implementation of the Nerode congruence. (Right: ) The
corresponding classification tree implementation of the congruence.
We will now proceed to describe each data structure in more detail. In figure 4-2
we present a DFA (left) and the corresponding congruence implementation using an
observation table (middle) and a classification tree (right).
4.8.1 Observation Table
The first data structure we will describe is called the observation table. This data
structure was originally introduced by Angluin as part of the seminal L⇤ algorithm [14]
and was later improved by Rivest and Schapire [75].
Definition 9. An observation table OT is a tuple (S,W,O) where:
• S ⇢ ⌃⇤ is the set of access strings (i.e. states).
• W ⇢ P is the set of distinguishing predicates.
• O : S ⇥W ! B is the lookup function with row indices from S and column
indices from W .
For s 2 S, let row(s) : W ! B denote the row vector of the table corresponding
to the access string s:
row(s) def= {x 7! O(s, x) | x 2 W}
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Deciding Equivalence
Equivalence in the observation table is checked by finding, for any string u, the class
r 2 S such that u ⇠ r. It follows that we can easily check equivalence of arbitrary
strings by finding the corresponding equivalence classes they belong. In order to find
the equivalence class for a string u we add u as a new row in the table and fill the
corresponding entries in order to get the row vector row(u). Afterwards, we find the
corresponding row of a string r 2 S such that row(u) = row(r).
Closedness of the observation table The astute reader might notice that, in the
case that a partial congruence is represented by the observation table, it may be the
case for a string u such that row(u) 6= row(r) for all r 2 S because u is congruent
to a yet unknown equivalence class! In this case, we say that the observation table is
not-closed. During the execution of the L⇤ algorithm the strings for which equivalence
will be checked will always be of the form r↵ where r 2 S and a 2 ⌃. If for all such
strings we have that row(r↵) = row(r0) for some r0 2 R then the table is closed and a
DFA model can be constructed. Otherwise, the string r↵ is used as a new equivalence
class and is added as a row in the table. Notice that in this case the distinguishing
predicates already present in the table are enough to distinguish between the new
class and all other classes already present. In general, one can show that the number
of distinguished predicates required to obtain a saturated set is at most |h⌃⇤i|   1
and at least log2 |h⌃⇤i|.
Extending the observation table
Given an extension (r, ), we extend the observation table by adding the distinguish-
ing predicate   in the set W and the new access string r in the set S.
4.8.2 The Classification Tree
The classification tree is a more efficient alternative to the observation table which
was introduced by Kearns and Vazirani [53]. The main difference from the observation
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table is that the distinguishing predicates are organized in a binary tree which allows
more efficient evaluation of the congruence relation. We will now proceed to give a
formal definition of the classification tree.
Definition 10. A classification tree T = (V, L,E) is a binary tree such that:
• V ⇢ P is the set of nodes.
• L ⇢ ⌃⇤ is the set of leafs.
• E ⇢ V ⇥ V ⇥ B is the transition relation. For (v, u, b) 2 E, we say that v is
the parent of u and furthermore, if b = T (resp. b = F) we say that u is the
T-child (resp. F-child).
Intuitively, given any internal node   2 V , any leaf lT reached by following the
T-child of   can be distinguished from any leaf lF reached by the F-child using  .
Initialization
To initialize the CT data structure, we use a query on the empty word ✏. Then, we
create a CT with two nodes, a root node labeled with ✏ and one child also labeled
with ✏. The child of the root is either a T-child or F-child, according to the result of
the query on ✏.
Deciding equivalence with the sift operation
Reducing a string s 2 ⌃⇤ to the corresponding equivalence class is perfomed using an
operation called sift. The sift(s) operation performs the following steps:
1. Set the current node to be the root node of the tree and let   be the label at
the root. Check the value of the predicate  (s).
2. Let b =  (s). Select the b-child of the current node and repeat step 2 until a
leaf is reached.
3. Once a leaf is reached, return the access string with which the leaf is labelled.
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Note that, until both children of the root node are added, we will have inputs that
may not end up in any leaf node. In these cases our sift operation will return ?
and, in the case of a learning algorithm, we will add the queried input as a new leaf
in the tree similarly with the closedness property of the observation table. However,
in the case of the tree, having an undefined target equivalence class can occur at most
one time (afterwards, all paths will lead to a known equivalence class), while in the
case of the observation table, closedness can be violated arbitrarily often.
Extending the classification tree
Given an extension (r, ) we proceed to extend the partial congruence represented by
the classification tree as follows: Let r0 be an access string such that r ⇠h r0 based
on the current classification tree. Then, we replace the leaf holding r0 with a new
subtree with three nodes such that
• The root of the subtree is labelled with the distinguishing predicate  .
• Assume without loss of generality that  (r) = T. Then, we have that the T-
child of the root is labelled with r and the F-child with r0. If  (r) = F, then





We will start this chapter with the presentation of the L⇤algorithm for learning de-
terministic finite automata using membership and equivalence queries.
The classical way under which the L⇤algorithm is presented is as an algorithm
which successively discovers new states in the target DFA. In this section we will
study the L⇤algorithm as a congruence learning algorithm. As we saw above, infer-
ring the Nerode congruence while having query access to the target function, allows
one to easily reconstruct a DFA representation of the target function (if such finite
representation exists).
5.0.1 Technical Description.
The algorithm starts with an equivalence relation containing a single equivalence class
accessed by the empty string (recall that the set of representatives is prefix-closed)
and a single distinguishing predicate Pdom✏ distinguishing between final and non-final
states. The congruence can be implemented using any appropriate data structure
discussed in the previous section such as the classification tree or the observation
table. Given any such congruence we use either a classification tree or an observation
table data structure to represent it and then construct a DFA. Finally, once we built
35
the DFA model, we submit an equivalence query. If the model is correct the algorithm
terminates. On the other hand, given a counterexample we invoke the counterexample
processing algorithm described below which utilizes the counterexample in order to
extract a new representative and distinguishing predicate which will then extend the
partial congruence.
The full pseudocode of the algorithm is available in algorithm 2 while the coun-
terexample processing routine in algorithm 3.
5.0.2 Processing Counterexamples.
The main idea behind using a counterexample s to extend the partial congruence
with a new equivalence class (in terms of a new representative and distinguishing
predicate) is the following:
Let  i = ri·s[i + 1..] where ri ⇠h s[..i]. In other words,  i is obtained by tak-
ing the prefix of length i of s and finding the representative based on ⇠h. Then,
we concatenate the resulting ri with the remaining suffix and check the value of the
string  i using a query to the target function. Notice that f( 0) = f(s) and moreover,
f( |s|) 6= f( |s|). Therefore, there exists a breakpoint j where f( j 1) = f(s) but
f( j) 6= f(s). We claim that rj 1s[j] is a new representative accessing an undiscov-
ered equivalence class (or equivalently state) and s[j + 1..] is a new distinguishing
string which can separate strings in the equivalence class rj from strings in the new
equivalence class rj 1s[j].
The following lemma formally proves that the counterexample processing algo-
rithm will provide us with a valid extension to the current partial congruence.
Lemma 2. The tuple (rj 1s[j], s[j + 1..]) is an extension to the partial congruence
(R, ).
Proof. The fact that RH remains prefix closed is trivial. Regarding distinguishability
notice that, by definition of  j we have that f(rj 1s[j]s[j + 1..]) 6= f(rjs[j + 1..]) but
we have that rj 1s[j] ⇠h rj and therefore Pdoms[j+1..] is distinguishing for rj 1s[j] and
rj.
36
Optimizing counterexample processing with binary search. Searching for
the breakpoint j can be done by sequentially running the process of generating  i
and checking whether the breakpoint is found for all i  |s|. However, we are not
necessarily interested in obtaining the smallest breakpoint j. Any index j such that
f( j 1) = f(s) and f( j) 6= f(s) will suffice. Therefore, in order to speed up the search
and reduce the number of queries we can use the following binary search process:
We start at the index j = |s|/2 and check whether f( j) = f(s). If f( j) = f(s)
we recursively apply the same process on the index 3|s|/4 or in the index |s|/4 on
the opposite case until we have found an index j such that j is a valid breakpoint.
Algorithm 3 presents the binary search counterexample processing algorithm.
Remarks. We should point out that certain properties of the congruence are not
really fundamental and can be implemented in different ways. For example, the set
of representatives can be constructed in a way that is not prefix closed while the set
of strings used by distinguishing predicates can be constructed in order to be suffix
closed [53]. Such variations on the properties of the congruence are affected by the
details of the counterexample processing algorithm, however the general principle of
detecting a breakpoint which provides both the new representative as well as the new
distinguishing predicate is a common theme across all variations.
5.0.3 Correctness and Complexity
The correctness and the complexity of the L⇤ algorithm is summarized in the following
theorem:
Theorem 2. Let A = (Q, q0, F, ) be a DFA over an alphabet ⌃. Then, the L⇤
algorithm will learn A using O(|Q|2|⌃| + |Q| logm) membership and |Q| equivalence
queries, where m is the length of the longest counterexample provided to the algorithm.
Proof. The correctness and termination of the algorithm follow from lemma 2 since,
after at most |Q| counterexamples all equivalence classes will be recovered and a
correct DFA model will be constructed. Since the algorithm starts with a partial
congruence with a single equivalence class and a single distinguishing predicates and
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extends the congruence with an additional equivalence class (i.e. state) with each
counterexample, it follows that |Q| counterexamples are required in order to recover
all equivalence classes. Processing each counterexample requires logm queries using
the binary search algorithm described above. Finally, constructing a DFA model
requires O(|Q||⌃|) queries using either the observation table or the classification tree
implementation of the partial congruence relation.
Algorithm 2 L⇤Algorithm
Require: f is the target function, E is an equivalence oracle
function L⇤(f , E)
R  {✏}
   {Pdom✏ }
h  getDFA(R, )
while E(h) 6= T do
s  getCounterexample()
(r, )  processCounterexample(s)
R  R [ {r}
     [ { }
h  getDFA(R, )
return h
Algorithm 3 Counterexample processing algorithm
Require: h is the partial congruence, s is the counterexample.
function processCounterexample(h, s)
L  0
R  |s|  1
while L 6= R do
m  (L+R)/2
if f( m) = f(s) then
L  m+ 1
else





In this chapter we will describe novel L⇤-style algorithms for learning transducer mod-
els. We will start by presenting a non-trivial extension of the L⇤algorithm for par-
tial deterministic transducers. Partiality introduces non-trivial challenges in learning
since concepts such as distinguishability become more difficult to verify in the setting
of partial functions. In order to address this challenge, we extend to concept of black-
box distinguishability for transducers and introduce a novel output label inference al-
gorithm which can be used in order to learn the output labels of a transducer given it’s
state machine structure. Afterwards, we introduce a generalized, indexed congruence
relation which can used as the basis of defining canonical non-deterministic transducer
models, and we develop such a class called visibly non-deterministic transducers and
show that this class can also be learned efficiently. As we will demonstrate in our eval-
uation this class is effective in modelling many string transformation functions which
are commonly encountered in Web applications such as calls to the preg_replace
function and other similar code constructs.
6.1 Overview
Figure 6-1 presents the overall algorithmic learning framework under which our learn-
ing algorithms operate. In a nutshell, our algorithms work by first inferring an ap-
proximation of the underlying state machine (or equivalence relation) of the target
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Figure 6-1: The overall algorithmic learning framework.
transducer. Given such a state machine we describe, in section 6.3, an algorithm
which can recover the output labels of the target transducer. This algorithm is very
general and can be applied even to non-deterministic models as long as they are func-
tional. Finally, given a counterexample, we proceed to refine the state machine by
adding previously undiscovered states.
6.2 Learning Total Transducers
As a warm-up for the T ⇤ algorithm let’s consider the problem of adapting the L⇤
algorithm in the case of deterministic transducers. As we will see the fact the target
function is total allows us to easily evaluate the syntactic congruence and therefore
adapting the L⇤ algorithm in this case is straightforward.
As we describe in our overall algorithmic framework in figure 6-1, we will split
learning into two components, a congruence learning component which allows us to
recover the syntactic congruence and an output label inference component which,
given the partial syntactic congruence, infers the corresponding output function. We
will now describe the two components in detail.
6.2.1 Learning the Syntactic Congruence
In order to learn the syntactic congruence we will use the identical high level L⇤
algorithm from the previous section including the counterexample processing method
introduced there. This shows the advantage of describing the L⇤ algorithm in terms
of a generic congruence. However, we will address certain aspects of the algorithm
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which are different.
Distinguishability. In the original L⇤ algorithm the distinguishing predicates
constructed were all domain distinguishing predicates. However, in the case of total
transducers, output distinguishing predicates need to be used in order to distinguish
between different equivalence classes (i.e. states).
6.2.2 Learning the output function  f
Once, we have a partial syntactic congruence, we proceed to use it in order to infer
the output function  f . Again, the fact that the transducer is total makes this task
straightforward as for all r 2 R,↵ 2 ⌃ we have that  f (r,↵) = f(r)   f(r↵). As we
will see in the next section, computing the output function becomes highly non-trivial
once we introduce partiality in the target functions.
6.2.3 The Algorithm
As we mention above, the algorithm follows the same high level description as the
L⇤ algorithm, shown in algorithm 2. However, since the target function is total, the
empty string is not distinguishing between any states and therefore, we start with the
congruence (R, ) = ({✏}, ;). Moreover, given a partial syntactic congruence, instead
of invoking the getDFA algorithm, we first invoke the getDFA to obtain a state machine
and afterwards, we use the algorithm described above to add the corresponding output
in each transition.
The second difference is the way we process counterexamples. As in the L⇤ algo-
rithm, given a counterexample s, we generate the strings  i in the same way. However,
instead of checking whether f( i) = f(s), we would like to only compare the suffix
of the generated output in order to distinguish according to the syntactic congru-
ence. Therefore, we perform the test f(ri)   f( i) = f(s[..i])   f(s). After we obtain
the breakpoint j, we generate the output distinguishing certificate parametrized by
(s[j + 1..], ✏, f(s[..j])   f(s)).
Given the above changes, the remaining part of the L⇤ algorithm remains the same
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and the correctness proof and complexity follow in the same fashion.
6.3 Output Label Inference
In this section we introduce a central component of all our learning algorithms. Our
goal in this section is to define and solve the Output Label Inference (OLI) problem.
An input to the problem is the syntactic congruence ⇠f corresponding to ( ,R). In
its full generality the input is allowed to be a partial congruence of ⇠f but it is useful
to explain first the algorithm in terms of the full syntactic congruence. The essential
part of ⇠f used by OLI is the DFA induced by ⇠f , the DFA has R as its set of states,
the initial state is ✏, final state set is R \ dom(f), and the transition function is
 (q, a) = p for q, p 2 R and a 2 ⌃ where p ⇠f q·a. The purpose of the algorithm is
to calculate the output function  f . More concisely:
OLI: The input parameters are query access to f and the DFA induced by ⇠f . The
task is to compute the output function  f and thus the finite state transducer
Tf .
In the transducer formulation of the problem, we are given as input the target trans-
ducer with the output labels hidden and the ability to query the target transducer
with any input of our choice. The goal is to efficiently recover the output labels of
the target transducer in ENF.
6.3.1 OLI Algorithm
Before starting to delve into the details of the OLI algorithm, we will define the set of
enabling suffixes, a concept which will be important for the operation of the algorithm.
Definition 11. For an r 2 R we say that e 2 ⌃⇤ is an enabling suffix if re 2 dom(f)
and for all prefixes p 2 prefixes(e) \ {e, ✏} we have that rp 62 dom(f).
Our algorithm will construct us a suffix-closed set of enabling suffixes E containing
one enabling suffix for each representative. For r 2 R we will denote by er 2 E the
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enabling suffix for r. Suffix-closedness is enforced by the following property for all
er 2 E:
er =
8<: ✏, if r 2 dom(f),er[1]·e (r,er[1]), otherwise. (6.1)
Finally, if there doesn’t exist a suffix er such that r·er 2 dom(f), i.e. r is accessing
a dead-end state, then we define er = ?. Our algorithm for solving the OLI problem
is based on a simple formula for computing the output function for any state. More
specifically, let u 2 R,↵ 2 ⌃. Then we have that:
 (u,↵) = bf(u)   (f(u·↵·e (u,↵))   f (u,↵)(e (u,↵))) (6.2)
Moreover, the following lemma shows a way to compute the prefix based on the values
of the suffix:
Lemma 3. For any sequence u 2 R we have that:
bf(u) = l
↵2⌃












Using lemma 3 we conclude that the only unknown in equation 6.2 is the value
of fr(er) for all access strings r 2 R. If r is a final state, then we can simply
compute fr(er) = f(r)   f(r·er). However, in the case that r is a non-final state, the
computation of fr(er) becomes non-trivial.
At a high level, our OLI algorithm will iteratively approximate the value of fr(er)
43
Figure 6-2: (Left: ) Iterative approximations of the fr(er) value by the OLI algorithm.
(Right:) Demonstration of a vulnerable transition (r, a, rs) 2 RH ⇥ ⌃⇥RH.
for each different state r 2 R until a fix-point is reached. More formally, the algorithm
works as follows:
1. Initialize f (0)r (er) = ✏ and f ( 1)r (er) = ? for all r 2 R.
2. While 9r 2 R : f (i)r (er) 6= f (i 1)r (er) repeat the following steps sequentially for
all r 2 R:
(a) bf (i+1)(r) = d↵2⌃(f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵))).
(b) 8↵ 2 ⌃ :  (i+1)(r,↵) = bf (i+1)(r)   (f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵))).
(c) f (i+1)r (er) = bf (i+1)(r)   f(r·er).
3. Return  (i) as the result.
Note that in the return value  (r,↵) = ? whenever  (r,↵) is a deadend.
6.3.2 Correctness and Complexity
In this section our main goal is to prove the correctness of the OLI algorithm. More
specifically, we will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3. The OLI algorithm on input a congruence ( ,R) with n = |R| over an
alphabet ⌃ and query access to the function f will recover the output function using
|⌃|n output queries and in time O(n2|⌃|m) where m = maxr2R,↵2⌃ | (r,↵)|.
The main idea in our analysis is to define a class of states for which the value
of fr(er) will be computed correctly from the first iteration. We will show that such
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r 2 R necessarily exist and moreover, that the correct values computed for these
states will eventually propagate in subsequent iterations into all the other states. We
will start with the basic definition of the BAD state .
Definition 12. A state r 2 R is called ↵-BAD if ⌃ can be partitioned into two sets G
and B such that:
– For every   2 B we have that  (r,  ) = ✏ and ↵ 2 fr(er).
– For every   2 G we have that ↵ 2  (r,  ).
An r 2 R is called BAD when there exists ↵ 2 ⌃ such that r is ↵-BAD.
The intuition behind the definition of BAD states, is that, for this class of r 2 R,
the initial computation of bf (1)(r) will result in over-approximating the value of bf(r).
As we will show now, for all r 2 R which are not BAD the value of fr(er) will be
computed correctly from the first iteration.
Lemma 4. If an r 2 R is not BAD then f (1)r (er) = fr(er).
Proof. Since we initially start with f (0)r (er) = ✏ for all r 2 R, it follows the computa-




Since r is not BAD one of the following holds:
1. There exist ↵,   2 ⌃ such that  (r,↵)u (r,  ) = ✏ and both  (r,↵) and  (r,  )
are non-empty. It follows easily that in this case bf(r) will be computed correctly.
2. There exists ↵,   2 ⌃ such that  (r,↵) =  (r,  ) = ✏ but fr↵(e (r,)↵)ufr (e (r, )) =
✏. Again, in this case, it follows that bf(r) will be computed correctly.
Our next task is to prove that even if an r is BAD, if any neighboring r↵ is not BAD
the subsequent iteration of the algorithm will correctly set the value for r. We start
with the following lemma:
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Lemma 5. For any i > 0 and any r 2 R we have that fr(er) 3 f (i)r (er).
Proof. By induction in i. For i = 0 the result holds trivially. For the inductive step,
notice that the inductive hypothesis implies that bf(r) 2 bf (i)(r) from which the result
follows using equation 6.2.
Lemma 6. Let r 2 R be ↵-BAD and assume that there exists   2 B with rb =  (r,  ),
such that f (i)r  (er ) = fr (erb). Then, f
(i+1)
r (er) = fr(er).
Proof. We have that
bf (i+1)(r) = l
↵2⌃
(f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵)))
= (bf(r)· (r,  )) u l
↵2⌃^↵ 6= 
(f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵)))
(  2 B =)  (r,  ) = ✏) = (bf(r) u l
↵2⌃^↵ 6= 
(f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵)))
(lemma 5) = bf(r)
Therefore, in the i+1 iterations of the algorithm, the value of bf(r) will be computed
correctly and thus, f (i+1)r (er) = fr(er).
At this point, we have that the correct results will eventually propagate and correct
the values in the BAD states. The final piece is to prove that for every BAD state there
exists a suffix which leads to a state which is not BAD showing that eventually all BAD
states will be fixed.
Lemma 7. Let r 2 R be a state such that r is ↵-BAD. Then, for every   2 B we
have that  (r,  ) is either ↵-BAD or not BAD.
Proof. Assume that rb =  (r,  ) is  -BAD for some   2 ⌃. Then, by definition 12, we
have that   2 frb(erb), a contradiction, since ↵ 2 frb(erb) since   2 B.
For the following lemma we will denote by Gr,Br the partition for the BAD state
r.
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Lemma 8. Let r be an ↵-BAD state. Then there exists a sequence wr, with |wr|  |R|
such that:
1.  (r, wr) is not BAD.
2. For all pi 2 prefixes(wr) we have that  (r, pi) is ↵-BAD and moreover, pi[|pi|] 2
B (r,pi).
Proof. Since r is ↵-BAD, by definition of bf(r), there exists a w such that rw 2 dom(f)
and moreover,   2 f(rw) for some symbol   6= ↵. Let r  =  (r, w ) be such that
w  2 w and   2  (r , w [|w |]). Moreover let ri =  (rw [1..i],) for i < |w |. It
follows that r  is either  -BAD or not BAD.
Now, consider the path starting at r and extending to r  through all prefixes of
w :
r
w  [1]   ! r1 w  [2]   ! r2 w  [3]   ! · · · w  [|w  | 1]      ! r  w  [|w  |]    ! · · · (6.5)
Notice that for all ri we have that  (ri, w [i]) = ✏ because the first output symbol
is produced by  (r, w ). Moreover, starting from r1 we have, by lemma 7, that
every ri is either ↵-BAD or not BAD. Finally, notice that r  cannot be ↵-BAD because
  2  (r , w [|w |]). Putting the above together, we get that there exists a k such
that for all i < k we have that ri is ↵-BAD and moreover, rk is not BAD.
Therefore, by setting wr = w[..k] we get the result. To show that |wr|  |R| we
notice that since there are at most n = |R| states, after at most n steps, we will have
a state repeating and therefore we can trim the path accordingly.
We are finally ready to prove theorem 3:
Proof of theorem 3. Consider any r 2 R. If r is not BAD then by lemma 4, we
have that f (1)r (er) = fr(er). Now consider an r 2 R such that r is ↵-BAD. By
lemma 8 there exists a w with length |w|  |R| such that  (r, w) is not BAD and
 (r, w[..|w|  1]) is ↵-BAD. By lemma 6, in the subsequent iteration of i = 2, we have
that f (i) (r,w[..|w| 1])(e (r,w[..|w| 1])) will be computed correctly, and therefore, by reap-
plying lemma 6 we have that after at most n = |R| iterations we will have that
f (n)r (er) = fr(er) will be computed correctly for all r 2 R and the algorithm will
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terminate. Regarding the time and query complexity of the algorithm, notice ini-
tially that we have proved that within at most n = |R| iterations, the OLI algorithm
will terminate. Within each iteration the common prefix of |⌃| sequences of length
at most nm which can be done in time linear in |⌃|nm. Therefore, the total time
complexity is O(n2|⌃|m). Moreover, for each state the algorithm performs |⌃| output
queries, for a total of |⌃|n queries.
The OLI problem and word equations. An alternative approach to solve the
OLI problem would be to pose it as a word equation problem. More specifically, since
by definition we have that the output of the function is a series of concatenations of
the output function, we can create a single variable for each output function value
and attempt to solve the following linear system of word equations: where, for r 2 R
and ↵ 2 ⌃ the variable  ↵r denotes the variable corresponding to the value of  (r,↵).
One can easily prove that any solution to the above system of equations would be a
valid assignment for the output labels in the corresponding transducer formulation
of the function. However, not all these solutions would correspond to a valid output
function as defined in this paper. Therefore, the following additional constraint has
to be added into the system which enforces a unique solution which corresponds to
the solution found by the OLI algorithm presented in this section:
8r 2 R :
l
↵2⌃
 ↵r = ✏ (6.6)
Notice that the addition of this constrains still give a linear system of word equa-
tions. Unfortunately, solving linear systems of word equations is an NP-Complete
problem []. While more restricted fragments are known to be solvable in polynomial
time, we didn’t find any efficiently solvable fragments which can capture the instances
generated by the OLI algorithm. Under this formulation our OLI algorithm can be
viewed as a word equation solver for a fragment of linear word equations as defined by
the problem definition. An interesting future work direction is to explore applications
of similar ideas in the context of word equation solving.
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6.3.3 Robust Output Label Inference
In the setting of learning transducers, when we invoke the OLI algorithm the input
given to the algorithm will be an incomplete representation of the state machine of
the transducer, i.e. a partial congruence. In order to be able to utilize OLI in the
context of a transducer learning algorithm this aspect needs to be taken into account.
In this section, we will describe a variation of the OLI algorithm which adds a
robustness check in each iteration in order to produce a certificate of the current
approximation computed by the algorithm. This certificate can be used to verify the
current approximation and will play a significant role when we analyze the behavior
of the OFL algorithm under partial congruences. Recall that, for a string r 2 R and
an enabling suffix er, we say that C(r) 2 ⌃⇤ is a certificate for w if J (r, e,C(r)) = w.
Our goal in this section is to develop an algorithm such that, for each approxi-
mation f (i)r (er) we will also obtain a certificate C(i)(r) for f (i)r (er) proving the current
approximation. Before describing the internals of the certificate generation algorithm,
we will define the reason for each approximation computed by the OLI algorithm.
Definition 13. For r 2 R and an approximation f (i+1)r (er) computed by the OLI
algorithm, we define the reason for the approximation as
R(i)(r) = argmin
↵2⌃
|f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵))| (6.7)
Intuitively, the certificate for each approximation is computed as follows: During
the first iteration of the OLI algorithm, the common prefix between all equations for
each state r 2 R will be removed to yield the first update. In this case, the certifi-
cate proving the first approximation is simply a suffix e (r,↵) for some ↵ 2 ⌃ such
that f(re (r,↵)) u f(re (r,er)) = f (1)r (er) . Afterwards, the newly computed approxima-
tions will be used to further prune the common prefix in successive iterations of the
algorithm. In this case, the reason function is used to determine which transition
(symbol) caused a new update in the current approximation.
More formally, the certificate for each successive approximation of the OLI algo-
rithm is defined as follows:
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Definition 14. For i   0 we define by C(i)(r) to be the certificate for f (i)r (er), defined
as follows.
C(0)(r) = ? (6.8)
For i = 1, let   2 ⌃ be such that bf (1)(r) = f(r·er)u f(r ·e (r, ))1. Then, we have that:
C(1)(r) =
8<: C(0)(r), if f
(1)





For i > 1, r 2 R, define ⇢ = R(i)(r). Then we have that
C(i)(r) =
8<: C(i 1)(r), if f
(i)





Note that the computation of the certificates can be incorporated within the main
execution loop of the OLI algorithm. We call this augmented version of OLI, the
Robust Output Label Inference (ROLI) algorithm. The overall ROLI algorithm is
depicted in algorithm 4. The following theorem states the correctness of the certificate
generation algorithm:
Theorem 4 (Certificate Validity). For every i   0, if C(i)(r) 6= ?, then C(i)(r) is a
certificate for f (i)r (er).
6.3.4 The OLI algorithm under partial congruences
Now that we have described the full version of the ROLI algorithm we will proceed to
analyze it’s behavior when a partial congruence is given as input. More specifically,
we consider the following problem: The algorithm is given output query access to
the transducer f as in the normal OLI setting however, the algorithm is given access
to a partial congruence ⇠h defined by (H,RH) instead of being given access to the
congruence for f .
1The existence of   is guaranteed by proposition 1
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Algorithm 4 Robust output function learning algorithm.
Require: (H,RH) is a partial congruence with respect to f .
1: function VerifyCertificate(C, r, e, w)





7: if 9r 2 R such that er 6= ? ^ f(rer) = ? then
8: return ?
9: 8r 2 RH : f (0)r (er)  ✏
10: 8r 2 RH : C(0)(r)  ?
11: while 9r 2 RH : f ir 6= f (i 1)r do
12: for r 2 RH do
13: if 9↵ 2 ⌃ : VerifyCertificate(C(i)(r↵), r↵, e (r,↵), f (i) (r,↵)(e (r,↵))) = F
then
14: return ?
15: bf (i)(r)  d↵2⌃(f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i 1) (r,↵)(e (r,↵)))
16:  (i)(r,↵)  bf (i)(r)   (f(r↵·e (r,↵))   f (i 1) (r,↵)((e (r,↵)))
17: f (i)r (er)  bf (i)(r)   f(r·er)
18: if f (i)r = f (i 1)r then
19: C(i)(r)  C(i 1)(r)
20: else
21: /* Set C(1)(r) according to def 14, afterwards use the following
formula */
22: C(i)(r)  R(i)(r)·C(i 1)( (r,R(i)(r)))
23: return  (i)
The ideal outcome for the algorithm when given as input a partial congruence ⇠h
would be to recover the partial output function  h and subsequently reconstruct the
transducer h defined by the partial congruence ⇠h and the partial output function  h.
For example, in traditional Mealy machine and total transducer learning algorithms,
the intermediate hypothesis constructed are always equivalence to the transducer
defined by ⇠h and  h (because the output labels are computed easily). However, as
we will see, the fact that algorithm is given access to ⇠h but is querying the transducer
f , may cause a certain number of issues. In this case the robust version of the OLI
algorithm is important in order to simplify the analysis.
First, notice that it is obvious that, as long as f and h are equal on all queries
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performed by the OLI algorithm, then, by theorem 3 the ROLI algorithm will recover
the partial output function  h.
Our next task is to analyze the conditions under which the results from the queries
will disagree between f and h. We start with the following definition.
Definition 15. Let (r,↵, rs) 2 RH ⇥ ⌃ ⇥RH be a transition in the DFA incduced
by ⇠h. We say that the tuple (r,↵, rs) is vulnerable if the following conditions hold:
1. r↵ ⇠h rs and r↵ 6⇠f rs.
2. frs(ers) 6= fr↵(ers).
In simpler words, a transition from a state r with a symbol ↵ is vulnerable if it
is directed to an incorrect state (i.e. the state accessed by r↵ and rs are different in
the transducer f) and moreover, frs(ers) is distinguishing for r↵ and rs.
As we will show now, if a discrepancy occurs in the results of the output queries
performed by the OLI algorithm when querying f versus querying h, then some tran-
sition (r,↵, rs) is vulnerable.
Proposition 7. Consider the set of strings S which are queried by OLI(H,RH).
Assume that there exists t 2 S such that f(t) 6= h(t). Then, there exists (r,↵, rs) 2
RH ⇥ ⌃⇥RH such that (r,↵, rs) is vulnerable.
In the proof of proposition 7 with the following lemma:
Lemma 9. For a deterministic transducer f = (⇠f ,  f ) and u 2 ⌃⇤, the transduction




 (u[..i  1], u[i]) (6.11)
We now proceed with the main proof.
Proof. Every t 2 ⌃⇤ queried by the OLI algorithm can be written as t = r↵·e (r,↵) for


















Notice now that, by definition, we have that RH is a prefix closed set and therefore,
for each u 2 r we have that u 2 RH. By applying proposition 6 we get that
O
i2[1..|r|]
 f (r[..i  1], r[i])· f (r,↵) =
O
i2[1..|r|]
 h(r[..i  1], r[i])· h(r,↵) (6.12)
Using the above equation we simplify the overall expression as follows:
O
i2[1..|r|]




=) fr↵(e (r,↵)) 6= hr↵(e (r,↵))
The result now follows from the fact that the set of enabling suffixes E is suffix-
closed.
We will now derive the main result of this section which constrains the errors that
may occur in the output function when inferred by the ROLI algorithm.
Theorem 5 (ROLI robustness). Assume the ROLI algorithm is executed on a partial
congruence and completes without failing and let  ROLI = ROLI(H,RH). Then, we
have that:
 ROLI(r,↵) =
8<:  h(r,↵)·(frs(ers)   fr↵(ers)), if (r, a, rs) is vulnerable , h(r,↵), otherwise. (6.13)
Proof. Firstly, notice that, by proposition 7 unless some transition (r,↵, rs) is vul-
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Figure 6-3: The three different types of conflict that may occur on a vulnerable
transition (r,↵, rs) as analyzed in the proof of theorem 5. The labels in the outgoing
transitions show the output produced by frs(ers) and fr↵(ers ) respectively.
nerable we have that  ROLI =  h. Now, consider a vulnerable transition (r,↵, rs) such
that r↵ ⇠h rs but r↵ 6⇠f rs.
Let us now consider the process of running the ROLI algorithm in the presence of
vulnerable transitions. The main issue with vulnerable transitions is that, while for
the state rs the value f (i)(er) will be approximated correctly, when this value is used
during the computation of bf (i)(r) instead of utilizing the correct value f (i)r↵ (e (r,↵)), the
value f (i)s (ers) will be used. In most cases this will have the effect of aborting the
algorithm but, as we will prove now in one case the algorithm will continue and end
up with an incorrect value for the output label of the vulnerable transition.
We distinguish three cases on the way ws = frs(ers) differs from wr↵ = fr↵(ers).
Moreover, notice that even the certificate suffix will likely have a different corre-
sponding output because we use a certificate computed with respect to rs however, in
reality, the certificate suffix is taken from  (r,↵). Now, we will discuss each different
case separately. The three cases are presented visually in figure 6-3.
1. Position conflict: This is the case demonstrated in the left side of figure 6-
3. In this case, we have that there exists an index j such that ws[|ws|   j] 6=
wr↵[|wr↵|   j]. It’s easy to notice that in this case the certificate verification
operation in the ROLI algorithm will fail.
2. Length Conflict 1(|ws| > |wr↵|): This is the case demonstrated in the mid-
dle of figure 6-3. Notice that in this case, the length of ws is larger than the
length of wr↵. Therefore, by proposition 3, regardless of the value the out-
put of the certificate C(i)(rs) is taking when we prepend r↵, we have that
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|J (rs, ers ,C(i)(rs))| > |J (r↵, ers ,C(i)(rs))| and therefore, the certificate verifi-
cation will fail.
3. Length Conflict 2(|ws| < |wr↵|): This is the case demonstrated on the right
side of figure 6-3. The difference with the previous case is that the output ws
has smaller length that wr↵. In this case, by setting the output produced by
C(rs) when computed from r↵ in an appropriate value we can ensure that the
certificate verification will be successful. In this case the prefix of w1 = wr↵   ws
will be pushed into the suffix of the output label  (r,↵).
Therefore, in all cases we have that either the algorithm will fail through a certificate
verification error, or the prefix of fr↵(ers) will be pushed into the suffix of  (r,↵) and
the proof is complete.
The astute reader might notice that fr↵(ers)   frs(ers) is undefined if frs(ers) 63
fr↵(ers). Indeed, in most cases of a vulnerable transition, the ROLI algorithm will
be able to detect the error using the certificate validation mechanism and abort the
execution. In fact, there is only one case of a length conflict between frs(ers) and
fr↵(ers) that will cause an invalid output label to be produced by ROLI.
Theorem 5 demonstrates the importance of the adding the certificate validation in
the basic version of the OLI algorithm. An immediate corollary of theorem 5 is that
the only case in which a transition has an invalid label with respect to the partial
transducer h is if some prefix of a subsequent transition is pushed backwards. Let µ
be the transducer defined by the partial congruence ⇠h and  ROLI. Then, for every
state r 2 H and suffix w we conclude that fr(w) 3 µr(w). This is an important
property which we will exploit in our learning algorithm in the next section. Finally,
note that this property does not hold for the basic version of the OLI algorithm.
6.4 Learning Partial Transducers
Now that we have described and analyzed our main technical tool, the ROLI algorithm,
we are ready to describe the algorithm for learning deterministic transducers.
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6.4.1 High-Level Overview
The algorithm starts with an initial, minimal partial congruence containing only the
domain distinguishing predicate Pdom✏ which distinguishes between final and non-final
states. In order to implement such a congruence we use the classification tree [53] a
data structure commonly used in L⇤-style algorithms.
Afterwards, the OLI algorithm is used to derive the output function for the con-
gruence relation. Notice here that in this first call to the OLI algorithm, no robustness
checks are required, since the problem of inferring the output function is trivial when
we only have a single state in our transducer model.
Once the first model is created and checked for equivalence we proceed to process
the counterexample in order to generate a new distinguishing predicate and access
string which are used to extend the current partial congruence (see below). Once
we extend our current congruence with the new distinguishing predicate and access
string we invoke the ROLI algorithm to convert the induced DFA into a transducer
model.
On each failure of the execution of the ROLI algorithm we extract a new distin-
guishing predicate and an access string for a new state which extends the partial
congruence. Once, the ROLI algorithm succeeds we generate a new transducer model
and repeat this process until a correct model is constructed. We will now describe
each component of the learning algorithm in more detail.
6.4.2 Counterexample Processing
Once the classification tree is constructed, we have access to the induced DFA corre-
sponding to a partial congruence and we proceed to invoke the ROLI algorithm and,
if the ROLI algorithm terminates without an error, we produce a transducer model
h and submit it for equivalence checking. In this section, we will describe how the
learning algorithm handles counterexample resulting either from equivalence queries
or from failures in the ROLI algorithm.
Domain Counterexamples. The simplest type of counterexamples that may
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occur during the execution of the algorithm are domain counterexamples. In this type
of counterexamples, we have a string s such that s 2 dom(h) but s 62 dom(f). These
counterexamples may occur either as a result of an equivalence query or during the
execution of the ROLI algorithm. Notice that domain counterexamples are indepen-
dent of the output labels in the transducer model and therefore, they only dependent
on the induced DFA of the current classification tree. Therefore, we process such
counterexamples using the same algorithms used for processing counterexamples in
classic automata learning algorithms [75]. Once we run the counterexample process-
ing algorithm we obtain a new access string and a domain distinguishing predicate
which are then used in order to extend the classification tree.
ROLI Counterexamples. By ROLI Counterexamples we refer to counterexamples
that occur during the execution of the ROLI algorithm when the algorithm fails (re-
turns ?). The two cases where this may happen is during the initial queries performed
by the algorithm if for some state r 2 R such that er 6= ? we have that f(rer) = ?. In
this case, we proceed to handle the input string s = rer as a domain counterexample
and generate a new domain distinguishing predicate as described above.
The second case where the ROLI algorithm may return ?, is if some certificate
verification check fails. We will now proceed to analyze how to extract distinguishing
predicates from a certificate verification failure in the ROLI algorithm. As stated in
theorem 5 the only way under which the ROLI algorithm may fail is if we have a
vulnerable transition (r,↵, rs) such that r↵ ⇠h rs but r↵ 6⇠f rs and moreover, es is
producing a different output from r↵ and rs. Therefore, if the certificate verification






output distinguishing predicate for r↵ and rs, where j is the last iteration of the
algorithm before failing. We proceed to extend the classification tree splitting the







Equivalence query counterexamples. The counterexample processing rou-
tine, shown in algorithm 6, is responsible with taking a counterexample provided by
the equivalence oracle and returning a new distinguishing predicate, either domain
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or output. In the case the counterexample is a domain counterexample, we proceed
to handle it as described above. If we have an output counterexample t (i.e. for our
transducer h we have h(t) 6= f(t) and both h(t) and f(t) are not ?), then we proceed
with the following algorithm:
In a high level, the algorithm processes each prefix t[..i] of the counterexample
and first, the prefix is executed in the model in order to obtain the state ri accessed
by t[..i]. Afterwards, the following checks are performed:
1. The first check, is to verify that the output produced by our model h up to
the prefix t[..i] is a prefix of the output produced by the target function f . If
we have that h(t[..i]) 62 f(t) then, we conclude that in fact the value of the
output function for the input  h(ri 1, t[i]) is overapproximated. In this case,
notice that using t[i+ 1..] as a certificate will be able to distinguish between ri
and ri 1t[i]. Let w = J (ri, eri , t[i + 1..]). Then, we create the distinguishing
predicate Pouteri ,t[i+1..],w and extend the classification tree by splitting ri with the
new access string ri 1t[i].
Connecting back to theorem 5, this check is responsible of processing coun-
terexamples caused due to vulnerable transitions causing a prefix of an output
label to be pushed backwards into the suffix of the output label of a vulnerable
transition.
2. Once the first check is passed, we proceed to extract and compare the suffix of
the counterexample using a certificate. As a certificate we choose appropriately
a sequence from the set W = {eri ,C(ri)}. Notice that, because the output
produced by the strings in the set W , (i.e. the values J (ri, eri ,C(ri)) and
J (ri,C(ri), eri)) share no common prefix and are non-empty, it follows that
one of them will be appropriate to extract any suffix using the J function. On
the case that C(ri) = ? then we can show that eri can be used to extract any
suffix using the J function. Assume that s 2 W is the certificate selected.
Then, we verify that J (ri, t[i + 1..], s) = J (ri 1t[i], t[i + 1..], s). If this check
fails, then we generate the output distinguishing predicate Poutt[i+1..],s,J (ri,t[i+1..],s).
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6.4.3 Overall Algorithm
Summarizing the previous section, we now provide the overall learning algorithm for
deterministic transducers:
1. Initialize a classification tree T = (V, L,E) with the distinguishing predicate
Pdom✏ and a single access string ✏ and use queries to set the leaf node to either a
T-child or a F-child.
2. Use the OLI algorithm to obtain a transducer model.
3. Repeat the following steps until an equivalence query returns T:
(a) Make an equivalence query on the current transducer model and process
any counterexample returned as described in section 6.4.2.
(b) Once the classification tree is extended, call the ROLI algorithm using the
DFA induced by the tree.
(c) While the ROLI algorithm returns ?, process the corresponding counterex-
amples, extend the classification tree and call the ROLI algorithm until a
transducer model is obtained.
4. return the current transducer model.
Algorithm 5 presents the pseudocode of the deterministic learning algorithm.
6.4.4 Correctness and Complexity
We will now state the following theorem which summarizes the query and time com-
plexity of our algorithm.
Theorem 6 (Learnability of Deterministic Transducers). Let f be a function rep-
resentable as a deterministic transducer with n states. Then, f is learnable using
O(n3|⌃| + nm) output and n equivalence queries, where m is the length of longest
counterexample given to the algorithm.
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Algorithm 5 Learning algorithm for deterministic transducers
Require: O, E is an output and equivalence oracle for a function f
function LearnDet(O, E)
(H,RH)  ( , ✏)
 h  OLI(H,RH)
while E(H,RH,  h) 6= > do
t  getCounterexample()
( n, rn)  processCounterexample(t)
(H,RH)  (H [ { n},RH [ {rn})
while ( h = ROLI(H,RH)) = ? do
( n, rn)  getROLIDistinguishingPredicate()
(H,RH)  (H [ { n},RH [ {rn})
return (H,RH,  h)
Algorithm 6 Counterexample processing algorithm
Require: O, E is an output and equivalence oracle for a function f
function ProcessCounterexample(t,h)
r0  ✏
for i = 1; i  |t| do
if bh(t[..i]) 62 f(t) then
w  J (ri, eri , t[i+ 1..])
return (Pouteri ,t[i+1..],w, ri 1t[i])
ri  getAccessString(t[..i])
W  {eri ,C(ri)}
s  getCertificate(W,hri(eri))
if J (ri, t[i+ 1..], s) 6= J (ri 1t[i], t[i+ 1..], s) then
w  J (ri, t[i+ 1..], s)
return (Poutt[i+1..],s,w, ri 1t[i])
// Unreachable code
In terms of time complexity, assuming that the maximum length of an output label
is k and each output and equivalence query take constant time, the algorithm will
run time O(n2(n|⌃|k +m)). The time complexity stems from the fact that building
each DFA model requires |⌃|n calls to the sift procedure where the maximum height
of the tree is n. Adding the complexity of counterexample processing and the ROLI





We introduce a subclass class of nonedeterministic transducers that have a canonical
form, based on an indexed form of syntactic congruence. The main idea behind this
class is the following. Given any state with two or more non deterministic transitions,
the output produced by each nondeterministic transition up to the enabling suffix
starts with a different prefix. The intuition is that, at this point, we are forced to
break into a non-determinsitic choice because we can no longer keep producing output
before resolving the lookahead.
The way we capture the different lookaheads needed to resolve the different cases
is by detecting nonmonotonicity in the behavior of the given function f : ⌃⇤ !  ⇤?
and by separating monotonic and nonmonotonic continuations using nondeterminism.
7.0.1 Visible nondeterminism
We define a partition of a language L ✓ ⌃⇤ into two lookahead languages eL and
L\eL representing nonmonotone and monotone behaviors wrt f . Observe that all
definitions here have f as an implicit parameter. For u 2 ⌃⇤ we let con(u) denote
the set of all v 2 ⌃⇤ such that u·v 2 dom(f). Let the enabling sequences from u be
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the following subset of con(u)
es(u) def= {v 2 con(u) | 8x(✏   x   v ) x /2 con(u))}
So, an enabling sequence from u is a valid proper continuation from u that is minimal
in the sense that no proper prefix of it suffices as a valid continuation. Observe that
con(u) is nonempty iff es(u) is nonempty. For e 2 es(u) let nme(u, e) be the set of
non-monotonic extensions of e from u.
nme(u, e) def= {w 2 con(u) | e   w ^ f(u·e) 62 f(u·w) ^ (7.1)





The intuition is that a non-monotonic extension of an enabling sequence breaks mono-
tonicity locally and therefore requires a nondeterministic choice to be made in the
underlying transducer. Condition (7.1) ensures that w is a witness of nonmonotonic-
ity while condition (7.2) makes sure that the nonmonotonicity is local in the sense
that the behavior has been monotonic upto butlast(w).
Finally, provided that nme(u) is nonempty we define a partition of a continua-
tion language L that is associated with u. Observe that L here is assumed to be a
nonempty subset of con(u).
eLu def= nme(u)·⌃⇤ \ L
We write eL for eLu when u is clear from the context.
7.0.2 Indexed congruence
Let bfL(u) be the output prefix of f that depends only on input prefix u for input




Define fLu : ⌃⇤ 7!  ⇤? as the continuation function of f after input u that omits from
the output the common output prefix produced for u, wrt continuations from L:
fLu (w)
def
= bfL(u)   f(u·w)
We define the indexed congruence relation ⇠L over ⌃⇤ as follows:
u ⇠L v def() 8w 2 L : fLu (w) = fLv (w) (7.4)
The relations ⇠L induce the following equivalence relation over ⌃⇤ ⇥ 2⌃⇤ :
(u, L) ⌘ (v, L0) def() L = L0 ^ u ⇠L v
A ⌘-equivalence class is denoted by hu, Li/⌘ or hu, Li when ⌘ is clear from the
context. We write bf for bf⌃⇤ and fu for f⌃⇤u . We write ⇠ for ⇠⌃⇤ .
7.0.3 Visibly nondeterministic transducer
The visibly nondeterministic transducer of f , denoted VND(f), is defined as the least
fixpoint of (⌃, , Q, q0, F, , ) satisfying the following conditions.
– q0 = h✏,dom(f)i and q0 2 Q;
– if hu, Li 2 Q and E 2 {eLu, L\eLu}, then, for all x 2 ⌃, if x0E 6= ; then
hu·x, x0Ei 2 Q and
hu, Li x/bfL(u) bfx0E(u·x)          ! hu·x, x0Ei 2  ;
– if hu, Li 2 Q and ✏ 2 L then hu, Li 2 F ;
–   = bfdom(f)(✏).
We have the following main correctness result forVND(f). (Proof is in the appendix.)
Theorem 7. TVND(f) = f .
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Proof. First, we prove (7.5).
8u, v 2 ⌃⇤, x 2 ⌃, L ✓ ⌃⇤, E ✓ L : (u ⇠L v ) (bfL(u)   bfx0E(u·x) = bfL(v)   bfx0E(v·x)))
(7.5)
This implies that for all states q of VND(f), and all outgoing transitions from q
the output produced is invariant wrt ⌘ and therefore the transitions of VND(f) are
well-defined. Consider fixed u, v 2 ⌃⇤, x 2 ⌃, L ✓ ⌃⇤, E ✓ L such that u ⇠L v.
We prove that bfL(u)   bfx0E(u·x) = bfL(v)   bfx0E(v·x) through a series of equivalence
preserving transformations of true statements. First, the following statement holds
by definition of ⇠L, for all x·w 2 L, and therefore also for all x·w 2 E (or w 2 x0E)
bfL(u)   f(u·x·w) = bfL(v)   f(v·x·w)
This implies in particular that the following statement holds
l
w2x0E
bfL(u)   f(u·x·w) = l
w2x0E
bfL(v)   f(v·x·w)
We can reorder the operations because the first parts are fixed
bfL(u)   l
w2x0E
f(u·x·w) = bfL(v)   l
w2x0E
f(v·x·w)
which is, by definition of bfx0E, the same as
bfL(u)   bfx0E(u·x) = bfL(v)   bfx0E(v·x)
which completes the proof of (7.5).
Next we prove that TVND(f) = f . Consider a start state q = hu, Li and a path
in  VND(f) consisting of two transitions starting from q for input characters a, b 2 ⌃
and some states s1 = hv, L1i and s2
q
a/bfL(u) bfa0E(ua)          ! s1 b/bfL1 (v) bfb0E1 (vb)           ! s2
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where we know that E ✓ L, L1 = a0E 6= ;, E1 ✓ L1, b0E1 6= ;, and ua ⇠L1 v. Let
L2 = b0E1. Then, by using (7.5), it follows that bfL1(v)   bfL2(vb) = bfL1(ua)   bfL2(uab),
and therefore the above path equals
q
a/bfL(u) bfL1 (ua)         ! s1 b/bfL1 (ua) bfL2 (uab)           ! s2
from this follows, by generalizing to arbitrary finite paths, given u 2 L0 = dom(f),
|u| = k, that there exists Li for 1  i  k such that
h✏, L0i u[1]/
bfL0 (✏) bfL1 (u[..1])             !hu[..1], L1i u[2]/bfL1 (u[..1]) bfL2 (u[..2])               !
hu[..2], L2i u[3]/
bfL2 (u[..2]) bfL3 (u[..3])               !
hu[..3], L3i · · · hu, Lki
where ✏ 2 Lk because u 2 dom(f), so hu, Lki 2 FVND(f). Then, by using the
definition of  ⇤VND(f) and the definition of TVND(f), it follows that
(u,bfL0(✏)· kO
i=1
(bfLi 1(u[..i 1])   bfLi(u[..i]))) 2 TVND(f)
We can now apply (k   1 times) the simplification that (x   y)·(y   z) = (x   z)




(bfLi 1(u[..i 1])   bfLi(u[..i])) = bfL0(✏)·(bfL0(✏)   bfLk(u)) = bfLk(u)
where the last equality holds because if x 2 y then x·(x   y) = y.
Let L = ]Lk 1
u[..k 1]
be the nonmonotonic lookahead from state hu[..k 1], Lk 1i,
i.e., this is the next to last state. Since ✏ 2 Lk we know that Lk cannot be u[k]0L
because all strings in L have length at least 2. This means that Lk = u[k]0(Lk 1\L)
which implies that Lk does not contain any nonmonotonic extensions of u. In other
words, for all v 2 Lk, f(u) 2 f(uv) and so bfLk(u) = f(u).
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Finally, it follows that (u, f(u)) 2 TVND(f) and if u0 = u then f(u) = f(u0), so
VND(f) is functional. The theorem follows.
Example 3. The example illustrates the principle behind how finalizers from the
subsequential case are handled by visible nondeterminism. Consider the following
functon f over ASCII strings:
f(✏) = ✏, f(&) = &, f(&a) = &a, f(&am) = &am, f(&amp) = &amp, f(&amp;) = &,
This function represents a small part of an HTML decoder. Assume also that for all
other input strings the output is undefined. We illustrate how VND(f) is formed
in this case. We have that, dom(f) = L0 = {✏, &, &a, &am, &amp, &amp;}, es(✏) =
{&},nme(✏, &) = nme(✏) = ;,fL0 = ;. Let L1 = &0L0 = {✏, a, am, amp, amp;}. We
have the transition
h✏, L0i &/&  ! h&, L1i
and es(&) = {a},nme(&, a) = nme(&) = {amp;},fL1 = {amp;}, L1\fL1 = {✏, a, am, amp}.
Let N2 = a0fL1 = {mp;}, M2 = a0(L1\fL1) = {✏, m, mp}. We now get two nondetermin-
istic transitions
h&, L1i a/✏ ! h&a, N2i
h&, L1i a/a  ! h&a,M2i
Next, we get that es(&a) = {m},nme(&a, m) = nme(&a) = {mp;},fN2 = N2, fM2 = ;.
Let N3 = m0N2 = {p;}, M3 = m0M2 = {✏, p}. We get, similarly to above, the
remaining tarnsitions
h&a, N2i m/✏ ! h&am, N3i p/✏ ! h&amp, {;}i ;/✏ ! h&amp;, {✏}i
h&a,M2i m/m  ! h&am,M3i p/p  ! h&amp, {✏}i
Observe that f{✏}u (✏) = bf{✏}(u)   f(u) = f(u)   f(u) = ✏ when u 2 dom(f), so u ⇠{✏} v
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for all u, v 2 dom(f). Therefore h&amp, {✏}i = h&amp;, {✏}i above. The transducer
VND(f) is shown in Figure 3-1(middle). ⇥
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Example 4. Let f be the transduction function of the transducer in Figure 3-1(right).
We construct VND(f). Assume ⌃ = ASCII. We use regular expressions here. Con-
sider q0 = hu, L0i where L0 = [[.*]] and u = ✏. Observe con(✏) = dom(f) = [[.*]] in
this case. We have es(u) = ⌃ and we get the following non-monotonic extension for
each such initial enabling sequence e 2 es(u).
for e 6= < : nme(✏, e) = ;, nme(✏, <) = [[<[^>]*>]]
To understand why nme(✏, <) is [[<[^>]*>]] note that < 2 <a<a> but f(<) 62 f(<a<a>)
while at the same time for any proper prefix x of <a<a> it holds that f(u·<) 2 f(u·x).
It follows that
fL0 = [[<[^>]*>.*]], L0\fL0 = [[<[^>]*|[^<].*|()]].
In order to compute the transitions from the initial state, we first compute the deriva-
tives x0L0\fL0 and x0fL0 with respect to each symbol x 2 ⌃. We have the following
four cases:
L1 = <0fL0 = [[[^>]*>.*]]
L2 = <0L0\fL0 = [[[^>]*]]
for x 6= < : x0fL0 = ;
for x 6= < : x0L0\fL0 = L0
Since both L1 and L2 are nonempty and distinct, there are two distinct states q1 =
h<, L1i and q2 = h<, L2i with the respective associated continuations L1 and L2. Also,
since x0fL0 is empty when x 6= < we may compute the derivative wrt L0, i.e., we get
that for x 6= <, x0L0 = L0.
Transitions are computed as follows. Transition q0
</y1  ! q1 is computed wrt looka-
head fL0 , transition q0 </y2  ! q2 is computed wrt lookahead L0\fL0 , and, for x 6= <,
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transition q0
x/y3  ! hx, L0i is computed wrt lookahead L0, where,
y1 = (bffL0 (✏)   bf<0fL0 (✏·<)) = (✏   bfL1(<)) = ✏
y2 = (bfL0\fL0 (✏)   bf<0L0\fL0 (✏·<)) = (✏   bfL2(<)) = <
for x 6= < : y3 = (bfL0(✏)   bfx0L0(✏·x)) = (✏   bfL0(x)) = x
where y1 6= y2, so the nondeterministic choice from q0 is visible. Next, fix x 6= <. We
show that x ⇠ ✏ (recall that L0 = ⌃⇤) and so hx, L0i = q0. Recall that x ⇠ ✏ holds iffbf(x)   f(x·v) = bf(✏)   f(✏·v) for any v 2 ⌃⇤ and the latter is true because bf(x) = x.
States q1 and q2 are explored as follows. First, we calculate that nme(<) =
[[[^>]+>]].
We consider q2 = h<, L2i first. Fix x 6= >. Since L2 does not admit > it follows
that fL2 = ;, so L2\fL2 = L2. State q2 ends up with loop q2 x/x  ! q2 because x0L2 = L2
and < ⇠L2 <·x. The output on the transition is x because (bfL2(<)   bfx0L2(<·x)) = (<  
<·x) = x. State q2 is final because ✏ 2 L2.
We consider q1 = h<, L1i next. We get that
fL1 = nme(<) · ⌃⇤ \ L1 = [[[^>]+>.*]] \ [[[^>]*>.*]] = [[[^>]+>.*]]
L1\fL1 = [[[^>]*>.*]] \fL1 = [[>.*]]
Fix x 2 ⌃\{>}. It is now easy to calculate that >0L1\fL1 = L0 and x0fL1 = L1 and that
in all other cases the derivative is empty. We also have that <> ⇠L0 ✏ and <·x ⇠L1 <,
so h<>, L0i = q0 and h<·x, L1i = q1. Also, it is straightforward to calculate that the
outputs of the transitions from q1 are empty. Thus the transitions are q1
x 6=>/✏   ! q1
and q1
>/✏ ! q0. Here the initial output   is ✏. ⇥
Now that we defined the general concept of visible non-determinism and visibly
non-deterministic transducers, we will proceed to describe an extension of the algo-
rithm for learning deterministic transducers in order to learn a subclass of the VND
class. The main motivation behind this subclass is that, as we will demonstrate in
our evaluation, it is able to efficiently capture many regular-expression based string
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transformations while being simple enough to allow efficient learnability.
We conjecture that the whole class of VND transducers is in fact efficiently learn-
able and we consider extending our algorithm to be an interesting direction for future
work.
7.0.4 Simple Visibly Non-Deterministic Transducers
We will now describe the additional constraints we impose on the functions in this sec-
tion. Specifically, we call a function f to be simple visibly non-deterministic (SVND)
if it satisfies the following properties:
1. f is visibly non-deterministic.
2. f is total.
3. Consider the transducer VND(f) = (⌃, Q, q0, F, , ). Then, for a state (u, L)
we have that eLu 6= ; =) (u, L) 2 F .
Condition (3) implies that, in the transducer formulation of the function f , non-
deterministic transitions can only happen in final states.
There are two main motivations behind the SVND class of functions: Firstly,
conditions (2) and (3) greatly simplify the analysis of non-monotonic extensions since
they allow us to create a simple oracle in order to check for non-monotonic extensions
from a state in the transducer. Moreover, since non-determinism only emerges from
final states in the target transducer, the analysis we performed for the ROLI algorithm
can be easily reused in this case as well.
Secondly, this class is well suited for learning regular-expression based transfor-
mations such as those performed using preg_replace type functions [71] and which
are commonly found in web applications and are a vital part of security-critical com-
ponents such as input sanitization frameworks. Visible determinism is well suited for
such functions, since the default behavior of the transformation is to compute the
identity function unless the regular expression is matched in which case an alterna-
tive path is triggered. Moreover, such transformations are by definition total and
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therefore, the class of simple visibly non-deterministic functions looks appropriate for
learning models of such transformations.
Learning algorithm overview. Intuitively, our algorithm views the transducer
as an ensemble of deterministic partial transducers. For each input, exactly one
transducer is reaching an accepting state and the output produced by that transducer
is returned as the output of the transduction. Because the transducer is visibly non-
deterministic, we can use the prefixes of each computation in order to distinguish
which partial transducer (or which non-deterministic transitions) were used for each
input character processed by the transducer.
7.0.5 Extended Classification Tree
As in the deterministic algorithm we use the classification tree data structure in
order to distinguish between different states in the target transducer. However, in
this case, we extend the tree in order to hold information regarding the monotonic
or non-monotonic lookaheads from each transition. More specifically we define the
extended classification tree as follows:
Definition 16. An extended classification tree (ECT) is a binary tree T = (V, L,E)
where:
• V ⇢ (P [ (⌃⇤ ⇥ ⌃⇤ ⇥ B) is the set of internal nodes.
• L ⇢ ⌃⇤ ⇥ ⌃⇤ ⇥ B is the set of leafs.
• E ⇢ V ⇥V ⇥B is the transition relation. A transition (u, v, b) is called a T-child
of u if b = T otherwise, it’s called a F-child.
The ECT operates exactly as the original classification tree, however each state is
holding additional information which determines whether it is part of a non-monotonic
extension as we will describe now.
Path Restricted Output Queries The main way we utilize the additional
information in the leafs of the extended classification tree is to implement a concept
called path restricted output queries. First, define a state (u, L) in a visible transducer
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to be enabled for an input v if u 2 v and moreover (u   v) 2 L. In other words, a
state is enabled for an input v if some prefix of v is accessing the state and moreover,
the suffix of v is part of the lookahead of the state.
A path restricted output query is given a leaf (u, v, b) 2 L and a string w and is
computed as:
Qpath(u, v, b) =
8<: f(w), if (u, v, b) is enabled on w?, otherwise. (7.6)
Given a leaf (u, v, b) and a string w In order to check whether the state represented
by the leaf (u, v, b) is enabled we proceed as follows:
1. Initially, we reduce the string w into a string p 2 w such that u 2 p such that
p 2 nme(u, ()), or in the case that no such prefix exists, we set p = w[1]. If
u 62 w we return ?.
2. Afterwards we check if (v 2 f(p)) = b. If the check is passed we return f(w),
otherwise we return ?.
To reduce the string w into the prefix p we use a variation of the path reconstruction
algorithm (described below) in order to recover all the non-monotonic paths and
select the appropriate one. Now that we have described the path restricted output
queries, we can give a better explanation on the structure of the leafs in the extended
classification tree:
Because of the additional constraints (2),(3) in the definition of the SVND class we
have that for any state all enabling suffixes are of length 1. Therefore, for a state u and
symbol ↵, we can always query f(u) and f(u↵) and obtain the corresponding output.
A tuple (u, v, b) represents the access string u, v represents the prefix generated by the
transducer up to u and b is a boolean value which denotes whether the current state
satisfies (if it’s monotonic) or doesn’t satisfy (non-monotonic) the produced prefix.
Therefore, states which are parts of non-monotonic extensions are always of the form
(u, v,F) while “normal” states are of the form (u, v,T).
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Initialization. As in the case of the simple classification tree we initialize the
tree with a single domain distinguishing predicate Pdom✏ . However, in this case we
start with two initial leafs, one containing (✏, ✏,T) being the T-child of the root
node and one containing (↵, f(↵),F) being the F-child of the root node. The second
leaf represents any possible non-monotonic extensions from the initial state (or the
dead-end state if none exist).
Induced NFA construction. Given an extended classification tree, we would
like to construct the NFA induced by the tree in order to invoke the ROLI algorithm
and obtain a transducer model. We proceed similarly as in the deterministic algo-
rithm with two major differences: First, when we compute the transitions from a
source state (u, v, b) we utilize path restricted output queries to determine the target
for the transition. Second, from each final state (i.e. a state of the form (u, vT)),
we generate two set of outgoing transitions, one normal monotonic transition and a
non-monotonic extension, as follows: For the monotonic extension we compute the
outgoing transitions as described above. For the non-monotonic transitions we per-
form the path restricted queries using the tuple (u, v,F) in order to enforce violation
of the monotonicity property.
Extending the classification tree. Extending the extended classification tree
with new distinguishing predicates and queries works exactly as in the case of the
classification tree.
7.0.6 Induced NFA Verification
Once the induced NFA is constructed and before we invoke the ROLI algorithm we
proceed to verify that the model is representing an unambiguous transducer model.
More specifically, we check whether there exists two different paths leading to a final
state. Such paths would violate the single-valuedness property of the transducer and
therefore one of them should be invalid. We process such counterexamples as we
describe in the corresponding section of ambiguity counterexamples below. Once the
NFA model is verified we proceed to invoke the ROLI algorithm, generate a transducer
model, and process any counterexamples resulting from either the ROLI algorithm
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or the subsequent equivalence queries. We point out that since SVND transducers
presented limited non-determinism, the analysis of the ROLI algorithm can be easily
ported into this class.
7.0.7 Counterexample Processing
In a nutshell, the counterexample processing algorithm first uses the visibility of non-
determinism in order to trace, for each prefix of the counterexample, whether the
transition followed by the next character was towards a non-monotonic extension or
towards a monotonic extension. After the correct path (i.e. the sequence of non-
deterministic choices) are recovered in the target transducer we reduce the problem
to the deterministic setting and use the algorithm from our deterministic transducer
learning algorithm to further process the counterexample and extract a distinguishing
predicate.
Path reconstruction algorithm. We will now proceed to describe our path
reconstruction algorithm, which, given a string u returns a sequence of non deter-
ministic choices p 2 {M,N}⇤ where p[i] = N if the transducer on input u followed a
non-monotonic transition on the target transducer with u[i]. The path reconstruction
algorithm uses violations of the monotonicity of the target function in order to recover
the non-deterministic choices made by the target transducer. The algorithm performs
a linear scan on the outputs obtained from all prefixes of u keeps a set T of intervals
[i, j] denoting that a non-monotonic extension was followed starting at u[i] and up
to u[j]. Because certain prefixes of u might follow different paths in the transducer
than the ones u is following, some of the paths recovered up to some position i may
be invalidated afterwards. More specifically, given a string u the algorithm works as
follows:
1. Initially, for each prefix u[..i  1] an output query is performed. For simplicity,
denote by ti = f(u[..i  1]). Moreover the set of intervals is initialized as T = ;.
2. For each i 2 [0, |u|  1 do:
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(a) If ti 62 ti+1, then let l < i be the largest index such that tl 2 ti+1. We add
the interval [l, i+ 1] in the set of intervals T .
(b) Remove and other intervals from T which have a non empty intersection
with [l, i+ 1].
3. Let p 2 {M,N}|u| be the sequence of non-deterministic choices. Set p[i] = N if
there exists an interval which starts at i and p[i] =M otherwise.
Processing Equivalence query counterexamples. Let s be a counterexam-
ple for a model h produced by the learning algorithm. The overall counterexample
processing algorithm proceeds as follows:
1. Run the path reconstruction algorithm and obtain the path p followed by s in
the target transducer.
2. Trace the execution of the model h on the transition choices followed by the
path p and execute the deterministic counterexample processing algorithm using
path restricted output queries to answer any output queries performed by the
deterministic counterexample processing algorithm.
The reduction to the deterministic learning algorithm is now straightforward: Because
of visibility we can recover the non-deterministic choices in the target transducer and
then invoke the deterministic counterexample processing algorithm, taking care to
restrict the model in the same path as in the target transducer by utilizing path
restricted output queries instead of normal queries. Notice, that because of that, the
resulting model as viewed by the deterministic learning algorithm will be partial and
therefore, our algorithm from section 6.4 is fundamental for the success of the SVND
learning algorithm.
Processing ambiguous input counterexamples. Finally, we now describe a
small variation to the above counterexample processing algorithm which can be used
in order to process counterexample occurring due to violations of the single valuedness
of the model as described above. Given an ambiguous input s for the NFA model h
constructed by the learning algorithm, we proceed as follows: Let p1, p2 be the two
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distinct ambiguous paths in h. We ran the path reconstruction algorithm for the
input s and recover that path pt in the target. Afterwards, let pi 2 {p1, p2} such that
pi 6= pt. Finally, we run the counterexample processing described above but instead
of tracing the execution of the model on pt we trace the execution on pi. Notice, that
when restricted to pi, our model h reaching a final state, while the target transducer,
by using path restricted output queries as an oracle, is returning ? as an output.
Therefore, the string s can be processed as a domain counterexample using the same
counterexample processing algorithm we used in the deterministic setting.
7.0.8 Learning Algorithm Summary
Overall, the learning algorithm for SVND follows the same high level loop as the
deterministic learning algorithm with the addition of the verification step for the
induced NFA model. Once the first model is produced, the same iteration is followed
as in the deterministic algorithm where counterexamples (either from ROLI or from
an equivalence query) are used in order to add new distinguishing predicates in the
model until the equivalence query returns T.
The following theorem summarizes the correctness and complexity of our algo-
rithm:
Theorem 8. The class of simple visibly non-deterministic transducers can be learned
with O(mn3|⌃| + nm(n + m)) output queries and n equivalence queries, where n is
the number of states in the target transducer, and m is the length of the longest
counterexample.
The main overhead compared with the deterministic algorithm is the fact that,
in many occasions, we replace normal output queries, with path restricted output






8.1.1 Boolean Algebras and Symbolic Automata
In symbolic automata, transitions carry predicates over a decidable Boolean algebra.
An effective Boolean algebra A is a tuple (D, , [_],?,>,_,^,¬) where D is a set of
domain elements ;  is a set of predicates closed under the Boolean connectives, with
?,> 2  ; [_] :  ! 2D is a denotation function such that (i) [?] = ;, (ii) [>] = D,
and (iii) for all ', 2  , [' _  ] = ['] [ [ ], [' ^  ] = ['] \ [ ], and [¬'] = D \ ['].
Example 5 (Equality Algebra). The equality algebra for an arbitrary set D has
predicates formed from Boolean combinations of formulas of the form  c. c = a where
a 2 D. Formally,  is generated from the Boolean closure of  0 = {'a | a 2
D} [ {?,>} where for all a 2 D, ['a] = {a}. Examples of predicates in this algebra
include  c. c = 5 _ c = 10 and  c.¬(c = 0).
Definition 17 (Symbolic Finite Automata). A symbolic finite automaton (s-FA)M is
a tuple (A, Q, qinit, F, ) where A is an effective Boolean algebra, called the alphabet ;
Q is a finite set of states; qinit 2 Q is the initial state; F ✓ Q is the set of final states ;
and   ✓ Q⇥ A ⇥Q is the transition relation consisting of a finite set of moves or
transitions.
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Characters are elements of DA, and words or strings are finite sequences of char-
acters, or elements of D⇤A. The empty word of length 0 is denoted by ✏. A move
⇢ = (q1,', q2) 2  , also denoted by q1 ' ! q2, is a transition from the source state
q1 to the target state q2, where ' is the guard or predicate of the move. For a state
q 2 Q, we denote by guard(q) the set of guards for all moves from q. For a character
a 2 DA, an a-move of M , denoted q1 a ! q2 is a move q1 ' ! q2 such that a 2 ['].
An s-FA M is deterministic if, for all transitions (q,'1, q1), (q,'2, q2) 2  , q1 6=
q2 ! ['1 ^'2] = ;—i.e., for each state q and character a there is at most one a-move
out of q. An s-FA M is complete if, for all q 2 Q, [W(q,'i,qi)2  'i] = dom—i.e.,
for each state q and character a there exists an a-move out of q. Throughout the
paper we assume all s-FAs are deterministic and complete, since determinization and
completion are always possible [39]. Given an s-FAM = (A, Q, qinit, F, ) and a state
q 2 Q, we say a word w = a1a2 · · · ak is accepted at state q if, for 1  i  k, there
exist moves qi 1
ai ! qi such that qinit = q and qk 2 F .
For a deterministic s-FAM and a word w, we denote byMq[w] the state reached in
M by w when starting at state q. When q is omitted we assume that execution starts
at qinit. For a word w = a1 · · · ak, we use w[i..] = ai · · · ak, w[..i] = a1 · · · ai, w[i] = ai
to denote the suffix starting from the i-th position, the prefix up to the i-th position
and the character at the i-th position respectively. We use B = {T,F} to denote the
Boolean domain. A word w is called an access string for state q 2 Q if M [w] = q.
For two states q, p 2 Q, a word w is called a distinguishing string, if exactly one of
Mq[w] and Mp[w] is final.
8.2 Learning Algorithm Overview
From a mathematical point of view, learning a symbolic state machine amounts to
learning the underlying equivalence relation and moreover, learning the predicates
that represent the guards between the transitions of the s-FA. In order to provide a
general solution to this problem we will assume the existence of an additional learning
algorithm for the underlying predicates. Naturally, the ability to learn the underlying
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predicates of the target s-FA is a necessary condition in order to guarantee the learn-
ability of the overall s-FA. Next we will discuss two models of learning algorithms for
the underlying predicate learning algorithms.
8.2.1 Partition Learning Algorithms
Since we are learning deterministic s-FAs, the set of predicates in the outgoing tran-
sitions from any state forms a partition of the symbolic alphabet. Therefore, it is
natural to consider algorithms which, given query access to a partition using predi-
cates from the Boolean algebra, are able to recover the partition. As we will see in
the MAT ⇤ algorithm, we can use such algorithms as building blocks for our MAT ⇤
algorithm. We will now formally define the problem of learning partitions using
queries.
For the following we will consider a partition S to be a set S = { 1, . . . , k} of
predicates from a Boolean algebra A such that _ 2S = T and for any  i, j 2 S with
i 6= j we have that  i ^  j = F.
Definition 18. In the partition learning problem, query access is given to a target
partition S = { 1, . . . , k}. Queries to the target partition can be performed as
follows:
• Membership Queries: In a memebership query the input is a symbol c 2 D
and the output returned is
S(c) def= i > 0 : c 2 [ i] (8.1)
In other words, given a symbol c the index of the predicate satisfied by the
symbol is given.
• Equivalence Queries: In an equivalence query, a model H of the target par-
tition is provided and the equivalence oracle returns either T if H = S, or a





Figure 8-1: An s-FA over equality algebra.
Now that we defined the partition learning problem, we will proceed to define
a partition learning algorithm, which is a MAT learning algorithm for the partition
learning problem.
Definition 19. A partition learning algorithm PA for a boolean algebra A is a MAT
learning algorithm which can learn partitions using predicates from the Boolean alge-
bra A. We will assume that partition learning algorithms perform proper equivalence
queries, i.e. all models S 0 submitted for equivalence checking will satisfy the partition
definition.
8.2.2 Predicate Learning Algorithm
While partition learning algorithms are a natural candidate for learning the transitions
of the target s-FA they have a significant disadvantage. They do not directly relate
the learnability of the underlying predicates with the learnability of the target s-
FA. In other words, given an algorithm which is able to learn predicates from the
underlying Boolean algebra efficiently, can we guarantee the efficient learnability of a
target s-FA which uses predicates from the same Boolean algebra?
Next, we will describe the MAT ⇤ algorithm which provides an answer to this
fundamental question. Also we will see that MAT ⇤ can be easily adapted in order to
utilize an underlying partition learning algorithm.
8.3 The MAT ⇤ Algorithm
Overview. The main idea behind the MAT ⇤ algorithm is simple: We utilize the
traditional L⇤algorithm in order to approximate the Nerode congruence of the target
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Algorithm 7 s-FA-Learn(O, E ,⇤) // s-FA Learning algorithm




H  GetSFAModel(T, S⇤,O)
while E(H) 6= T do
w  GetCounterexample(H)
T, S⇤  ProcessCounterexample(T, S⇤, w,O)
H  GetSFAModel(T, S⇤,O)
return H
s-FA and then, we utilize either the partition or the predicate learning algorithms in
order to learn the underlying predicates and build an s-FA model. The main challenge
in utilizing the underlying partition or predicate learning algorithms is the lack of a
membership and an equivalence oracle for the corresponding target predicates. To
address this problem we will show how to utilize the partial congruence relation in
order to simulate membership queries to the underlying predicates and moreoveer,
utilize the s-FA equivalence oracle to simulate equivalence queries for the underlying
predicates.
The pseudocode for the overallMAT ⇤ algorithm can be found in algorithm 7. Ob-
serve that the high level structure of the algorithm is identical with the L⇤algorithm.
The algorithm starts by constructing a simple congruence which is used in order to
built the s-FA model. Once a model is built, we submit it for equivalence testing.
However, given a counterexample we use it to either extend the congruence or in order
to refine the predicates in the s-FA model.
We will now describe each module of the MAT ⇤ algorithm in more detail.
8.3.1 Contructing an s-FA model
Assume we are given a classification tree T = (V, L,E). Our next task is to use
the tree along with the underlying algebra learning algorithm ⇤ to produce an s-FA
model. The main idea is to spawn an instance of the ⇤ algorithm for each potential
transition and then use the classification tree to answer membership queries posed
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by each ⇤ instance. Initially, we define an s-FA H = (A, QH, q✏, FH, H), where
QH = {qs | s 2 L}—i.e. we create one state for each leaf of the classification tree T .
Finally, for any q 2 QH, we have that q 2 FH if and only if O(q) = T. Next, we will
show how to build the transition relation forH. As mentioned above, our construction
is based on the idea of spawning instances of ⇤ for each potential transition of the s-
FA and then using the classification tree to decide, for each character, if the character
satisfies the guard of the potential transition thus answering membership queries
performed by the underlying algebra learner.
Constructing a model using a predicate learning algorithm
Guard inference. To infer the set of guards in the transition relation  H, we spawn,
for each pair of states (qu, qv) 2 QH⇥QH, an instance ⇤(qu,qv) of the algebra learning
algorithm. We answer membership queries to ⇤(qu,qv) as follows. Let ↵ 2 D be a
symbol queried by ⇤(qu,qv). Then, we return T as the answer to O(↵) if sift(u↵) = v
and F otherwise. Once ⇤(qu,qv) submits an equivalence query E( ) using a model  ,
we suspend the execution of the algorithm and add the transition (qu, , qv) in  H.
Partition verification. Once all algebra learners have submitted a model through
an equivalence query, we have a complete transition relation  H. However, at this
point there is no guarantee that for each state q the outgoing transitions from q
form a partition of the domain D. Therefore, it may be the case that our s-FA
model H is in fact non-deterministic and, moreover, that certain symbols do not
satisfy any guard. Using such a model in an equivalence query would result in an
improper learning algorithm and potential problems in the counterexample processing
algorithm in Section 8.3.2. To mitigate this issue we perform the following checks:
1. Determinism check: For each state qs 2 QH and each pair of moves
(qs, 1, qu), (qs, 2, qv) 2  H, we verify that [ 1 ^  2] = ;. Assume that a
character ↵ is found such that ↵ 2 [ 1 ^  2] and let m = sift(s↵). Then,
it must be the case that the guard of the transition qs ! qm must satisfy ↵.
Therefore, we check if m = u and m = v and provide ↵ as a counterexample to
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⇤(qs,qu) and ⇤(qs,qv) respectively if the corresponding check fails.
2. Completeness check. For each state qu 2 QH let S = {  | (q, , p) 2  H}.
We check that [
W
 2S  ] = D. If a symbol h 62 [
W
 2S  ] is found then, let
v = sift(uh). Following the same reasoning as above, we provide h as a
counterexample to ⇤(qu,qv).
These checks are iterated for each state until no more counterexamples are found. In
figure 8-2 we demonstrate instances of failed determinism and completeness checks
while learning our running example from figure 8-1 along with the corresponding
updates on the predicates. For details regarding the equality algebra learner, see
section 8.5.
Optimizing the number of algebra learning instances. Note that in the description
above, MAT ⇤ spawns one instance of ⇤ for each possible transition between states
in H. To reduce the number of spawned algebra learning instances, we perform the
following optimization: For each state qs we initially spawn a single algebra learning
instance ⇤(qs,?). Let ↵ be the first symbol queried by ⇤(qs,?) and let u = sift(s↵). We
return > as a query answer for ↵ to ⇤(qs,?) and set the target state for the instance
to qu, i.e. we convert the algebra learning instance to ⇤(qs,qu). Afterwards, we keep a
set R = {qv | v = sift(s )} for all   2 D queried by the different algebra learning
instances and generate new instances only for states qv 2 R for which the guards
are not yet inferred. Using this optimization, the total number of generated algebra
learning instances never exceeds the number of transitions in the target s-FA.
Constructing a model using a partition learning algorithm
When we are given access to a partition learning algorithm instead of a predicate
learning algorithm, the construction of the s-FA model is much simples, since the
partition verification step performed above can be skipped as all models produced by
the partition learning algorithm P will already be partitions of the alphabet.
Building the model. In order to build the s-FA model, from each state qu 2 Q
we spawn a single instance of the predicate learning algorithm P (qu) and answer
83
Figure 8-2: (left) Classification tree and corresponding learned states for our running
example. (right) Two different instances of failed partition verification checks that
occured during learning and their respective updates on the given counterexamples
(CE).
membership queries as follows:
O(c) = sift(u↵) (8.2)
In other words, we answer membership queries in the same exact way, but instead of
answering with a Boolean {T,F} we forward as the label of the target predicate to
be the accessing string for the state accessed using the queried symbol c.
Once an equivalence query is performed by the partition learning algorithm P (qu),
we inspect the generated partition H and for each predicate  v 2 H we add the
transition (u, v, v) in the s-FA model. Once this process is repeated for all states,
we have a complete s-FA model.
8.3.2 Counterexample Processing
In a nutshell, our algorithm works similarly to the classic Rivest-Schapire algo-
rithm [75] and the TTT algorithm [51] for learning DFAs, where a binary search
is performed to locate the index in the counterexample where the executions of the
model automaton and the target one diverge. However, once this breakpoint index is
found, our algorithm performs further analysis to determine if the divergence is caused
by an undiscovered state in our model automaton or because the guard predicate that
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consumes the breakpoint index character is incorrect.
Error localization. Let w be a counterexample for a model H generated as described
above. For each index i 2 [1..|w|], let qu = H[w[..i]] be the state accessed by w[..i] in
H and let  i = uw[i+ 1..]. In other words,  i is obtained by first running w in H for
i steps and then, concatenating the access string for the state reached in H with the
word w[i + 1..]. Note that, because initially the model H and the target s-FA start
at the same state accessed by ✏, the two machines are synchronized and therefore,
O( 0) = O(w). Moreover, since w is a counterexample, we have that O( |w|) 6= O(w).
It follows that, there exists an index j, which we will refer to as breakpoint, for which
O( j) 6= O( j+1). The counterexample processing algorithm uses a binary search on
the index j to find such a breakpoint.
Breakpoint analysis. Once we find an index j such that O( j) 6= O( j+1) we can
conclude that the transition taken in H from H[w[..j]] with the symbol w[j + 1] is
incorrect. In traditional algorithms for learning DFAs, the sole reason for having
an incorrect transition would be that the transition is actually directed to a yet
undiscovered state in the target automaton. However, in the symbolic setting we
have to explore two different possibilities. Let qu = H[w[..j]] be the state accessed in
H by w[..j], qv = sift(uw[j+1]) be the result of sifting uw[j+1] in the classification
tree and consider the transition (qu, , qv) 2  H. We use the guard   to determine
if the counterexample was caused by an invalid predicate guard or an undiscovered
state in the target s-FA.
Case 1. Incorrect guard. Assume that w[j + 1] 62 [ ]. Note that,   was generated as
a model by ⇤(qu,qv) and therefore, a membership query from ⇤(qu,qv) for a character ↵
returns T if sift(u↵) = v. Moreover, we have that sift(uw[j + 1]) = v. Therefore,
if w[j + 1] 62 [ ], then w[j + 1] is a counterexample for the learning instance ⇤(qu,qv)
which produced  . We proceed to supply ⇤(qu,qv) with the counterexample w[j + 1],
update the corresponding guard or partition and proceed to generate a new s-FA
model.
Case 2. Undiscovered state. Assume w[j + 1] 2 [ ]. It follows that   is behaving as
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Figure 8-3: (left) A minimal s-FA. (right) The s-FA corresponding to the classification
tree of MAT ⇤ with access strings for qinit and q2 and a single distinguishing string ✏.
expected on the symbol w[j+1] based on the current classification tree. We conclude
that the state accessed by w[..j + 1] is in fact an undiscovered state in the target
s-FA which we have to distinguish from the previously discovered states. Therefore,
we proceed to add a new leaf in the tree to access this state. More specifically, we
replace the leaf labelled with v with a sub-tree consisting of three nodes: the root is
the word w[j+1..], which is the distinguishing string for the states accessed by v and
uw[j + 1]. The T-child and F-child of this node are labelled with the words v and
uw[j] based on the results of O(v) and O(uw[j + 1]).
Finally, we have to take care of one last point: Once we add another state in the
classification tree, certain queries that were previously directed to v may be directed
to uw[j] once we sift them down in the tree. This change implies that certain previous
queries performed by algebra learning instances ⇤(qs,qv) may be given invalid results
and therefore, we can no longer guarantee correctness of the generated predicates.
To solve this problem, we terminate all instances ⇤(qs,qv) for all qs 2 QH and replace
them with fresh instances of the algebra learning algorithm.
8.4 Correctness and Completeness of MAT ⇤
Given a learning algorithm ⇤, we use C⇤m(n) to denote the number of membership
queries and C⇤e (n) to denote the number of equivalence queries performed by ⇤ for
a target concept with representation size n. In our analysis we will also use the
following definitions:
Definition 20. Let M = (A, Q, q0, F, ) over a Boolean algebra A and let S ✓  A.
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Then, we define:
– The maximum size of the union of predicates in S as U(S) def= max ✓S |
W
 2   |.
– The maximum guard union size for M as B(M) def= maxq2Q U(guard(q)).
The value B(M) denotes the maximum size that a predicate guard may take in any
intermediate hypothesis produced by MAT ⇤ during the learning process. Contrary
to traditional L⇤-style algorithms, the size of the intermediate hypothesis produced
by MAT ⇤ may fluctuate as we demonstrate in the following example.
Example 6. Consider the s-FA in the left side of figure 8-3. When we execute
the MAT ⇤ algorithm in this s-FA, and after an access string for q2 is added to the
classification tree, the tree will correspond to the s-FA shown on the right, in which
the transition from qinit is taken over the union of the individual transitions in the
target. Certain sequences of answers to equivalence queries can force MAT ⇤ to first
learn a correct model of  1 _  2 _  3 before revealing a new state in the target s-FA.
We now state the correctness and query complexity of our algorithm.
Theorem 9. Let M = (A, Q, q0, F, ) be an s-FA, ⇤ be a learning algorithm A
and let k = B(M). Then, MAT ⇤ will learn M using ⇤ with O(|Q|2| |C⇤m(k) +
|Q|2| |C⇤e (k) logm) membership and O(|Q|| |C⇤e (k)) equivalence queries, where m is
the length of the longest counterexample given to MAT ⇤.
Proof. First, we note that our counterexample processing algorithm only splits a leaf
if there exists a valid distinguishing condition separating the two newly generated
leafs. Therefore, the number of leafs in the discrimination tree is always at most
|Q|. Next, note that each counterexample is processed using a binary search with
complexity O(logm) to detect the breakpoint and, afterwards, either a new state is
added or a counterexample is dispatched to the corresponding algebra learner.
Each classification tree T = (V, L,E) defines a partition over dom⇤ and, therefore,
an s   FA HT . In the worst case, MAT ⇤ will learn HT exactly before a new state
in the target s-FA is revealed through an equivalence query. Since HT is the result of
87
merging states in the target s-FA, we conclude that the size of each predicate in HT is
at most k. It follows that, for each classification tree T , we can get at most | HT |C⇤e (k)
counterexamples until a new state is uncovered on the target s-FA. Note here, that our
counterexample processing algorithm ensures that each counterexample will be either
a valid counterexample for a predicate guard in HT or it will uncover a new state.
For each membership query performed by an underlying algebra learner, we have to
sift a string in the classification tree which requires at most |Q| membership queries.
Therefore, the total number of membership queries performed for each candidate
model H is bounded by O(| |(|Q|C⇤m(k) + C⇤e (k) logm) where m is the size of the
longest counterexample so far. The number of equivalence queries is bounded by
O(| |C⇤e (k)). When a new state is uncovered, we assume that, in the worst case, all
the algebra learners will be restarted (this is an overestimation) and therefore, the
same process will be repeated at most |Q| times giving us the stated bounds.
Note that the bounds on the number of queries stated in theorem 9 are based on
the worst-case assumption that we may have to restart all guard learning instances
each time we discover a new state. In practice, we expect these bounds to be closer
O(| |C⇤m(k)+(| |C⇤e (k)+ |Q|) logm) membership and O(| |C⇤e (k)+ |Q|) equivalence
queries.
Minimality of learned s-FA.
Since the MAT ⇤ will only add a new state in the s-FA if a distinguishing sequence
is found it follows that the total number of states in the s-FA is minimal. Moreover,
MAT ⇤ will not modify in any way the predicates returned by the underlying algebra
learning instances. Therefore, if the size of the predicates returned by the ⇤ instances
is minimal, MAT ⇤ will maintain their minimality.
The following theorem shows that it is indeed not possible to learn s-FAs over a
Boolean algebra that is not itself learnable.
Theorem 10. Let ⇤s FA be an efficient learning algorithm for the algebra of s-FAs
over a Boolean algebra A. Then, the Boolean algebra A is efficiently learnable.
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Which s-FAs are efficiently learnable?
Theorem 10 shows that efficient lernability of an s-FA requires efficient learnability
of the underlying algebra. Moreover, from theorem 9 it follows that efficiently learn-
ability using MAT ⇤ depends on the following property of the underlying algebra:
Corollary 1. Let A be an efficiently learnable Boolean algebra and consider the class
Rs FAA of s-FAs over A. Then, Rs FAA is efficiently learnable using MAT ⇤ if and
only if, for any set S ✓  A such that for any distinct  , 2 S =) [  ^  ] = ;, we
have that U(S) = poly(|S|,max 2S | |).
At this point we would like to point out that the above condition arises due
to the fact that MAT ⇤ is a congruence-based algorithm which successively computes
hypothesis automata based on refining a set of access and distinguishing strings which
is a common characteristic among all L⇤-based algorithms. Therefore, this limitation
of MAT ⇤ is expected to be shared by any other algorithm in the same family. Given
the fact that after three decades of research, L⇤-based algorithms are the only known,
provably efficient algorithms for learning DFAs (and subsequently s-FAs), we expect
that expanding the class of learnable s-FAs is a very challenging task.
8.5 Learnable Boolean Algebras
We will now describe a number of interesting effective Boolean algebras which are
efficiently learnable using membership and equivalence queries.
Boolean Algebras over finite domains. Let A be any Boolean Algebra over a finite
domain dom. Then, any predicate   2  can be learned using |dom| membership
queries. More specifically, the learning algorithm constructs a predicate   accepting
all elements in dom for which the membership queries return true as   = {c | c 2
dom ^ O(c) = T}. Plugging this algebra learning algorithm into our algorithm,
we get the TTT learning algorithm for DFAs without discriminator finalization [51].
This simple example demonstrates that algorithms for DFAs can be viewed as special
cases of our s-FA learning algorithm for finite domains.
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Equality Algebra. Consider the equality algebra defined in example 5. Predicates
in this algebra of size | | = k can be learned using 2k equivalence queries and no
membership queries. Initially, the algorithm outputs the empty set ? as a hypothesis.
In any subsequent step, the algorithm keeps a list of the counterexamples obtained
so far in two sets P,N ✓ dom such that P holds all the positive examples received
so far and N holds all the negative examples. Afterwards, the algorithm finds the
smallest hypothesis consistent with the counterexamples given. This hypothesis can
be found efficiently as follows:
1. If |P | > |N | then,   =  c.¬(Wd2N c = d).
2. If |P |  |N | then,   =  c. (Wd2P c = d).
It can be easily shown that the algorithm will find a correct hypothesis after at most
2k equivalence queries.
Other Algebras. The following Boolean algebras can be efficiently learned using mem-
bership and equivalence queries. All these algebras also have approximate finger-
prints [14], which means that they are not learnable by equivalence queries alone.
1. BDD algebra. The algebra of ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) is
efficiently learnable using a variant of the L⇤ algorithm [66].
2. Tree automata algebra. Deterministic finite tree automata form an algebra
which is also learnable using membership and equivalence queries [44].
3. s-FA algebra. s-FAs themselves form an effective Boolean algebra and there-
fore, s-FAs over s-FAs over learnable algebras are also learnable.
8.6 Learning Equality Partitions from Data
In this section we are going to explore algorithms with which we can solve the par-
tition learning problem using the corpus of data C. Specifically, we will describe a
maximum likehood estimation (MLE) algorithm for the partition learning problem.
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An advantage of our algorithm is that it works for any predicate family, since we
assume no specific structure in the predicates themselves.
A first approach in order to compute the MLE partition would be, given the
training set, to directly compute the most likely partition given the corpus C, by
taking each partition as an individual element and find the partition with the highest
likehood. However, the number of different partitions for large sets is huge and
therefore, this approach is unlikely to yield any practical results.
A more natural and practical approach is to assume that the occurrence of each
set in a partition is independent from the others sets in the same partition conditioned
on the fact the collection of sets still forms a partition.
Definition 21. In the Partition Learning Maximum Likehood Estimation problem
(PL-MLE) the input is a tuple (T,⌃,P , fP (·)) where, fP is a partial function fP : P !
[0, 1] of probabilities over subsets of ⌃ and T = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} is the training data.
The goal in the PL-MLE is to find a set Pm = {S1, S2, . . . , Sk}, Si 2 P such that:
1. 8i 2 [k], Si ◆ si.
2.
S
i2[k] Si = ⌃.
3. 8i, j s.t i 6= j =) Si \ Sj = ;.
4. max
Q
i2[k] Pr[Si] = max
Q
i2[k] fP (Si) = max
P
i2[k] log fP (Si).
The first condition implies that when generalizing the observations we will retain
the already known symbols into the correct set, the second and third conditions imply
that the sets we will select will indeed form a partition of our alphabet while the last
condition asserts that we will select the sets that maximize the overall likehood. One
technical point that one should take into account is defining the function fP (·) which
defines the probability of each predicate in P . Since the domain of the function is
|P|  2|⌃| defining each individual value will require the same amount of space to be
given as input. To avoid this exponential blowup in terms of the size of the input
we assume that any point in the function not specified in the input is being given an
equal uniform value, normalized in order to satisfy
P
S2P fP (S) = 1.
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Unfortunately, finding such a partition is a computationally intractable problem
as we prove in the following theorem.
Theorem 11. The decision PL-MLE problem is NP-Complete.
8.6.1 A Greedy MLE algorithm
Algorithm 8 Greedy partition learning MLE algorithm.
Require: T is a set of tuples (q, Sq) where q is a label and Sq ✓ ⌃, P ✓P(⌃) is a
predicate family and fP is a function fP : P ! [0, 1].
1: function GreedyPL-MLE(T,⌃,P , fP )
2: P  ;
3: M  ;




5: while |T | > 1 do
6: for (q, Sq) 2 T do
7:  q  argmax
 2P
I{Sq ✓   ^   \D \ Sq = ;}fP ( )
8: M  M [ {(Sq, q)}
9: if max(Sq , q)2M fP ( q) = min_prob then




12: SqM , M  argmax
(Sq , )2M
fP ( )
13: P  P [ { M}
14: D  D [  M
15: T  T \ {(qM , SqM )}
16: P  P [ {⌃ \D}
17: return P
Given the NP-Hardness of computing the MLE for the partition learning problem
we will now describe a greedy algorithm which repeatedly assigns the label with the
highest probability that is consistent with the data to the corresponding set.
Technical Description.
The pseudocode for the algorithm is presented in algorithm 8. We will now describe
each step of the algorithm in more detail. Initially, the algorithm will initialize a set
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D = [(q,Sq)Sq which contains all the symbols available in the training data (line 4).
The goal here is collect all symbols which are already assigned into a label by the
training data in order to avoid reassigned them. The next step (line 7) is to select, for
each label q the set with the maximum likehood that is compatible with the currently
assigned data D and is a superset of the training data available for the label q. The
expression I{S ✓   ^   \D \ Sq = ;} denotes an indicator variable, taking a value
1/0 depending on whether the specified expression holds.
After this process is repeated for all labels, we select the predicate with the highest
overall probability (line 13). In case that the maximum (and therefore, all other
labels) is equal to the minimum uniform probability, then the algorithm will choose
the label with the smallest training data size and generate a predicate containing only
the training data and assign it to the corresponding label.
Once this label is assigned, we add all symbols belonging to the newly assigned
predicate to the set D in order to exclude them from further selection in the future,
remove the label we just assigned from the training data and repeat the process (lines
15-17).
Finally, once all but one labels are assigned, we break out of the main loop and
assign the final label to the remaining symbols (line 19). This avoids many technical
difficulties since we can guarantee completeness in our partition regardless of the
assignment of the first n 1 sets. Notice, that this assignment assumes that {⌃\D} 2
P which may require the assumption that P =P(⌃).
Correctness and analysis.
The correctness of our algorithm is evident from the technical description above.
Indeed, the way we select the predicate with the maximum likehood (line 7) ensures
that each selected predicate is a superset of the training data and also that it does
not intersect with any other predicates already selected. Finally, the way the last
predicate is selected (line 19) ensures that the final set of predicates will partition the
alphabet ⌃.
The next natural question is how close is our greedy algorithm to the optimal
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likehood. It is very easy to show that we will always be within a factor |T | from the
log-likehood of the optimal solution.
Theorem 12. Let (⌃, T,P , fP (·)), where |T | = k, be an instance of the PL-MLE
problem. Also, let COPT = max
P
i2[k] log fP (Si) be the optimal log-likehood to the
PL-MLE instance and CG be the log-estimate of the greedy MLE algorithm. Then,
COPT  k · CG.
We can also show that this simple analysis is tight. In the following we denote by
negl(x) to be a negligible function of x, i.e. a function smaller than any polynomial.
Theorem 13. There exists an instance of the PL-MLE problem such that COPT =
kCG   negl(COPT ).
Nevertheless, in practice, the average number of transitions in the SFAs we en-
countered both in our training set as well as in our test set, have small number of
transitions, around |T | = 2 on average, and therefore, this greedy algorithm tends to
perform well in practice.
8.6.2 A frequency based GuardGen algorithm
We will now use our greedy MLE algorithm in order to built a simple frequency based
GuardGen algorithm, called MLEGuardgen, for inferring the transitions of an SFA. Our
algorithm presents a very simple, yet efficient, construction which demonstrates the
possibilities of our hybrid learning model and our MLE framework.
Training the GuardGen algorithm.
Let C be a corpus of SFAs and Mi = (Qi, F, q0,P , ) 2 C be an SFA om C. Then,









Notice here, that G is a multiset thus, repetitions of members are allowed. Given
the multiset of all predicate guards we are going to create a probability distribution
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over all predicate guards in the predicate family P . Next, we process each predicate
from G and assign a score as score( ) = countG( ), where the countG( ) function
counts the number of occurences of element   in the multiset G. For all predicates
  which are not found in our training data we set score( ) = 0. Finally, converting
the generated scores to a probability distribution is simply a matter of normalization
which can be achieved by using the softmax function as:





We point out however that, unless a confidence value is required, the score by
itself is enough in order to run the greedy MLE algorithm and generate the predicate
guards.
Technical Description.
After obtaining the probability distribution from the training phase, the algorithm
will initially make a membership query for a random symbol in the alphabet and
use the MLE algorithm in order to produce a set Pg of predicate guards for which we
submit an equivalence query. Each time a counterexample is given, the corresponding
symbol is added to the training data given to the MLE algorithm and a new set of
guards is produced until a correct partition is produced.
Analysis. It is evident that for any finite set ⌃ and a predicate family P over
⌃ our algorithm will learn any partition of ⌃ over P using at most ⌃ equivalence
queries since, at that point, every element of ⌃ will be labelled by the equivalence
queries made by the algorithm. Proving better bounds on the query complexity of




Now that we have discussed a large body of learning algorithms for automata and
transducers, we will switch gears into algorithms that allow us to use our novel learn-
ing algorithms in order to perform black-box testing of large systems.
9.1 Code Injection Attacks
The main application of our techniques lies in the detection of code injection attacks
in Web applications. Code injection attacks occur when the application, while pro-
cessing input data from an utrusted source (typically the user), is confusing part
of the data for code a fact which may alter the code executed in various runtimes
within the application such as the database, LDAP directories, XML or client side
code such as HTML/Javascript. The impact of such attacks can be severe and ranges
from the execution of untrusted code into either the Web application server or the
client’s browser, leaking of sensitive information and others. The OWASP Top Ten,
is an annual document which categorizes the top 10 security vulnerabilities for Web
Applications in terms of severity. We note that for 2017 the most dangerous vulner-
ability for Web applications was code injection attacks while the seventh place was
also taken by Cross Site Scripting (XSS) another popular code injection vulnerability
class.
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9.2 Web Application Firewalls and String Sanitizers
There are many different ways with which an application can defend against a code
injection attack, but in this chapter we will focus on the two most popular defenses
and formalize them in order to fit into our formal models framework.
Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) and Filters. Web Application Firewalls
(WAFs) are system which preprocess the input to a Web application and try to
detect whether the input contains any malicious data such as an injection attack. If
a malicious input is detected, then the request is dropped (or in certain cases just
logged). In more general terms we say that WAFs are a type of filter. Formally, a
filter is defined as a Boolean function f : ⌃! B, such that for any string s, f(s) = T
only if s belongs to a set of malicious inputs. A filter can either be a system such as a
WAF which pre-processes the input to the application or a security module within the
application that processes the input before it is passed to security critical components.
An important aspect of Web Application Firewalls is that they are required by Web
applications in order to comply to the PCI standard which set the requirements for
web applications which process credit card information. Therefore, it is evident that
WAFs are very common systems in industrial environments.
String sanitizers While filters are a common first line of defense, eventually, we
would like the Web application to be able to process all requests without having to
drop requests which may be malicious: indeed, it is difficult to precisely determine
the inputs which contain malicious data and therefore, dropping requests may have
the effect of failing to process benign requests which are incorrectly deemed malicious
(false positives). A more natural approach is to build functions which clean the input
from potentially malicious data and then the application can proceed to process the
sanitized input normally. In practice, such functions are implemented through a series
of string transformations in the original input such as encoding potentially dangerous
characters, removing malicious parts of the inputs and other similar transformations.
More formally, we define a string sanitizer to be a function f : ⌃⇤ ! ⌃⇤ which takes
as input any string s and produces a string u = f(s) such that u does not contain
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any malicious substring.
In the following sections, we will describe algorithms which can be utilized in order
to evaluate the robustness of filters and string sanitizers in a black-box manner, i.e.
given only query access to the target application.
9.3 Grammar Oriented Filter Auditing
In this section, we will define the Grammar Oriented Filter Auditing (GOFA) problem
and present a learning based algorithm for solving the problem. Intuitevely, the
GOFA problem asks one to assess the robustness of a sanitizer or filter with respect
to a context free grammar G which contains a set of attack strings.
Definition 22. In the Grammar Oriented Filter Auditing (GOFA) problem the input
is a context free grammar G and query access to an unknown function f such that:
1. If f : ⌃⇤ ! ⌃⇤ is a sanitizer function then, the GOFA problem asks to find
s 2 G such that there exists an input u 2 ⌃⇤ such that f(u) = s.
2. If f : ⌃⇤ ! B is a filter function then, the GOFA problem asks to find u 2 G
such that f(u) = F.
One can easily prove that in the general case the GOFA problem requires an
exponential number of queries. Simply consider the CFG L(G) = ⌃⇤ and a DFA F
such that L(F ) = ⌃⇤ \{random-large-string}. Then, the problem reduces in guessing
a random string which requires an exponential number of queries in the worst case.
A formal proof of a similar result was presented by Peled et al. [70].
Our algorithm for the GOFA problem uses a learning algorithm for SFAs utilizing
as an equivalence oracle the algorithm in Algorithm 9. The algorithm takes as input
a hypothesis machine H. It then finds a string s 2 L(G) such that s 62 L(H). If
the string s is an attack against the target filter, the algorithm outputs the attack-
string and terminates. If it is not it returns the string as a counterexample. On the
other hand if there is no string bypassing the hypothesis, the algorithm terminates
accepting the hypothesis automaton H. Note that, this is the point where we trade
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completeness for efficiency since, even though L(G\H) = ;, this does not imply that
L(G \ F ) = ;.
Algorithm 9 GOFA Algorithm
Require: Context Free Grammar G, membership oracle O
function Equivalence Oracle(H)
GA  G \H








Adaptation to sanitizers. The technique above can be generalized easily to
sanitizers. Assume that we are given a grammar G as before and a target transducer
T implementing a sanitization function. In this variant of the problem we would like
to find a string sA such that there exists s 2 L(G) for which sA[T ]s holds.
In order to determine whether such a string exists, we first construct a pushdown
transducer TG with the following property: A string s will reach a final state in TG
if and only if s 2 L(G). Moreover every transition in TG is the identity function, i.e.
outputs the character consumed. Therefore, we have a transducer which will generate
only the strings in L(G). Finally, given a hypothesis transducer H, we compute the
pushdown transducer H   TG and check the resulting transducer for emptiness. If
the transducer is not empty we can obtain a string sA such that sA[H   TG]s. Since
TG will generate only strings from L(G) it follows that sA when passed through the
sanitizer will result in a string s 2 L(G). Afterwards, the GOFA algorithm continues
as in the DFA case.
Comparison With Random Testing. Regarding the usefulness of GOFA al-
gorithm as a security auditing method it is important to consider it in comparison to
random testing/fuzzing. Currently, most tools in the black-box testing domain, such
as web vulnerability scanners, work by fuzzing the target filter with various attack
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strings until a bypass is found or the set of attack strings is exhausted.
We argue that our GOFA algorithm is superior to fuzzing for two reasons:
1. The number of queries of the GOFA algorithm is independent of the size of the
grammar. On the other hand, when producing random strings from a grammar
in order to test a filter a very large number of strings has to be produced.
Moreover, testing for modern vulnerabilities such as XSS is very complex, since
there is a large number of variations that one should consider(cf. [8]).
2. Random testing produces no information on the structure of the filter if no at-
tack is found. Consider the case where one produces a large number of candidate
attack strings, but no bypass is found. Then, the auditor is left with no addi-
tional information for the filter, other than it rejected the set of strings that was
tested. One approach would be to try to infer the structure of an automaton
from that set of strings. Unfortunately, inferring the minimal automaton which
is consistent with a set of strings is NP-Hard to approximate even within any
polynomial factor [72]. On the other hand, as we demonstrate our GOFA algo-
rithm is able to recover on average 90% of the states of the target filter in cases
where no attack exists and an expressive enough grammar is given as input.
9.3.1 Approximating a Complete Equivalence Oracle
Although the GOFA algorithm is a suitable equivalence oracle implementation in
the case the goal is to audit a target filter, in some cases one would like to recover
a complete model of the target filter/sanitizer. In such cases, finding a bypass is
not enough. Since we only assume black-box access to the target filter, in order for
this problem to be even solvable we have to assume an upper bound on the size of
the target filter. In this case, The Vasilevskii-Chow(VC) algorithm [27] exists for
checking compliance between a DFA and a target automaton given black-box access
to the second.
However, if the DFA at hand has n states and the upper bound given is m then
















Figure 9-1: SFADiff archtitecture
same limitations in the alphabet size as DFA learning algorithms since every possible
transition of the black-box automaton must be checked. Creating a symbolic version
of the VC algorithm may be possible however, we will again only get probabilistic
guarantees on the correctness of our equivalence oracle.
Another option is to construct a context free grammar describing the input pro-
tocol under which the sanitizer should operate and then use random sampling from
that grammar to test whether the hypothesis and the target programs are complying.
For example, when we test HTML Encoders we might want to construct a grammar
with a number of different character sequences such as encoded HTML entities or
special characters and test the behavior of the encoder under these strings. We em-
ploy this approach in our experiments.Finally, static analysis techniques [85] can be
used to generate a CFG describing the output of another implementation of the same
sanitizer or filter and then cross check the generated CFG with the target sanitizer
using our GOFA algorithm.
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9.4 Differential Testing with s-FAs
9.4.1 Basic Algorithm
The main idea behind our differential testing algorithm is to leverage automata learn-
ing in order to infer SFA-based models for the test programs and then compare the
resulting models for equivalence as shown in Figure 9-1. As mentioned above, this
technique has a number of advantages such as being able to generalize from comparing
individual input/output pairs and build models for the programs that are examined.
Algorithm 10 provides the basic algorithmic framework for differential testing us-
ing automata learning. The algorithm takes two program implementations as input.
The first function calls, to the GetInitialModel function, are responsible for boot-
strapping the models for the two programs. The initialized models are then checked
for differences using the RCADiff function call. The internals of this function are
described in detail in Section 9.4.2. This function is responsible for categorizing the
differences in the two models and return a sample set of inputs covering all categories
that can cause the two programs to produce different outputs. The algorithm stops if
the two models are equivalent. Otherwise, RCADiff returns a set of inputs that cause
the two SFA models to produce different output.
However, since these differences are obtained by comparing the program models
and not the actual programs, they might contain false positives resulting from inaccu-
rate models. To detect such cases, we verify all differences obtained from the RCADiff
call using the actual test programs. If any input is found not to produce a difference
in the implementations, then that input is used as a counterexample in order to refine
the model through the UpdateModel call. Finally, when a set of differences in the
two models is verified to contain only true positives, the algorithm returns the set of
corresponding inputs back to the user.
The astute reader may notice that, if no candidate differences are found between
the two models, the algorithm terminates. For this reason, model initialization plays
a significant role in our algorithm, since the initialized models should be expressive
enough in order to provide candidate differences. It is interesting to point out that
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Algorithm 10 Differential SFA Testing Algorithm






if S = ; then
return ;
modelUpdated  False
for s 2 S do
if P1(s) 6= M1(s) then
M1  UpdateModel(M1, s)
modelUpdated  True
if P2(s) 6= M2(s) then
M2  UpdateModel(M2, s)
modelUpdated  True
if modelUpdated = False then
return S
the candidate differences do not have to be real differences.
9.4.2 Difference Analysis
Assume that we found and verified a number of inputs that cause the two programs
under test to produce different outputs. One fundamental question is whether we
can classify these inputs in certain equivalence classes based on the cause of the
deviant behavior. We will now describe how we can use the inferred SFAs in order
to compute such a classification. Ideally, we would like to assign in two inputs that
cause a difference the same root cause if they follow the same execution paths in the
target programs. Since the program source is unavailable, we trace the execution
path of the inputs in the respective SFA models.
RCADiff algorithm. Given two SFAs M1 and M2, it is straightforward to com-
pute their intersection by adapting the classic DFA intersection algorithm [78]. Let
Mprod = (Q1⇥Q2, (q0, q0), {(qi, qj) : qi 2 F1^qj 2 F2},P , ) be the, minimal, product
automaton of M1,M2. Notice initially, that the reason a difference is observed in the
output after processing an input in both SFAs is that the labels of the states reached
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in the two machines are different. This motivates our definition of points of exposure.
Definition 23. Let Mprod be the intersection SFA of M1,M2 as defined above. We
define the set {(qi, qj)|(qi, qj) 2 Qprod ^ qi 2 Q1 ^ qj 2 Q2 ^ l(q1) 6= l(q2)} to be the
points of exposure for the differences between M1,M2.
Intuitively, the points of exposure are the reasons the differences in the programs
are observed through the output of programs. The path to a point of exposure encodes
two different execution paths in machines M1 and M2 respectively which, under the
same input, end up in states producing different output. Thus, we say that any simple
path to a point of exposure is a root cause of a difference.
Definition 24. Let M1,M2 be two SFAs and Mprod be the intersection of M1,M2.
Let Qp ✓ Qprod be the points of exposure for Mprod. We say that the set of simple
paths S = {q0 ⇤! qp|qp 2 Qp} is the set of root causes for the differences between M1
and M2.
Equipped with the set of paths our classification algorithm works as follows: Given
two inputs causing a difference, we first reduce the path followed by each input into a
simple path, i.e. we remove all loops from the path. For example, an input following
the path q0 ! q4 ! q5 ! q4 ! q10 will be reduced to the path q0 ! q4 ! q10.
Afterwards, we classify the two inputs in the same root cause if the simple paths
followed by the inputs are the same.
Algorithm 11 shows the pseudocode for the RCADiff algorithm. The algorithm
works by collecting all the distinct root causes from the product automaton using
the the SimplePaths function call. This function accepts an SFA and a target state
and returns all simple paths from the initial state to the target state using a BFS
search. Afterwards, each path is converted into a sample input through the function
Path2Input. This function works by selecting, for each edge qi ! qj in the path,
a symbol ↵ 2 ⌃ such that (qi, , qj) 2   ^  (↵) = 1. Finally, these symbols are
concatenated in order to form an input that exercise the given path in the SFA.
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Algorithm 11 Difference Categorization Algorithm




for (qi, qj) 2 Qprod | l(qi) 6= l(qj) do
S  S [ SimplePaths(Mprod, (qi, qj))
return Path2Input(S)
9.4.3 Differentiating Program Sets
In this section, we describe how our original differential testing framework can be
generalized into a GetSetDifferences algorithm which works as follows: Instead of
getting two programs as input, the GetSetDifferences algorithm receives two sets
of programs I1 = {P1, . . . , Pn} and I2 = {P1, . . . , Pm}. Assume that the output of
each program is a bit b 2 {0, 1}. The goal of the algorithm is to find a set of inputs
S such that, the following condition holds:
9b 8P1 2 I1, P1(s) = b ^ 8P2 2 I2, P2(s) = 1  b
While conceptually simple, this extension provides a number of nice applica-
tions. For example, consider the problem of finding differences between the HTM-
L/JavaScript parsers of browsers and those of WAFs. While finding such differences
between a single browser and a WAF will provide us with an evasion attack against
the WAF, the GetSetDifferences algorithm allows us to answer more sophisticated
questions such as: (i) Is there an evasion attack that will bypass multiple different
WAFs? and (ii) Is there an evasion attack that will work across different browsers?
Also, as we describe in Section 9.4.4, this extension allows us to produce succinct
fingerprints for distinguishing between multiple similar programs.
GetSetDifferences Algorithm. We extend our basic GetDifferences algorithm
as follows: First, instead of initializing two program models as before, we initialize
the SFA models for all programs in both sets accordingly. Similarly, when we verify
the candidate differences obtained from the inferred models, all programs in both
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sets should be checked. Besides these changes, the skeleton of the GetDifferences
algorithm remains the same.
The most crucial and time-consuming part of our extension is the extension to the
RCADiff functionality in order to detect differences between two sets of models. Recall
that RCADiff utilizes the product construction and then finds the simple paths leading
to the points of exposure. Given two sets of models, we compute the intersection
between all the models in the two sets. Afterwards, we set the points of exposure as
follows. Let q = (q0, . . . , qm+n) be a state in the product automaton. Furthermore,
assume that state qi corresponds to automata Mi from one of the input sets I1, I2.
Then, q is a point of exposure if
8Mi 2 I1,Mj 2 I2 =) l(qi) 6= l(qj)
With this new definition of the points of exposure, the modified RCADiff algorithm
proceeds as in the original case to find all simple paths in the product automaton
that lead to the points of exposure.
One potential downside of this algorithm is that, its complexity increases expo-
nentially as we add more models in the sets. For example, computing the intersection
of m DFA with n states each, requires time O(nm) while, in general, the problem is
PSPACE-complete [56]. That being said, we stress that the number of programs we
have to check in practice will likely be small and many additional heuristics can be
used to reduce the complexity of the intersection computation.
9.4.4 Program Fingerprints
Formally, the fingerprinting problem can be described as follows: given a set I of m
different programs and black-box access to a server T which runs a program PT 2 I,
how can one find out which program is running in the server T by simply querying
the program in a black-box manner, i.e. find P 2 I such that P = PT .
In this section, we present two different fingerprinting algorithms that provide dif-
ferent trade-offs between computational and query complexity. Both these algorithms
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Algorithm 12 Fingerprint Tree Building Algorithm
Require: I is a set of Programs
function BuildFingerprintTree(I)
if |I| = 1 then
root.data  P 2 I
return root
Pi, Pj  I
s  GetDifferences(Pi, Pj)
root.data  s
root.left  BuildFingerprintTree(I \ Pi)
root.right  BuildFingerprintTree(I \ Pj)
return root
build a binary tree called fingerprint tree that stores strings that can distinguish be-
tween any two programs in I. Given a fingerprinting tree, our first algorithm requires
|I| queries to the target program. If the user is willing to perform extra off-line compu-
tation, our second algorithm demonstrates how the number of queries can be brought
down to logm.
Basic fingerprinting algorithm. The BuildFingerprintTree algorithm (shown
in Algorithm 12) constructs a binary tree that we call a fingerprint tree where each
internal node is labeled by a string and each leaf by a program identifier. In order to
build the fingerprint tree recursively, we start with the set of all programs I, choose
any two arbitrary programs Pi, Pj from I, and use the differential testing framework
to find differences between these programs. We label the current node with the
differences, remove Pi and Pj from I, and call BuildFingerprintTree recursively
until a single program is left in I. If I has only one program, we label the leaf node
with the program and return.
Given a fingerprint tree, we solve the fingerprinting problem as follows: Initially,
we start at the root node and query the target program with a string from the set
that labels the root node of the tree. If the string is accepted (resp. rejected), we
recursively repeat the process along the left subtree (resp. right subtree), until we
reach a leaf node that identifies the target program.
Time/query complexity. For the following we assume an input set of programs
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I of size |I| = m. Our algorithm has to find differences between all  m2  different
program pairs. The fingerprint tree resulting from the algorithm will be a full binary
of height m. Assuming that the complexity of the differential testing algorithm is D,






query complexity of the algorithm is |I|-1 queries, since each query will discard one
candidate program from the list.
Reducing queries using shallow fingerprint trees. Notice that, in the previous
algorithm, we need m queries to the target program in order to find the correct pro-
gram because we discard only one program at each step. We can cut down the number
of queries by shallower fingerprint trees at the cost of higher off-line computational
complexity for building such trees.
Consider the following modification in the BuildFingerprintTree algorithm:
First, we partition I into k subsets I1, . . . Ik of sizem/k each. Next, we call BuildFingerprintTree
algorithm with the set IS = {I1, . . . , Ik} as input programs and replace the call to
GetDifferences with GetSetDifferences. This algorithm will generate a full binary
tree of height k that can distinguish between the programs in the different subsets of
I. We can recursively apply the same algorithm on each of the leafs of the resulting
fingerprinting tree, further splitting the subsets of I until each leaf contains a single
program.
Time/query complexity. It is evident that the algorithm will eventually terminate
since each subset is successively portioned into smaller sets. Let us assume that
Dset(k) the complexity of the GetSetDifferences algorithm when the input program
sets are of size k (see section 9.4.3 for a complexity analysis of Dset(k)). The number
of queries required for fingerprinting an application with this algorithm will be equal
to the height of the resulting fingerprint tree. Note that each subset is of size m/k
and to distinguish between the k subsets using our basic algorithm we need k   1
queries. Therefore we get the equation T (m) = T (m/k)+(k 1) describing the query
complexity of the algorithm. Solving the equation we get that T (m) = (k  1) logkm
which is the query complexity for a given k. When k = 2 we will need logm queries
to identify the target program. Since each program provides one bit of information
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per query (accept/reject), a straightforward decision tree argument [?] provides a
matching lower bound on the query complexity of the problem.
Regarding the time complexity of the problem, we notice that, at the i-th recursive
call to the modified BuildFingerprintTree algorithm, we will have an input set of
size m/ki since the initial set is repeatedly partitioned into k subsets. the overall














10.1 Transducer Learning Algorithms Evaluation
10.1.1 Benchmarks
In our evaluation, we focused on real-life benchmarks from web applications and
specifically on string transformations which are used in order to protect web-applications
from code injections attacks such as Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) attacks. XSS is one
of the most important threats for modern web applications according to the recently
released OWASP Top Ten 2017 [69]. We will now discuss the set of benchmarks used
in our experiments. The interested reader can find a detailed description of each
string transformation in the appendix.
– Encoders/Decoders: We include certain basic encoders and decoders used
extensively in web applications such as HTML encoders/decoders and encoders
for quote symbols.
– Browser Filters: We also include filters from The Internet Explorer (IE)
browser which are designed to modify suspicious parts of the input in order to
prevent XSS attacks.
– Browser innerHTML Mutations: Mutation XSS [46], is a type of XSS vul-
nerability that occurs due to the fact that the browser is internally transform-
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ing a non-malicious string into a malicious one by applying a number of string
transformations internally in the user’s browser after the input is cleaned by the
application. This may result in converting safe inputs back into malicious ones.
Recent work [59] posed the open problem of modeling these transformations as
transducers in order to allow a formal analysis. We collected 5 of these trans-
formations from the literature [45] and demonstrate that these transformations
can be effectively modelled as SVND transducers.
– String Sanitizers: Finally, we include a number of string transformations
found in popular XSS sanitization frameworks which are used by popular appli-
cations in order to prevent XSS attacks. We include filters from Codeigniter [9],
Kses, which is used by Wordpress [10] and the SysPass [11] password manager.
Research questions. The goal of the evaluation of the paper is to provide
answers to the following research questions:
Q1: Can the SVND class of transducers capture real life string transformations from
our benchmark set and are those transformations efficiently learnable?
Q2: What is the effect of the size of the alphabet on the efficiency of the algorithm.
Q3: Can the SVND learning algorithm be used for the evaluation of XSS sanitizers?
10.1.2 Evaluation of SVND transducer learning
In order to evaluate our SVND learning algorithm we used an alphabet of 74 sym-
bols containing most printable ASCII characters. We chose this alphabet because it
was large enough to cover all the character utilized by our benchmarks while at the
same time keeping the performance of the algorithm in a reasonable level. In order
to implement an equivalence oracle, we used a manually created set of test cases
designed to cover all different behaviors of each benchmark and manually inspected
each learned model. Implementing, or approximating, a correct equivalence oracle is
an important aspect in order to utilize query learning algorithms in practice. We dis-







































































































17. M-1 6 1 1101 3471 2 1
2. E-2 2 0 126 683 1 0 18. M-2 9 1 2128 7126 2 3









4. B-1 25 1 14023 39812 2 10 20. M-4 29 1 17785 52499 5 10
5. B-2 13 1 5736 15032 2 6 21. M-5 12 1 4820 13810 2 5






22. S-1 20 1 6703 20820 3 5
7. B-4 17 1 7524 21538 2 7 23. S-2 8 1 1742 5823 2 2
8. B-5 29 1 20425 56251 2 13 24. S-3 12 1 2205 8531 2 2
9. B-6 17 1 7498 21325 2 7 25. S-4 12 1 2951 9951 2 3
10. B-7 13 1 3092 11399 2 4 26. S-5 11 1 4521 12421 2 5
11. B-8 34 1 23428 46150 3 10 27. S-6 44 1 37852 104521 6 15
12. B-9 23 1 1Z289 31541 3 7 28. S-7 4 1 561 2521 2 0
13. B-10 15 9 6650 18275 2 7
14. B-11 9 1 2858 7209 1 4
15. B-12 13 1 4461 13954 2 5
16. B-13 23 1 10273 30499 2 7
Table 10.1: Performance of SVND learning algorithm.
query reduction optimizations: Firstly, whenever an output query is asked by the al-
gorithm we cache the result for future usage. Second, we implement a similar caching
optimization for equivalence queries: Whenever an equivalence query is performed
we check that the supplied model is behaving correctly on the last counterexample,
otherwise we resupply the same counterexample.
Overall results. Table 10.1 presents the results of running our SVND learning
algorithm in the set of experiments. We found that that the filters, despite being
simple in their description they are non-trivial in terms of number states, ranging
from 2 to 44 states. Notice that, caching the membership queries resulted in reusing
a large part of the output queries previously made by the algorithm. Finally, we
notice that most benchmarks have unbounded lookahead, a fact suggests that non-
deterministic models are necessary in order to model real-life programs as transducers,
at least in the domain of string sanitizer programs.
Equivalence queries and counterexamples. When examining the number of
equivalence queries made by the learning algorithm we notice that despite the fact
that the algorithm may perform up to |Q| equivalence queries the number of actual
equivalence queries performed was usually a small fraction of |Q| and many times, a
single equivalence query was made. We attribute this behavior in two facts: First,
many counterexamples were generated by resupplying the same counterexample as
before. This behavior is expected in L⇤ style algorithms since each addition of a distin-
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Figure 10-1: Total number of output queries made by the learning algorithm for
different alphabet sizes when learning the IE Anti-XSS Form filter (no. 14).
guishing condition will usually discover one additional state and therefore, discovering
all undiscovered states which were accessed by the counterexample may require many
iterations. Moreover, a large number of counterexamples in each benchmark was
detected by checking the models for ambiguity.
Effect of the alphabet size on performance. As we mention in theorem 8, the
number of output queries performed by the algorithm is correlated linearly with the
size of the alphabet. In figure 10-1 we verify this relation by examining the number of
output queries required in order to learn a correct model of the IE Anti-XSS Form (no.
14) filter using alphabets of different sizes. Notice, that even though the correlation is
indeed linear, the actual number of queries tends to increase significantly (in concrete
numbers) as the alphabet grows. Indeed, learning the filter using a small alphabet of
10 symbols requires just 350 queries while learning over an alphabet of 128 symbols
requires more 4500 queries. To mitigate this problem, we are currently working
on adapting our algorithms on the symbolic setting where independent synthesis
algorithms are used in order to infer the set of output labels from a few examples [17,
36].
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10.1.3 Black-box testing of sanitizer robustness
Learning algorithms can be used to develop testing frameworks. In the context of
testing string sanitizers, one such testing method is the GOFA algorithm [17]. In a
nutshell, the algorithm accepts a set of attack vectors in the form of a context-free
grammar (CFG) G, a learning algorithm for transducers, and checks, in a black-
box manner, whether any string from G can bypass a target string sanitizer. The
interested reader can find more details on the algorithm in the appendix.
Case study. We will now demonstrate that using our SVND transducer learning
algorithm, the GOFA algorithm can uncover sophisticated attacks against sanitizers.
The following example is taken from a vulnerability found in an older version of the
Taskfreak [12] task management application which is affected by an XSS vulnerability.
The taskfreak application used, among others, the following string transformation in
order to remove malicious part of the user input:
“<script[^>]*>[^<]+</script[^>]*>” ! ✏
Using the GOFA algorithm we evaluated whether it is possible to bypass the filtering
and insert a script tag into the response of the application. To do so, we generated
a grammar containing the string <script>s()</script>. Afterwards, we ran the
GOFA algorithm using our VND transducer learning algorithm.
Results. The GOFA algorithm quickly converged to a vulnerability after our learn-
ing algorithm initially inferred a model computing the identity function for which a
candidate attack was produced. The counterexample uncovered the non-deterministic
path that removed suspicious input and after 33 states were added to the model, the
algorithm uncovered the following attack:
“<sc<script>s</script>ript>s()</script>”
The reason this attack works is the fact the sanitization routine is not applied re-
cursively and therefore, once the inner malicious payload is removed another malicious
payload is created. The algorithm converged to this vulnerability after making about
2000 output queries and 1 equivalence query (without counting cached queries). The
114
alphabet used in this experiment was restricted on the characters used in our attack
vector. Notice that the discovered attack is non-trivial: The attack requires to break
a valid attack vector using another valid attack vector in a specific index. Discovering
this attack using random testing or grammar-based testing is unlikely because such
strings have a very small probability of occurring randomly even if sampling from a
grammar.
10.2 MAT ⇤ Evaluation
We have implemented MAT ⇤ in the open-source symbolicautomata library [3], as
well as the learning algorithms for boolean algebras over finite domains, equality
algebras and BDD algebras as discussed in Section 8.5. Our implementation is fully
modular: Once an algebra learning algorithm is defined in our library, it can be
seamlessly plugged in as a guard learning algorithm for s-FAs. Since MAT ⇤ is also
an algebra learning algorithm, this allows us to easily learn automata over automata.
All experiments were ran in a Macbook air with an 1.8 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GiB
of memory. The goal of our evaluation is to answer the following research questions:
Q1: How does MAT ⇤ perform on automata over large finite alphabets? (§ 10.2.1)
Q2: How does MAT ⇤ perform on automata over algebras that require both mem-
bership and equivalence queries? (§ 10.2.2)
Q3: How does the size of predicates affect the performance of MAT ⇤? (§ 10.2.3)
10.2.1 Equality Algebra Learning
In this experiment, we useMAT ⇤ to learn s-FAs obtained from 15 regular expressions
drawn from 3 domains: (1) Regular expressions used in web application sanitization
frameworks such as in the CodeIgniter framework, (2) Regular expressions drawn
from popular web application firewall ModSecurity and finally (3) Regular expressions
from [58]. For this set of experiments we utilize as alphabet the entire UTF-16 (216
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Table 10.2: Evaluation of MAT ⇤ on regular expressions.
ID |Q| | | Memb Equiv R-CE GU D-CE C-CE
RE.1 11 35 653 17 19 25 106 78
RE.2 24 113 7203 66 45 87 565 479
RE.3 11 15 483 11 16 16 59 45
RE.4 18 40 1745 17 33 32 188 164
RE.5 25 55 3180 22 48 45 244 211
RE.6 52 155 43737 588 104 640 3102 2953
RE.7 179 658 66477 1486 91 1398 7748 6540
RE.8 115 175 929261 299 206 390 28606 28354
RE.9 144 369 844213 699 261 817 30485 30135
RE.10 175 551 3228102 5346 286 5457 172180 170483
RE.11 6 9 3409 281 14 289 723 710
RE.12 10 14 1367 88 8 86 314 291
RE.13 29 46 20903 743 49 764 2637 2550
RE.14 8 13 5949 365 24 381 854 836
RE.15 8 15 661 82 2 76 228 198
characters) and used the equality algebra to represent predicates. Since the alphabet
is finite, we also tried learning the same automata using TTT [51], the most efficient
algorithm for learning finite automata over finite alphabets.
Results Table 10.2 presents the results of MAT ⇤. The Memb and Equiv columns
present the number of distinct membership and equivalence queries respectively. The
R-CE column shows how many times a counterexample was reused, while the GU
column shows the number of counterexamples that were used to update an underlying
predicate (as opposed to adding a new state in the s-FA). Finally, D-CE shows the
number of counterexamples provided to an underlying algebra learner due to failed
determinism checks, while C-CE shows the number of counterexamples due to failed
completeness checks. Note that these counterexamples did not require invoking the
equivalence oracle.
Given the large alphabet sizes, TTT runs out of memory on all our benchmarks.
This is not surprising since the number of queries required by TTT just to construct
the correct model for a DFA with 128 = 27 states is at least |⌃||Q| log |Q| = 216 ⇤ 27 ⇤
7 ⇡ 226. We point out that a corresponding lower bound of ⌦(|Q| log |Q||⌃|) exists
for the number of queries any DFA algorithm may perform and therefore, the size of
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the alphabet provides a fundamental limitation for any such algorithm.
Analysis. First, we observe that the performance of the algorithm is not always mono-
tone in the number of states or transitions of the s-FA. For example, RE.10 requires
more than 10x more membership and equivalence queries than RE.7 despite the fact
that both the number of states and transitions of RE.10 are smaller. In this case,
RE.10 has fewer transitions, but they contain predicates that are harder to learn—
e.g., large character classes. Second, the completeness check and the corresponding
counterexamples are not only useful to ensure that the generated guards form a par-
tition but also to restore predicates after new states are discovered. Recall that, once
we discover (split) a new state, a number of learning instances is discarded. Usually,
the newly created learning instances will simply output ? as the initial hypothesis.
At this point, completeness counterexamples are used to update the newly created
hypothesis accordingly and thus save theMAT ⇤ from having to rerun a large number
of equivalence queries. Finally, we point out that the equality algebra learner made no
special assumptions on the structure of the predicates such as recognizing character
classes which are used in regular expressions and others. We expect that providing
such heuristics can greatly improve the performance MAT ⇤ in these benchmarks.
10.2.2 BDD Algebra Learning
In this experiment, we useMAT ⇤ to learn s-FAs over a BDD algebra. We run MAT ⇤
on 1,500 automata obtained by transforming Linear Temporal Logic over finite traces
into s-FAs [30]. The formulas have 4 atomic propositions and the height in each
BDD used by the s-FAs is four. To learn the underlying BDDs we use MAT ⇤ with
the learning algorithm for algebras over finite domains (see section 8.5) since ordered
BDDs can be seen as s-FAs over dom = {0, 1}.
Figure 10-2 shows the number of membership (top left) and equivalence (top
right) queries performed by MAT ⇤ for s-FAs with different number of states. For
this s-FAs, MAT ⇤ is highly efficient with respect to both the number of membership
and equivalence queries, scaling linearly with the number of states. Moreover, we
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Figure 10-2: (Top) Evaluation of MAT ⇤ on s-FAs over a BDD algebra. (Bottom)
Evaluation of MAT ⇤ on s-FAs over an s-FA algebra. For an s-FA Mm,n, the x-axis
denotes the values of n. Different lines correspond to different values of m.
note that the size of the set of transitions | | does not drastically affect the overall
performance of the algorithm. This is in agreement with the results presented in the
previous section, where we argued that the difficulty of the underlying predicates and
not their number is the primary factor affecting performance.
10.2.3 s-FA Algebra Learning
In this experiment, we use MAT ⇤ to learn 18 s-FAs over s-FAs, which accept strings
of strings. We evaluate the scalability of our algorithms when the difficulty of learning
the underlying predicates increases. The possible internal s-FAs, which we will use as
predicates, operate over the equality algebra and are denoted as Ik (where 2  k 
17). Each s-FA Ik accepts exactly one word a · · · a of length k and has k+1 states and
2k + 1 transitions. The external s-FAs are denoted as Mm,n (where m 2 {5, 10, 15}
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and 2  n  17). Each s-FAMm,n accepts exactly one word s · · · s of length m where
each s is accepted by In.
Analysis. For simplicity, let’s assume that we have the s-FA Mn,n. Consider a
membership query performed by one of the underlying algebra learning instances.
Answering the membership query requires sifting a sequence in the classification tree
of height at most n which requires O(n) membership queries. Therefore, the number
of membership queries required to learn each individual predicate is increased by
a factor of O(n). Moreover, for each equivalence query performed by an algebra
learning instance, the s-FA learning algorithm has to pinpoint the counterexample
to the specific algebra learning instance, a process which requires logm membership
queries, where m is the length of the counterexample. Therefore, we conclude that
each underlying guard with n states will require a number of membership queries
which is of the order ofO(n3) at the worst andO(n2 log n) queries at the best (since the
CT has height ⌦(log n)), ignoring the queries required for counterexample processing.
Figure 10-2 shows the number of membership (bottom left) and equivalence (bot-
tom right) queries, which verify the theoretical analysis presented in the previous
paragraph. Indeed, we see that in terms of membership queries, we have a very sharp
increase in the number of membership queries which is in fact about quadratic in the
number of states in the underlying guards. On the other hand, equivalence queries
are not affected so drastically, and only increase linearly.
10.3 GOFA Algorithm Evaluation
10.3.1 Implementation
We have implemented all the algorithms described in the previous sections. In order to
evaluate our SFA learning algorithm in the standard membership/equivalence query
model we implemented a complete equivalence oracle by computing the symmetric
difference of each hypothesis automaton with the target filter. In order to evaluate
regular expression filters we used the flex regular expression parser to generate a
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IDS RULES DFA LEARNING SFA LEARNING
ID STATES ARCS MEMBER EQUIV MEMBER EQUIV SPEEDUP
1 7 13 4389 3 118 8 34.86
2 16 35 21720 3 763 24 27.60
3 25 33 56834 6 6200 208 8.87
4 33 38 102169 7 3499 45 28.83
5 52 155 193109 6 37020 818 5.10
6 60 113 250014 7 38821 732 6.32
7 66 82 378654 14 35057 435 10.67
8 70 99 445949 15 17133 115 25.86
9 86 123 665282 27 34393 249 19.21
10 115 175 1150938 31 113102 819 10.10
11 135 339 1077315 24 433177 4595 2.46
12 139 964 1670331 29 160488 959 10.35
13 146 380 1539764 28 157947 1069 9.68
14 164 191 2417741 29 118611 429 20.31
15 179 658 770237 14 80283 1408 9.43
AVG= 15.31
Table 10.3: SFA vs. DFA Learning
DFA from the regular expressions and then parsed the code generated by flex to
extract the automaton. In order to implement the GOFA algorithm we used the
FAdo library [2] to convert a CFG into Chomsky Normal Form(CNF) and then we
convert from CNF to a PDA. In order to compute the intersection we implemented the
product construction for pushdown automata and then directly checked the emptiness
of the resulting language, without converting the PDA back to CNF, using a dynamic
programming algorithm [24].
10.3.2 Testbed
Since our focus is on security related applications, in order to evaluate our SFA learn-
ing and GOFA algorithms we looked for state-of-the-art regular expression filters used
in security applications. We chose filters used by Mod-Security [5] and PHPIDS [7]
web application firewalls (WAFs). These systems contain well designed and very com-
plex regular expressions rule sets that attempt to protect against vulnerability classes
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Figure 10-3: Speedup of SFA vs. DFA learning.
such as SQL Injection and XSS, while minimizing the number of false positives. For
our evaluation we chose 15 different regular expression filters from both systems tar-
geting XSS and SQL injection vulnerabilities. We chose the filters in a way that they
will cover a number of different sizes when they are represented as DFAs. Indeed, our
testbed contains filters with sizes ranging from 7 to 179 states. Using the identifiers
from the figure, one can retrieve the rules from the source code of the systems. Our
sanitizer testbed is described in detail in section 10.3.5.
For the evaluation of our SFA and DFA learning algorithms we used an alphabet of
92 ASCII characters. We believe that this is an alphabet size which is very reasonable
for our domain. It contains all printable characters and in addition some non printable
ones. Since many attacks contain Unicode characters we believe that alphabets will
only tend to grow larger as the attack and defense technologies progress.
10.3.3 SFA Learning Algorithm Evaluation
We first evaluate the performance of our SFA learning algorithm using the L⇤ al-
gorithm as the baseline. We implemented the algorithms as we described them in
the paper using only an additional optimization both in the DFA and SFA case: we
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DFA LEARNING SFA LEARNING
ID MEMBER EQUIV LEARNED MEMBER EQUIV LEARNED SPEEDUP
1 3203 2 100.00% 81 5 100.00% 37.27
2 18986 2 100.00% 521 11 100.00% 35.69
3 52373 5 100.00% 1119 7 96.00% 46.52
4 90335 5 96.97% 2155 10 96.97% 41.73
5 176539 4 98.08% 4301 38 80.77% 40.69
6 227162 5 96.67% 5959 32 96.67% 37.92
7 355458 12 98.48% 8103 17 98.48% 43.78
8 420829 13 98.57% 11013 34 98.57% 38.10
9 634518 25 98.84% 15221 30 98.84% 41.61
10 1110346 29 99.13% 27972 54 99.13% 39.62
11 944058 19 94.81% 100522 955 93.33% 9.30
12 1645751 28 100.00% 113714 662 96.40% 14.39
13 1482134 26 97.95% 45494 143 93.15% 32.48
14 1993469 24 90.85% 45973 32 90.85% 43.33
15 14586 5 8.94% 428 22 8.94% 32.42
AVG= 91.95 AVG= 89.87% 35.66
Table 10.4: SFA vs. DFA Learning + GOFA
cached each query result both for membership and equivalence queries. Therefore,
whenever we count a new query we verify that this query wasn’t asked before. In
the case of equivalence queries, we check that the automaton complies with all the
previous counterexamples before issuing a new equivalence query.
In table 10.3 we present numerical results from our experiments that reveal a
significant advantage for our SFA learning over DFA: it is approximately 15 times
faster on the average. The speedup as the ratio between the DFA and the SFA
number of queries is presented in Figure 10-3. An interesting observation here is that
the speedup does not seem to be a simple function of the size of the automaton and
it possibly depends on many aspects of the automaton. An important aspect is the
size of the sink transition in each state of the SFA. Since our algorithm learns lazily
the transitions, if the SFA incorporates many transitions with large size, then the
speedup will be less than what it would be in SFAs were the sink transition is the
only one with big size.
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Figure 10-4: Speedup of SFA vs. DFA learning with GOFA.
Finally, we conducted we evaluated the overall speedup of the SFA algorithm in
different alphabet sizes. Specifically, we found the minimal alphabet size such that all
transitions of the filters tested are present; this requires an alphabet with 34 symbols.
Then, we run the DFA and SFA algorithm with different alphabet sizes starting from
34 symbols up to our full alphabet of 92 symbols. The results of the experiments
are shown in figure 10-5. We notice that the speedup is a monotonically increasing
function as the alphabet size gets larger.
10.3.4 GOFA algorithm
In this section we evaluate the efficiency of our GOFA algorithm. In our evalua-
tion we used both the DFA and the SFA algorithms. Since our SFA algorithm uses
significantly more equivalence queries than the L⇤ algorithm, we need to evaluate
whether this additional queries would influence the accuracy of the GOFA algorithm.
Specifically, we would like to answer the following questions:
1. How good is the model inferred by the GOFA algorithm when no attack string
exists in the input CFG?
2. Is the GOFA algorithm able to detect a vulnerability in the target filter if one
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Figure 10-5: Speedup of SFA vs DFA algorithms for different alphabet sizes.
exists in the input CFG?
Making an objective evaluation on the effectiveness of the GOFA algorithm in
these two questions is tricky due to the fact that the performance of the algorithm
depends largely on the input grammar provided by the user. If the grammar is too
expressive then a bypass will be trivially found. On the other hand if no bypass exists
and moreover, the grammar represents a very small set of strings, then the algorithm
is condemned to make a very inaccurate model of the target filter. Next, we tackle
the problem of evaluating the two questions about the algorithm separately.
DFA model generation evaluation. Intuitively, the GOFA algorithm is effi-
cient in recovering a model for the target filter if the algorithm is in possession of the
necessary information in order to recover the filter in the input CFG and is able to
do so. Therefore, in order to evaluate experimentally the accuracy of our algorithm
in producing a correct model for the target filter independently of the choice of the
grammar we used as input grammar the target filter itself. This choice is justified
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as setting as input grammar the target filter itself we have that a grammar that,
intuitively , is a maximal set without any vulnerability.
In table 10.4 we present the numerical results of our experiments over the same
set of filters used in the experiments of Section 10.3.3. The learning percentage of
both DFA and SFA with simulated equivalence oracle via GOFA is quite high (close
to 90% for both cases). The performance benefit from our SFA learning is even more
dramatic in this case reaching an average of ⇡ 35 times faster than DFA. The speedup
is also pictorially presented in Figure 10-4. We also point out the even though the
DFA algorithm checks all transitions of the automaton explicitly (which is the main
source of overhead), the loss in accuracy between the L⇤ algorithm and our SFA
algorithm is only 2%, for a speedup gain of approximately x35.
Vulnerability detection evaluation. In evaluating the vulnerability detection
capabilities of our GOFA algorithm we ran into the same problem as with the model
generation evaluation; namely, the efficiency of the algorithm depends largely on the
input grammar given by the user. If the grammar is much wider than the targeted
filter then a bypass can be trivially found. On the other hand if it is too restrictive
maybe no bypass will exist at all.
In our first experiment we test the GOFA algorithm using a regular grammar
against the union of two rules targeting SQL Injection attacks from PHPIDS. Specif-
ically, we start with a small grammar which contains the combination of some attack
vectors and, whenever a vector bypassing the filter is found, we remove the vector
from the grammar and rerun it with a smaller grammar until no attack is possible.
Here we would like to find out whether the GOFA algorithm can operate under re-
stricted grammars that require many updates on the hypothesis automaton. To check
whether a vulnerability exists in the filter we computed the symmetric difference be-
tween the input grammar and the targeted filters. We note that this step is the reason
we did not perform the same experiment on live WAF installations, since we do not
have the full specification as a regular expression and thus cannot check if a bypass
exists in an attack grammar.
We notice that in this case, GOFA was successful in updating the attack vectors
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in order to generate new attacks bypassing the filter. However, in this case the GOFA
algorithm generated as many as 61 states of the filter in the DFA case and 31 states
in the SFA case until a successful attack vector was detected. Against we notice that
the speedup of using the SFA algorithm is huge.
For our second experiment we used the GOFA algorithm against a live WAF
installation. We utilized a handcrafted grammar containing valid suffixes for SQL
statements. This grammar is efficiently modeling many different types of SQL in-
jection attacks. For our target we use the latest version of Mod-Security, version
3.0.0. Table 10.6 presents the results from our experiment. We found many, previ-
ously unknown, SQL Injection attacks that could be used for evading Mod-Security
while allowing the attacker to bypass authentication or retrieve data from the back-
end database. In order to find different attacks we use the same technique as in the
previous experiment, i.e. we successively remove attacks found from the grammar.
We notice that many vulnerabilities were found without discovering any state of the
WAF. This fact suggests that state of the art WAFs are still not mature enough in
order to defend even against popular vulnerability classes such as SQL injection. Fur-
thermore, we notice that after detecting some vulnerabilities for which no rules exist,
the algorithm discovered more complex vulnerabilities which required to iterate a few
failed attack attempts from the input grammar.
To conclude with the evaluation of the GOFA algorithm, even though any GOFA
algorithm is necessarily either incomplete or inefficient in the worst case, our algorithm
performs well in practice detecting both vulnerabilities when they exist and inferring
a large part of the targeted filter when it is not able to detect a vulnerability.
10.3.5 Cross Checking HTML Encoder implementations
To demonstrate the wide applicability of our sanitizer inference algorithms we re-
consider the experiment performed in the original BEK paper [48]. The authors,
payed a number of freelancer developers to develop HTML encoders. Then they took
these HTML encoders, along with some other existing implementations and manually
converted them to BEK programs. Then, using BEK the authors were able to find
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GRAMMAR DFA LEARNING SFA LEARNING VULNERABILITY
ID STATES ARCS FOUND STATES MEMB EQUIV FOUND STATES MEMB EQUIV SPEEDUP EXISTS FOUND
1 128 175 61 155765 3 31 1856 8 83.56 TRUE union select
load_file(’0\0\0’)
2 111 146 61 155765 3 31 1811 7 85.68 TRUE union select
0 into outfile
’0\0\0’
3 92 120 61 155765 3 31 1793 6 86.58 TRUE union select
case when (select
user_name()) then
0 else 1 end
4 43 54 61 155764 3 31 1770 7 87.65 FALSE None
AVG= 85.87
Table 10.5: Attacks found by succesively reducing the attack grammar rules PHPIDS
76 & 52 composed
STATES MEMB EQUIV VULNERABILITY
0 3 1 a for update
0 3 1 a limit 1
0 3 1 a ; select a
0 3 1 a join a on a
10 118 2 a group by a desc
0 3 1 a procedure a ( a )
0 3 1 a and exists select a
7 67 2 a and a > any select a
7 90 2 a and a like 1
Table 10.6: Vulnerabilities discovered using the GOFA algorithm on Mod-Security
3.0.0.
differences in the sanitizers and check properties such as idempotence.
Using our learning algorithms we are able to perform a similar experiment but
this time completely automated and in fact, without any access to source code of
the implementation. For our experiments we used 3 different encoders from the PHP
language, the HTML encoder from the .net AntiXSS library [4] and then, we also
inferred models for the HTML encoders used by Twitter, Facebook and Microsoft
Outlook email service.
We used our transducer learning algorithms in order to infer models for each of the
sanitizers which we then converted to BEK programs and checked for equivalence and
idempotence using the BEK infrastructure. A function f is idempotent if 8x, f(x) =
f(f(x)) or in other words, reapplying the sanitizer to a string which was already
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sanitized won’t change the resulting string. This is a nice property for sanitizers
because it means that we easily reapply sanitization without worrying about breaking
the correct semantics of the string.
In our algorithm, we used a simple form of symbolic transducer learning where
we generalized the most commonly seen output term to all alphabet members not
explicitly checked. As an alphabet, we used a subset of characters including standard
characters that should be encoded under the HTML standard and moreover, a set
of other characters, including Unicode characters, to provide completeness against
different implementations. For the simulation of the equivalence oracle we produced
random strings from a predefined grammar including all the characters of the alphabet
and in addition many encoded HTML character sequences. The last part is important
for detecting if the encoder is idempotent.
Figure 10-6 shows the results of our experiment. We found that most sanitizers are
different and only one sanitizer is idempotent. All the entries of the figure represent
the character or string that the two sanitizers are different or a tick if they are equal.
One exception is the entries labelled with u8249 which denotes the Unicode character
with decimal representations &#8249;. We included the decimal representation in the
table to avoid confusion with the “<” symbol. The idempotent sanitizer is a version
of htmlspecialcharacters function with a special flag disabled, that instructs the
function not to re-encode already encoded html entities. We would like to point out
that although in general html encoders can be represented by single state transducers,
making the encoder idempotent requires a large amount of lookahead symbols to
detect whether the current character is part of an already encoded HTML entity.
This adds a significant amount of complexity to the encoder which is a possible
reason for not being used in practice.
Another surprising result is that the .net HTML encode function did not match
the one in the MS Outlook email service. The encoder in the outlook email seems
to match an older encoder of the AntiXSS library which was encoding all HTML
entities in their decimal representations. For example, this encoder is the only one
encoding the semicolon symbol. On the other hand the .net AntiXSS implementation
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PHP1 PHP2 PHP3 .NET TW FB MS Idempotent
PHP1 3 u8249 &amp; u8429 3 3 ; 7
PHP2 3 u8249 u8294 u8429 u8429 ; 7
PHP3 3 &amp; &amp; &amp; ; 3
.NET 3 u8429 u8429 ; 7
TW 3 3 ; 7
FB 3 ; 7
MS 3 7
Figure 10-6: Equivalence Checking of HTML encoder implementations.
will encode Unicode characters in their decimal representations but will skip encoding
the semicolon, as did every other sanitizer that we tested.
At this point, we would like to stress that our results are not conclusive. For
example, the fact that we found that the Twitter and Facebook encoders are equal
does not mean that there is no string in which these two functions differ. This is
fundamental limitation of all black-box testing algorithms. In fact, even the results
on differences between sanitizers might be incorrect in principle. However, in this
case we can easily verify the differences and, if necessary, update the corresponding
models for the encoders.
Black-box Cross Compilation: Once we have obtained models of our encoders
and converted them to BEK programs, we can use the BEK backend to compile the
generated models in a different language. For example, since twitter and facebook
seem to use the htmlspecialcharacters fuction, we show in the appendix the corre-
sponding BEK program inferred by our algorithm and the generated JavaScript code
produce by BEK.
10.3.6 Bug in BEK HTML Decoder Example
While developing and debugging our implementation we found a bug in an example
implementation of a simplified HTML decoder in the online BEK tutorial. The pro-
gram in question is the program named decode from the second part of the BEK
tutorial [1]. We won’t present the whole program here due to space constraints, but
the problem occurs in the following case:
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case (s == 1) : //memorized &
if (c == ’&’) { yield (’&’); }
else if (c == ’l’) { s := 2; }
else if (c == ’g’) { s := 3; }
else { yield (’&’,c); s := 0; }
Here as the comments suggests, the transducer has already processed the letter “&”
and checks if any of the letter “l” or “t” follows which would complete the html entities
“&lt;” or “&gt;”. In the opposite case that no match with these two characters is found,
the memorized symbol is being added to the output along with the current symbol.
Unfortunately, if the new character is also part of an HTML entity, for example “&”,
then the program will fail to start scanning for the next symbols of the entity, rather
it will just output the same character and return to initial state. Therefore, the
program will fail to correctly decode sequences such as “&&lt;”.
We detected this bug during the development of our lookahead learning algorithm
and our conversion algorithm to BEK programs. Specifically, we coded an HTML
decoder like the decode BEK program and used the equivalence checking function of
BEK in order to check whether the inferred BEK programs we were producing were
correct. At some point, we detected the bug we described as a counterexample to the
equivalence of the two implementations.
We believe that this bug demonstrates the complexity of writing sanitizers that
make heavy use of lookahead transitions in BEK. One should implement a large
number of nested if-then-else statements, like we describe in our conversion algorithm
in section 10.3.5. We believe that the BEK language could become much simpler
with the introduction of a string compare function to allow the programmers to
easily handle lookaheads. This may require extra work on the backend of the BEK
compiler, however we believe that this is a feasible task, that will greatly simplify the
language.
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Figure 10-7: The performance (no. of equivalence and membership queries) of the
SFA learning algorithm with and without initialization for different rules from two
WAFs (ModSecurity OWASP CRS and PHPIDS).
10.4 SFADiff Evaluation
10.4.1 Initialization evaluation
Our first goal is to evaluate the efficiency of our observation table initialization algo-
rithm as a method to reduce the number of equivalence queries while inferring similar
models. The experimental setup is motivated by our assumptions that the initializa-
tion model and the target model would be similar. For that purpose, we utilized 9
regular expression filters from two different versions of ModSecurity (versions 3.0.0
and 2.2.7) and PHPIDS WAFs (versions 0.7.0 and 0.6.3). The filters in the newer ver-
sions of the systems have been refined to either patch evasions or possibly to reduce
false positive rate.
For our first experiment we used an alphabet of 92 symbols, the same one used
in our next experiments, which contains most printable ASCII characters. Since, in
this experiment, we would like to measure the reduction offered by our initialization
algorithm in terms of equivalence queries, we simulated a complete equivalence oracle
by comparing each inferred model with the target regular expression.
Results. Table 10-7 shows the results of our experiments. First, notice that in most
cases the updated filters contain more states than their previous versions. This is
expected, since most of the times the filters are patched to cover additional attacks,
which requires the addition of more states for covering these extra cases. We can see
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OS States Queries
OSX Yosemite (version 14.5.0) 7 858
Debian Linux (Kernel v3.2.0) 9 1100
FreeBSD 10.3 9 1100
Table 10.7: Results for different TCP implementations: Number of states in each
model and number of membership queries required to infer the model.
that, in general, our algorithm offers a massive reduction of approximately 50⇥ in the
number of equivalence queries utilized in order to infer a correct model. This comes
with a trade-off since the number of membership queries are increased by a factor
of 1.15⇥, on average. However, equivalence queries are usually orders of magnitude
slower than membership queries. Therefore, the initialization algorithm results in
significant overall performance gain. We notice that 2/3 cases where we observed a
large increase (more than 1.2⇥) in membership queries (filters PHPIDS 50 & PHPIDS
56) are filters for which states were removed in the new version of the system. This
is expected since, in that case, SFADiff makes redundant queries for an entry in
the observation table that does not correspond to an access string. Another possible
reason for an increase in the number of the membership queries is the chance that
the distinguishing set obtained by the SFA learning algorithm is smaller than the
one obtained by the initialization algorithm which is always of size n   1 where n
is the number of states in a filter. Exploring ways to obtain a distinguishing set of
minimum size is an interesting direction in order to further develop our initialization
algorithm. Nevertheless, in all cases, the new versions of the filters were similar in
structure with the older versions and thus, our initialization algorithm was able to
reconstruct a large part of the filter and massively reduce the number of equivalence
queries required to obtain the correct model.
10.4.2 TCP state machines
For our experiments with TCP state machines, we run a simple TCP server on the
test machine while the learning algorithm runs as a client on another machine in the
same LAN. Because the TCP protocol will, possibly, emit output for each packet
sent, the ASKK algorithm is not suited for this case. Thus, we used our algorithm for
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Input Linux OSX FreeBSD
S, S SA, RA SA, RA, RA SA
S, A, F SA, A, FA SA SA
S, RA, A SA, R SA, R SA
Table 10.8: Some example fingerprinting packet sequences found by SFADiff across
different TCP implementations. The TCP flags that are set for the input packets are
abbreviated as follows: SYN(S), ACK(A), FIN(F), and RST(R).
Figure 10-8: State machine inferred by SFADiff for Mac OSX TCP implementation.
The TCP flags that are set for the input packets are abbreviated as follows: SYN(S),
ACK(A), FIN(F), PSH(P), URG(U), and RST(R).
learning deterministic transducers in order to infer models of the TCP state machines.
Alphabet. For this set of experiments, we focus on the effect of TCP flags on the
TCP protocol state transitions. Specifically, we select an alphabet with 11 symbols
including 6 TCP flags: SYN(S), ACK(A), FIN(F), PSH(P), URG(U), and RST(R)
along with all possible combinations of these flags with the ACK flag, i.e., SA, FA,
PA, UA, and RA.
Membership queries. Once our learning algorithm formulates a membership query,
our client implementation creates a sequence of TCP packets corresponding to the
symbols and sends them to the server.
Our server module is a simple python script which works as follows: The script is
listening for new connections on a predefined port. Once a connection is established
our server module makes a single recv call and then actively close the connection.
In addition, for each different membership query we spawn a new server process on
a different port to ensure that packets belonging to different membership queries will
not be mixed together.
The learning algorithm handles the sequence and acknowledgement numbers in
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the outgoing TCP packets in the following way: a random sequence number is used as
long as no SYN packet is part of a membership query; otherwise, after sending a SYN
packet we set the sequence and acknowledgement numbers of the following packets in
manner consistent with the TCP protocol specification. In case the learning algorithm
receives a RST packet during the execution of a membership query, we also reset the
state of the sequence numbers, i.e. we start sending random sequence numbers again
until the next SYN packet is send.
After sending each packet from a membership query, the learning algorithm waits
for the response for each packet using a time window. If the learning algorithm
receives any re-transmitted packets during that time, it ignores those packets. We
detect re-transmitted packets by checking for duplicate sequence/acknowledgement
numbers. Ignoring the re-transmitted packets is crucial for the convergence of the
learning algorithm as it helps us avoid any non-determinism caused by the timing of
the packets.
Initialization. As TCP membership queries usually outputs more information in
terms of packets than one bit, our algorithm worked efficiently for the TCP imple-
mentations even without any initialization. Thus, for this experiment, we start the
learning algorithm without any initial model.
Results. We used SFADiff in order to infer models for the TCP implementations
of three different operating systems: Debian Linux, Mac OSX and FreeBSD. The
inferred models contain all state transitions that are necessary to capture a full TCP
session. Figure 10-8 shows the inferred state machine for Mac OSX. States in green
color are part of a normal TCP session while states in red color are reached when
an invalid TCP packet sequence is sent by the client. The path q0 ! q1 ! q3 is
where the TCP three-way handshake takes place and it is leading to state q3 where
the connection is established, while the path q3 ! q6 ! q0 close the connection and
returns to the initial state (q0). Table 10.7 shows that the inferred model for Mac
OSX contain fewer states than the respective FreeBSD and Linux models. Manual
inspection of the models revealed that these additional states are due to different
















Figure 10-9: The setup for SFADiff finding differences between the HTML/-
JavaScript parsing in Web browsers and WAFs.
sample differences found by SFADiff. Note that, even though the state machines of
Linux and FreeBSD contain the same number of states, they are not equivalent, as
we can see in Table 10.8, since the two implementations produce different outputs for
all three inputs.
10.4.3 Web Application Firewalls and Browsers
In this setting, we perform two sets of experiments: (i) we use SFADiff to explore
differences in HTML/JavaScript signatures used by different WAFs for detecting XSS
attacks; and (ii) we use SFADiff to find differences in the JavaScript parsing imple-
mentation of the browsers and the WAFs that can be exploited to launch XSS attacks
while bypassing the WAFs.
For these tests, we configure the WAFs to run as a server and the learning algo-
rithm executes as a client on the same machine. The browser instance is also running
on the same machine. The learning algorithm communicates with the browser in-
stance through WebSockets. The learning algorithm can test whether an HTML
page with some JavaScript code is correctly parsed by the browser and if the embed-
ded JavaScript is executed or not by exchanging messages with the browser instance.
The overall setup is shown in Figure 10-9.
Alphabet. We used an alphabet of 92 symbols containing most printable ASCII
characters. This allows us to encode a wide range of Javscript attack vectors.
Membership queries to the browser. In order to allow the learning algorithm















Figure 10-10: The implementation of membership queries for Web browsers.
the learning algorithm. Next, the learning algorithm sends a message to the browser
over WebSockets with the HTML/JavaScript content corresponding to a membership
query as the message’s payload. Upon receiving such a message, the browser sets the
query payload as the innerHTML of a DOM element and waits for the DOM element
to be loaded. The user’s browser dispatches a number of events (such as “click”) on
the DOM element and examines if the provided string led to JavaScript execution.
These events are necessary for triggering the JavaScript execution in certain payloads.
In order to examine if the JavaScript execution was successful, the browser monitors
for any change in the value of a JavaScript variable located in the page. The payload,
when executed, changes the variable value in order to notify that the execution was
successful. Furthermore, in order to cover more cases of JavaScript execution, the
user’s browser also monitors for any JavaScript errors that indicate JavaScript exe-
cution. After testing the provided string, the user’s browser sends back a response
message containing a boolean value that indicates the result. The results of the
membership queries are cached by the learning algorithm in order to be reused in the
future. The details of our implementation of membership queries for the browsers is
shown in Figure 3.
Membership queries to the WAF. SFADiff sends an HTTP request to the
WAFs containing the corresponding HTML/JavaScript string as payload to perform
a membership request, The WAF analyzes the request, decides whether to allow/block
the payload, and communicates the decision back to SFADiff. SFADiff caches the
results of the membership queries in order to be reused in the future.
Equivalence queries. We perform equivalence queries in two ways: first, when-
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ever an equivalence query is sent either to the browser or to a WAF, we check that
the model complies to the answers of all membership queries made so far. This en-
sures that simple model errors will be corrected before we perform more expensive
operations such as cross-checking the two models against each other. Afterwards,
we proceed to collect candidate differences and verify them against the actual test
programs.
Initialization. We initialize the observation tables for both the browser and the
WAF using a small subset of filters that come bundled with PHPIDS and ModSecu-
rity, two open-source WAFs in our test set. However, in the case of the browser we
slightly modify the filters in order to execute our JavaScript function call if they are
successfully parsed by the browser.
Fingerprinting WAFs. In order to evaluate the efficiency of our fingerprint gen-
eration algorithm we selected 4 different WAFs. Furthermore, To demonstrate the
ability of our system to generate fine-grained fingerprints we also include 4 different
versions of PHPIDS in our test set. As an additional way to avoid blowup in the
fingerprint tree size we employ the following optimization: Whenever a fingerprint is
found for a pair of firewalls, we check whether this fingerprint is able to distinguish
any other firewalls in the set and thus further reduce the remaining possibilities. This
simple heuristic significantly reduces the size of the tree: Our basic algorithm creates
a full binary tree of height 8 while this heuristic reduced the size of the tree to just 4
levels.
Figure 10.4.3 presents the results of our experiment. The resulting fingerprinting
tree also provides hints on how restrictive each firewall is compared to the others.
An interesting observation is that we see the different versions of PHPIDS to be in-
creasingly restrictive in newer versions, by rejecting more of the generated fingerprint
strings. This is natural since newer versions are usually patching vulnerabilities in
the older filters. Finally, we would like to point out that some of the fingerprints are
also suggesting potential vulnerabilities in some filters. For example, the top level
string, union select from, is accepted by all versions of PHPIDS up to 0.6.5, while
being rejected by all other filters. This may raise suspicion since this string can be
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easily extended into a full SQL injection attack.
Evading WAFs through browser parser inference. For our last experiment we
considered the setting of evaluating the robustness of WAFs against evasion attacks.
Recall, that, in the context of XSS attacks, WAFs are attempting to reimplement
the parsing logic of a browser in order to detect inputs that will trigger JavaScript
execution. Thus, finding discrepancies between the browser parser and the WAF
parser allows us to effectively construct XSS attacks that will bypass the WAF. In
order to accomplish that, we used the setup described previously. However, instead
of cross-checking the WAFs against each other, we cross-checked WAFs against the
web browser in order to detect inputs which are successfully executing JavaScript in
the browser, however they are not considered malicious by the WAF.
Table 10.9 shows the result of a sample execution of our system in the setting of
detecting evasions. The execution time of our algorithm was about 6minutes, in which
53 states were discovered in the browser parser and 36 states in PHPIDS. Our system
converged fast into a vulnerability after improving the generated SFA models using
the cached membership queries. This optimization was very important in order to
correct invalid transitions generated by the learning algorithm in the inferred models.
The number of invalid attacks that were attempted was 4. Each failed attack led to
the refinement of the SFA models and the generation of new candidate differences.
At some point the vector “<p onclick=-a()></p>” was reported as a difference by
SFADiff.
We were able to detect the same vulnerability using all major browsers and fur-
thermore, the same problem was found to affect the continuation of PHPIDS, the
Expose WAF. Finally, we point out that our algorithm also found three more varia-
tions of the same attack vector, using the characters “!”, and “;”.
Evasion analysis. Figures 10-11 and 10-12 shows simplified models of the parser
implemented by the WAF and the browser respectively. These models contain a
minimal number of states in order to demonstrate the aforementioned evasion attack.
Notice that, intuitively, the cause for the vulnerability is the fact that from state qp1
the parser of PHPIDS will return to the initial state with any non alphanumeric input,
138
Figure 10-11: PHPIDS 0.7 parser (simplified version).
Figure 10-12: Google Chrome parser (simplified version).
while the Google Chrome parser has the choice to first transition to qc2 and then to
an accepting state qc3 using any alphanumeric character. For example, with an input
“=!a” the product automaton will reach the point of exposure (qp0, qc3). Furthermore,
using our root cause analysis, all different evasions we detected are grouped under a
single root cause. This is intuitively correct, since a patch, which adds the missing
state in the PHPIDS parser will address all evasion attacks at once.
10.4.4 Comparison with black-box fuzzing
To the best of our knowledge there is no publicly available black-box system which is
capable of performing black-box differential testing like SFADiff. A straightforward
approach would be to use a black-box fuzzer (e.g. the PEACH fuzzing platform [6])
and send each input generated by the fuzzer to both programs. Afterwards, the
outputs from both programs are compared to detect any differences. Note that, like
SFADiff, fuzzers also start with some initial inputs (seeds) which they mutate in
order to generate more inputs for the target program. We argue that our approach
is more effective in discovering differences for two reasons:
Adaptive input generation. Fuzzers incorporate a number of different strategies
in order to mutate previous inputs and generate new ones. For example, PEACH
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Figure 10-13: Fingerprint tree for different web application firewalls.
supports more than 20 different strategies for mutating an input. However, assuming
that a new input does not cause a difference, no further information is extracted from
it; the next inputs are unrelated to the previous ones. On the contrary, each input
submitted by SFADiff to the target program provides more information about the
structure of the program and its output determines the next input that will be tested.
For example, in the execution shown in table 10.9, SFADiff utilized the initialization
model and detected the additional state in Chrome’s parser (cf. figures 10-11, 10-12).
Notice that, the additional state in Chrome’s parser was not part of the model used
for initialization. This allowed SFADiff to quickly discover an evasion attack after
a few refinements in the generated models. Each refinement discarded a number of
candidate differences and drove the generation of new inputs based on the output of
previous ones.
Root cause analysis. In the presence of a large number of differences, black-
box fuzzers are unable to categorize the differences without some form of white-box
access to the program (e.g. crash dumps). On the other hand, as demonstrated in
the evasion analysis paragraph of section 10.4.3, our root cause analysis algorithm
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Attributes Browser Model WAF Model
Membership 6672 4241
Cached Membership 448 780
Equivalence 0 3
Cached Equivalence 40 106
Learned States 53 36
Cross-Check Times 4 4
Provided Browser Model (<(p|div|form|input) onclick=a()>)
(</(p|div|form|input)>)
Vulnerability Discovered <p onclick=;a()></p>
Execution Time 382.12 seconds
Table 10.9: A sample execution that found an evasion attack for PHPIDS 0.7 and
Google Chrome on MAC OSX.
provides a meaningful categorization of the differences based on the execution path




In this thesis we studied the idea of extracting formal models from programs using
novel automata and transducer learning algorithms with the goal of checking security
properties such as robustness against code injection attacks. In order to achieve this
goal, we have developed a number of novel learning algorithms, namely the MAT ⇤
algorithm for learning symbolic automata and new algorithms for learning partial and
non-deterministic functional transducers. In terms of applications we presented the
GOFA algorithm for evaluating the robustness of filters and sanitizers against code
injection attacks and differential automata learning and sfadiff a technique and tool
which can be used when the specification which is required by the GOFA algorithm
is either unavailable or imprecise. We evaluated our algorithms against state of the
art web application firewalls and found a large number of new attacks.
In terms of future work, we need to consider both short term as well as long term
goals: Short terms goals include finding more applications for our techniques as well
as extending our current learning algorithms into more expressive models to allow
us to check if more complicated filter and sanitizer routines. A concrete application
which requires more expressive models is path normalization functions which usually
require pushdown transducers in order to model effectively.
Finally, in terms of long term research goals, we believe that the problem of learn-
ing the proper abstractions will play a significant role in order to develop effective
program analysis systems. As we demonstrated in our evaluation it is common to find
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vulnerabilities were common heuristics such as code and basic block coverage will fail
to uncover the underlying problems and addressing the problems in the right abstrac-
tion layer (in our case using transducers) is of fundamental importance. Therefore,
we believe that developing systems which are capable of abstracting away irrelevant
information and reason about the parts of code which are relevant to the security
property to be checked is very important. Taking this concept further, we believe
that an important long term goal is to develop systems that can infer proper abstrac-
tions which can be used in order to reason about different systems. While this goal
seems out of reach using current technologies we believe that working towards this
direction may bring important new insights in the field of program analysis.
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